In the past, Gulf security was viewed merely as an issue of the Middle East, marked by regional tensions, competition between superpowers for oil and a significant U.S. military presence. That interpretation is no longer sufficient to describe the situation today. With the growth of Asian countries, their economies have become more intertwined with the global energy markets, and dependence on Gulf oil and gas has increased dramatically. The energy security of China, India, Japan and South Korea is directly dependent on Gulf developments, which means that Gulf stability is a concern for the whole Indo-Pacific region and not just an issue of the area itself.
Asian economic growth has driven energy demands far more rapidly than domestic production could accommodate. Gulf states have filled the gap, with the Strait of Hormuz being the main route for energy deliveries to Asia. Therefore, any serious disruption in the Gulf will affect energy delivery, shipping routes and supply chains throughout Asia. The consequences of instability in the Gulf are no longer confined to the Middle East.
This insight suggests that the growing dependence of Asian countries on Gulf energy has made Gulf security a matter of strategic importance for the wider Indo-Pacific area, even though some scholars believe that the transition toward renewable energy and changes in supply chains will result in a decrease in dependence on Gulf energy. The paper is structured in three sections: the first section explains why Asia is dependent on Gulf stability; the second section discusses the impact of Gulf instability on the economies and security of countries of the Indo-Pacific region; and the third section explains how Asian states cope with that issue with the involvement of the UAE.
Why Asia Depends on Gulf Stability
Over the last two decades, Asia has gradually become more reliant on Gulf energy. As countries, including China, India, Japan, and South Korea, accelerated their industrialization, the growing demand for oil and gas surpassed what the region could supply internally and import from other regions. The Gulf has been able to supply the vast quantities of fuel required by these countries. Consequently, Asia’s dependency on the Gulf has evolved to the extent that it has now become a key part of all aspects of energy being delivered to the countries, including refining processes, long-term contracts and national energy policies.[1]
The statistics show how significant the situation truly is. In accordance with the U.S. Energy Information Administration, approximately 20 million barrels of oil and petroleum products crossed the Strait of Hormuz each day in the year 2024, which means that the Strait accounts for about 20% of oil consumption around the world and more than 25% of oil that travels by sea.[2] Of this amount, 84% of crude oil and 83% of LNG supplies were destined for the Asian market. China, India, Japan and South Korea accounted for 69% of the total flow of crude oil through the Strait of Hormuz, with 37.7% of crude oil going to China, 14.7% to India, 12% to South Korea and 10.9% to Japan.[3] By comparison, the United States sourced just 2.5% of Hormuz flows in 2024, largely because of its domestic shale production and more diversified supply options. Asia has no comparable buffer.
These figures have real strategic implications. Japan gets the equivalent of 77% of its total domestic oil consumption from the Middle East, and South Korea and Taiwan are similarly reliant.[4] China imports about 74% of its oil, with roughly 54% coming from the Middle East. For India, nearly half of all crude imports and around 60% of natural gas supplies travel through the Strait of Hormuz.[5] In all these cases, switching to alternative suppliers is not straightforward. Refineries are built to process Gulf-grade crude, supply contracts are tied to Gulf producers, and no other region can quickly make up the shortfall if Hormuz were disrupted for an extended period.
It is noteworthy that this situation is slowly changing. China has been importing more oil overland from Russia and Central Asia, and has been scaling up renewable energy at home. Japan’s latest energy plan targets up to 50% renewable electricity by 2040. Some researchers, including Michael Klare, have argued that the global shift toward clean energy will gradually reduce the power that oil-producing regions hold over importing countries. That may be true in the long run, but within the next decade, the picture looks different. Japan and South Korea will still need large amounts of LNG through 2040, India’s oil demand is expected to keep growing into the 2030s, and the existing refining and supply infrastructure across Asia means Gulf dependence is not going away any time soon.
The Strait of Hormuz makes all of this more fragile because it is the only major route available. The strait is around 21 nautical miles wide at its narrowest point, with two-mile shipping lanes running in each direction. Saudi Arabia and the UAE do have pipelines that can bypass the strait, but together they can only move roughly 3.5 to 5.5 million barrels per day, which is less than a quarter of normal Hormuz traffic.[6] Five other major oil producers, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Iran, have no bypass option at all. That means around 14 million barrels per day have no alternative route. If the Strait of Hormuz were closed, there is no realistic way to reroute that volume.
