Introduction: Germany’s Postwar Soft Power Identity
Does “Zeitenwende” also imply that Germany shall rely more on hard power rather than soft power in the future? At the end of World War II, Germany made a deliberate and defining choice: it would not pursue hard power. Stripped of moral legitimacy and international credibility, the country embarked on a decades-long project of rebuilding its standing through entirely different means. It embraced the promotion of the international liberal order, the advancement of democracy, the liberalization of trade, the deepening of cultural understanding, and the use of economic linkages as tools of influence. Soft power became not merely a policy instrument but the very foundation of the German foreign policy identity.
Yet the world in which this strategy flourished is rapidly changing. The international liberal order is increasingly under threat. Germany’s own application of international law has shown notable inconsistencies. The transatlantic relationship, long the bedrock of Germany’s security calculus, is under question, with the United States’ commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) no longer taken for granted. The war in Ukraine has forced a reckoning with the naïve assumption that trade and dialogue could tame authoritarian ambitions. In this shifting landscape, Germany’s traditional reliance on soft power alone is no longer cutting it.
Germany serves as a textbook example of what scholars call normative or civilian power. Rather than defining influence through military capability or economic coercion, the nation’s postwar strategy was centered on communication, trustworthiness, and moral legitimacy. Its foreign policy placed a strong emphasis on global relationships, educational exchange, and cultural diplomacy. Humanitarianism, democratic values, and support for international cooperation became the hallmarks of what Germany projected to the world. Institutions such as the Goethe-Institut, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), the Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen (ifa), and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) were the semi-autonomous intermediaries through which Germany’s External Cultural Policy (ECP) was operationalized, all overseen by the Federal Foreign Office.
The Architecture of German Soft Power
Language is perhaps one of Germany’s most effective tools of attraction. The Goethe-Institut, present in over 100 countries, serves as a key conduit for intercultural understanding. It promotes German art, cinema, and literature while offering language courses that open pathways for higher education in Germany. As Joseph Nye reminds us, soft power depends not on command but on appeal. The desire to learn German often originates from admiration for its intellectual tradition, disciplinary rigor, and culture of innovation.
Nye, who formally introduced the concept to the academic literature, defined soft power as “cooptive power”, the ability to get “others to want what you want.”[i] It is also argued that soft power is a less costly way of exercising influence under conditions of globalization and interdependence, which have increased the costs of hard power confrontation. As Gallarotti argues, “In such an environment, strategies for optimizing national wealth and influence have shifted from force and coercion to cooperation.”[ii] The main distinction is that soft power employs appeal and persuasion rather than overt coercion, encouraging other governments to emulate the values and preferences of those who wield it. Scholars have since applied the concept beyond its original liberal context to study the foreign policies of a range of states, institutions, and organizations, while also extending the study of soft power resources into the 21st century’s framework of External Cultural Policy, encompassing the arts, education, science, and media diplomacy.[iii]
Germany’s political party foundations, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), Heinrich Böll Stiftung (HBS), and Friedrich Naumann Stiftung (FNS), extend political education and civic dialogue to countries across the globe. They host leadership programs, civil society workshops, and governance dialogues, functioning as transmission belts for democratic norms and pluralist political culture. Meanwhile, GIZ implements projects across the developing world in renewable energy, governance reform, and vocational training, providing concrete development outcomes that help to build goodwill and dependence on Germany as a partner.
A related concept, diaspora diplomacy, also plays a growing role in Germany’s soft power calculus. The country’s large immigrant communities, Turkish-Germans, Polish-Germans, and others, serve as informal ambassadors, strengthening ties through personal networks, civic engagement, and economic activity. The German brand, meanwhile, remains powerful in global markets: associated with superior quality, high-tech engineering, precision, and reliability. Particularly in the Middle East, the German brand has historically commanded significant respect, and even before the crisis triggered by 7th October, research showed that Germany was perceived more favorably in the region than the United States, with the European Union also benefiting from this halo effect.[iv]
Cracks in the Edifice: Where German Soft Power Is Faltering
Migration Policy and the Liberal Image
One of the defining moments of Angela Merkel’s chancellorship was the decision to welcome over a million Syrian refugees in 2015, a choice that was celebrated internationally as a demonstration of Germany’s humanitarian values.[v] Germany positioned itself as the liberal bastion of Europe at a time when other nations were closing their borders. Yet that image has eroded considerably. Faced with a domestic political backlash against migration, successive German governments have moved toward restriction and deterrence. Most recently, the current German government has signaled that Syrian refugees should return to their home country, even as their labor is simultaneously in demand in a tight domestic market.[vi] This tension between pragmatic domestic politics and Germany’s self-projected image as a humanist, open society undermines the very coherence that soft power requires. Credibility, after all, depends on consistency.
The Environmental Agenda Under Pressure
Germany has long styled itself as a global leader on environmental sustainability, a position that reflects genuine domestic political consensus and substantial policy investment. The Energiewende, Germany’s energy transition, was once a global model. German engagement on climate change in multilateral forums was consistent and high-profile. However, the environmental agenda is finding increasingly thin traction in the Global South, where other pressing concerns—economic development, food security, debt, and the cascading effects of armed conflict—take precedence.[vii] For many developing countries, the urgency of the green transition rings hollow when it is delivered by wealthy nations whose historical emissions caused the climate crisis in the first place. Germany’s credibility as an environmental leader in the Global South is further complicated by its own domestic backsliding.
The Middle East: A Reputational Inflection Point
Perhaps nowhere has the strain on German soft power been more acute than in the Middle East. Germany’s response to the conflict in Gaza, and its continuation of weapons exports to Israel even as civilian casualties mounted, generated fierce criticism internationally and was perceived by many governments in the Arab and Muslim world as a fundamental double standard.[viii] The charge is one of hypocrisy: a country that presents itself as a guardian of human rights and international law appeared to many to be selectively applying those principles based on political allegiance.
Germany has justified its position through the doctrine of Staatsraison, a concept of historical responsibility to the state of Israel born from the legacy of the Holocaust, which it has treated as a near-unconditional commitment.[ix] While this position is internally consistent within the German moral-historical framework, it is poorly understood and deeply unpopular across much of the Global South, and particularly in Muslim-majority societies. The damage to Germany’s soft power standing in the Middle East has been severe and may take years to repair.
At the same time, Germany appears to be recalibrating its regional relationships. Increased diplomatic activity with Gulf states such as the United Arab Emirates suggests a pragmatic pivot, prioritizing economic and security interests over the promotion of democratic values.[x] This shift toward Realpolitik has real consequences for Germany’s normative soft power: if Germany is willing to deepen ties with states in the Gulf, it can hardly simultaneously credibly champion liberal democracy in the same region.
The China Challenge: Economic Anxiety and Strategic Ambiguity
The rise of China presents Germany with what may be its most complex strategic dilemma. China is not merely a geopolitical rival to the West; it is actively offering an alternative model to the Global South, one that promises south-south cooperation, non-interference in domestic affairs, and development finance without the political conditionalities that Western donors often attach. For many developing nations, particularly those governed by non-democratic regimes, the Chinese model holds considerable appeal precisely because it does not demand democratic reform as a condition of engagement.[xi] In this sense, the rise of China does not merely challenge the Western-led global liberal order; it poses an existential question about the future of democratic norms in the Global South.
Domestically in Germany, the rise of China has produced significant anxiety among both publics and business leaders.[xii] The concern is no longer merely about cheap manufacturing competition; China is rapidly ascending the value chain, developing high-quality industrial goods that directly threaten Germany’s traditional niche in precision engineering and high-tech manufacturing. Automobile technology offers the starkest example: Chinese electric vehicle manufacturers have moved with extraordinary speed, and Germany’s automotive giants have struggled to match the pace of innovation.
Germany’s policy response has been uncertain and internally contested. On the security side, Germany has aligned with Western partners in restricting Chinese technology from sensitive infrastructure, a significant departure from its earlier posture of economic openness. Chinese students now face increased scrutiny when seeking access to research in fields deemed sensitive to national security. Yet a coherent, comprehensive China strategy has proven elusive, particularly given the deep economic interdependency that German industry has built with China over decades, and the added complexity of a declining transatlantic partnership under President Trump that leaves Germany without a reliable Western anchor. In a future where the global trade regime is increasingly shaped by great-power competition, Germany may eventually be forced to make partner choices that its soft power identity was specifically designed to avoid.
The Collapse of Western Development Aid and the Soft Power Vacuum
It is impossible to disregard the broader context of American retrenchment from soft power. The Trump administration’s decision to roll back USAID, shutter the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), defund the Wilson Center, and slash contributions to international organizations has dramatically changed the Western soft power landscape.[xiii] USAID was originally established by John F. Kennedy to “maintain a position of influence and control around the world” during the Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union; for decades, it was the largest foreign assistance donor in the world. Its effective dismantlement is not merely an American story; it places enormous pressure on Europe, and on Germany as the second-largest Western donor, to fill the vacuum at precisely the moment when development budgets across Europe are also being squeezed.
Germany’s own development budget has not been immune to austerity pressures. According to Niels Keijzer, an expert on European development policy at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), the cuts significantly harm German efforts to build influence in the Global South. He pointed to the coalition’s planned prestige projects, such as the creation of an international ‘North-South commission’ to boost cooperation with developing nations, as no longer credible without the prospect of significant international investment to back them up.[xiv]
Research from the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) underscores the strategic cost of this retreat. Development assistance, the IfW argues, has always generated political and economic returns for donor nations. Recipient governments often express their appreciation through political alignment and commercial preference. As the then German Development Minister Dirk Niebel stated as far back as 2013: “With every euro spent on development cooperation two euros will flow back to us in the long term.”[xv] A reduction in development engagement, by this logic, is not merely a humanitarian loss; it is a geostrategic setback, producing fewer commercial opportunities and diminished influence.
The geopolitical consequences of Western disengagement from development aid are already materializing. Across Africa, Latin America, and Asia, China and Russia are trying to fill the space vacated by Western donors. There has been speculation in Germany about whether the United States’ de facto exit from the development field could allow Germany to assume a ‘leading role’ as the largest remaining Western contributor, a position that would carry both influence and responsibility. But given the pressures on Germany’s domestic economy and the political climate that has produced spending cuts rather than increases, such an ambition appears aspirational at best. The transatlantic powers will need to find creative ways to reclaim influence in the Global South if they wish to prevent its wholesale drift toward China and Russia, and there is, at present, little sign of a coherent strategy for doing so.
Measuring the Decline: The 2026 Global Soft Power Index
The deterioration in Germany’s soft power position is not merely anecdotal; it is quantifiable. Germany is ranked fifth in the 2026 Global Soft Power Index, having lost 2.4 points to register a score of 67.7.[xvi] The declines are revealing in their specificity. Perceptions of a robust and stable economy fell by 0.7 points, leadership in science by 0.8, and technological competitiveness by 0.6. These figures suggest that Germany’s economic slowdown and its comparatively modest role in the global artificial intelligence race are tangibly damaging its international standing. The data confirm that in the 21st century, technological leadership has become inseparable from soft power.
Perceptions of government leadership fell by 0.6 points, and diplomatic influence by 0.7. This indicates a transitional moment: Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who took office in the middle of the index year, has not yet established the international stature once associated with Angela Merkel’s 16 years of leadership. Merkel’s long tenure gave Germany a recognizable and trusted face in international diplomacy, a form of leadership soft power that is not easily or quickly replaced. The question now is whether Merz can craft a foreign policy vision that is both adapted to the new realities of great-power competition and capable of projecting the normative values that defined German diplomacy for decades.
Germany at the Crossroads: Can Soft Power Survive Zeitenwende?
The central question confronting German foreign policy is whether soft power diplomacy can survive and remain relevant in a world that looks increasingly unlike the one for which it was designed. The postwar liberal international order, within which German soft power flourished, was a specific historical construction, underwritten by American power, sustained by shared Western values, and premised on the proposition that engagement, trade, and multilateralism could gradually pacify and liberalize global politics. That architecture is under serious stress.
Germany’s soft power instruments have not become obsolete, but they must evolve to remain relevant. The DAAD, Goethe-Institut, the political foundations, and development agencies such as GIZ remain valuable assets, but they require sustained political and financial commitment, and they must operate within a broader foreign policy framework that is internally consistent.
Germany’s foreign policy must also become more receptive to the concerns and priorities of the Global South in a more transactional international environment. This means engaging seriously on trade terms, debt restructuring, technology transfer, and security, not merely on democratic governance and environmental standards, which can appear to Global South partners as conditions that serve Western interests. Even in the absence of American leadership, Germany can collaborate with multilateral institutions and Global South nations to strengthen the architecture of international cooperation, positioning Europe as a credible alternative pole in a multipolar world.
Conclusion: Reinventing Soft Power for a Harder World
German soft power is not dead. But it is in distress. The forces bearing down upon it are multiple, simultaneous, and structurally significant: the erosion of the liberal international order, American retrenchment from multilateralism, the rise of China as an ideological and economic competitor, the fallout from Germany’s Middle East policy, domestic political pressures that have pulled immigration and development spending in directions inconsistent with Germany’s projected values, and a declining economy that is quietly undermining the prestige of the German brand. Each of these challenges is individually manageable; together, they constitute a paradigm shift that demands a fundamental rethinking.
Zeitenwende, the epochal turning point declared by Chancellor Olaf Scholz in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, was initially understood primarily in military terms: a recognition that Germany needed to invest seriously in hard power. That conversation must continue. But Zeitenwende must also prompt a parallel reckoning with soft power: not its abandonment, but its renewal. Germany needs a soft power strategy fit for a harder world, one that is more transparent about its strategic interests, more attentive to the perspectives of Global South partners, more consistent in the application of its stated values, and more innovative in the tools it deploys.
The German brand still carries weight. The DAAD still opens doors. German development expertise still commands respect. German universities still attract global talent. These assets are real and should not be squandered. But they must be supported by a political class willing to resource soft power instruments adequately and to make the hard choices that credible soft power requires: principled consistency even when inconvenient, genuine engagement with the Global South as partners rather than targets of influence, and a frank acknowledgment that Germany’s interests and values do not always perfectly align, and that navigating that tension honestly is itself a form of diplomatic integrity.
Soft power has never been cost-free. Wielding it effectively requires investment, coherence, and the willingness to be held to one’s stated principles. For Germany, a country whose international identity was painstakingly constructed on the ruins of moral catastrophe, abandoning that identity would be more than a foreign policy miscalculation; it would be a failure of historical responsibility. The beginning of the end of German soft power need not be inevitable. But averting it will require more than inertia. It will require a conscious, courageous, and comprehensive recalibration.
[i] Joseph S. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 94–109.
[ii] Giulio M. Gallarotti, “Soft Power: What It Is, Why It’s Important, and the Conditions for Its Effective Use,” Journal of Political Power 4, no. 1 (2011): 25–47, https://doi.org/10.1080/2158379X.2011.557886.
[iii] Giulio M. Gallarotti and Mathilde Chatin, “The BRICS and Soft Power: An Introduction,” Journal of Political Power 9, no. 3 (2016).
[iv] Mujtaba Isani and Bernd Schlipphak. “Attitudes Towards the European Union in the MENA Region: The Case of Saudi Arabia,” European Foreign Affairs Review 27, no. 1 (2022).
[v] Philip Oltermann, “How Angela Merkel’s great migrant gamble paid off,” The Guardian, August 30, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/30/angela-merkel-great-migrant-gamble-paid-off.
[vi] “Most Syrian refugees in Germany expected to return home in three years, Merz says,” BBC, March 31, 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy41vqx4pdzo.
[vii] “A Changing World: Germany and the Global South,” Global Perspectives, https://globalperspectives.org/en/a-changing-world-germany-and-the-global-south/. Accessed March 1, 2026.
[viii] Thomas O. Falk, Is Germany’s Postwar Consensus on Israel in Peril?,” Foreign Policy, April 2, 2026, https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/04/02/germany-israel-postwar-consensus/.
[ix] Antje Wiener, “Staatsräson: Empty Signifier or Meaningful Norm?,” Verfassungsblog, January 12, 2024, https://verfassungsblog.de/staatsrson-empty-signifier-or-meaningful-norm/.
[x] United Arab Emirates, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “UAE Deepens Strategic Partnership with Germany in Science, Research and Emerging Technologies,” June 18, 2026, https://www.mofa.gov.ae/en/mediahub/news/2025/6/18/18-6-2025-uae-germany.
[xi] Philipp Vogt and Felix Berenskötter, “Global South and German Foreign Policy under the Next Government,” GIGA Focus, https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/giga-focus/global-south-and-german-foreign-policy-under-next-government. Accessed March 1, 2026.
[xii] Tim Rühlig and Richard Q. Turcsányi, Skeptical and Concerned – How Germans View China, DGAP, October 24, 2023, https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/skeptical-and-concerned-how-germans-view-china.
[xiii] Alex Gangitano, “Trump rolls back CFPB, USAID and Department of Education: Where things stand,” The Hill, February 2, 2025, https://thehill.com/homenews/5146125-trump-rolls-back-cfpb-usaid-and-doe-where-things-stand/.
[xiv]Nick Alipour, “Germany Puts Development Budget (and Western Soft Power) on the Chopping Block,” Euractiv, https://www.euractiv.com/news/germany-puts-development-budget-and-western-soft-power-on-the-chopping-block/. Accessed March 2, 2026.
[xv] “Soft Power Curtailed,” German-Foreign-Policy.com, https://www.german-foreign-policy.com/en/news/detail/10041. Accessed March 3, 2026.
[xvi] “Global Soft Power Index 2026: Executive Summary,” Brand Finance, https://brandfinance.com/insights/global-soft-power-index-2026-executive-summary. Accessed March 3, 2026.