How Gulf Instability Affects the Indo-Pacific
The consequences of Gulf instability on the Indo-Pacific region cannot be regarded as a mere theoretical concept. Recent developments have shown that the Gulf instability can have an immediate and real impact on Asian economies. Indeed, after militia attacks conducted by Houthi forces on shipping in the Red Sea in late 2023, the number of ships reaching the Gulf of Aden decreased by 70% compared to the previous year by April 2025, and shipping companies had to change their routes from the Suez Canal to the Cape of Good Hope, adding about 10 days to their time in transit between Asia and Europe.[7] By early 2026, a more critical scenario arose, as rising military strains involving Iran made it almost impossible for any shipping activity in the Strait of Hormuz. On 7 March 2026, just one commercial vessel managed to go through the strait, as opposed to 138 on average each day. At the same time, oil prices, which were at $71 per barrel on 27 February, reached $94 as of 9 March and continued to rise.
Energy prices will be impacted straight away. Countries such as Japan, South Korea, and India, which import oil at the world market price, have little influence on global oil market prices; hence, even a temporary blockage at Hormuz will lead to a surge in production costs, widening trade deficits and heightening inflation. According to JP Morgan, a prolonged blockade would see oil prices rise to $130 per barrel, as in the crisis of 2007-08, while Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister estimated them at $200-300 due to the long-term halting of oil deliveries through this route.[8] In nations that pay a lot for their energy imports, this sort of price rise can put a tremendous strain on their state budgets and sometimes lead to currency depreciation.
The disturbance is not limited to the rise in oil costs; to make things worse, the Gulf contributes one-third of the global supply of fertilizers and produces a massive volume of petrochemicals, monoethylene glycol (MEG), among other things, as well as aluminum and direct-reduced iron.[9] Any significant interruption to exports from the Gulf would impact agriculture, construction, manufacturing, and consumer goods sectors, many of which are heavily centered in Asia. Roland Berger points out that supply chain issues in the Gulf have the potential to ripple through industries and regions, including nations that do not rely on imports through Hormuz. According to UNCTAD, global trade growth was expected to slow from around 4.7% in 2025 to between 1.5 and 2.5% in 2026, partly because of disruptions to energy corridors, and Asian export-oriented economies would feel that slowdown most.
There are long-term strategic implications in addition to the immediate economic effects. Due to Asian economies being highly reliant on Gulf energy and trade flows, governments across the Indo-Pacific have had to reconsider their security policies, considering Gulf instability. Countries such as China, India, Japan, and South Korea have responded in several ways, such as increasing oil reserves, establishing bilateral energy agreements, and increasing naval presence in the region. Governments in Tokyo and New Delhi are now taking closures of the Hormuz strait into account when planning their strategies, indicating that Gulf security is increasingly being integrated into the strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific.
Another issue that arises is how much Asian nations depend on U.S. support in ensuring their navigation in the region. For a long time, the U.S. Fifth Fleet based in Bahrain ensured free navigation through the Hormuz strait and Asian governments did not pay much attention to oil and gas security issues in the Gulf region. However, with the growth of U.S. oil production, the direct U.S. interest in protecting energy supplies from the Gulf has decreased.
Indo-Pacific Responses to Gulf Dependence
Asian economies are structurally dependent on Gulf energy flows, and Gulf instability creates direct economic and strategic consequences across the Indo-Pacific. What follows examines how that dependence has translated into policy: how China, India, Japan, and South Korea have each adapted their national strategies to account for a Gulf whose stability they cannot guarantee but whose disruption they cannot afford.
China: Hedging, Stockpiling, and the Limits of Diversification
China’s response to its Gulf energy vulnerability has been layered and deliberate. In 2025, roughly 15 million barrels per day of crude oil passed through the Strait of Hormuz, accounting for around 34% of global seaborne crude trade, with the vast majority destined for Asian markets.[10] China and India combined received approximately 44% of those Hormuz crude exports, according to the International Energy Agency, making the Strait the single most consequential chokepoint for Chinese energy security.[11]
Beijing has pursued three broad responses to this vulnerability. The first is stockpiling: by March 2026, China held an estimated 1.39 billion barrels of oil in strategic and commercial storage, enough to cover approximately 120 days of net crude oil imports at 2025 consumption levels.[12] The second is supply diversification: in 2025, the proportion of crude oil imported from the Middle East dropped to approximately 42%, a decrease of 10 percentage points compared with a decade ago, with China now sourcing oil from 49 countries.[13] Overland pipeline corridors through Russia, Central Asia, and Myanmar provide meaningful alternative volume, with the proportion of overland oil transportation reaching 38% of China’s total crude supply by 2025.[14] The third is domestic decarbonisation: electric vehicles accounted for over 50% of new car sales in China in 2025, reducing marginal oil demand in the transport sector.[15]
Yet none of these buffers eliminates China’s structural Hormuz exposure. Crude flows linked to the Strait still account for roughly one-third of China’s total crude supply, and its LNG dependence is more acute still; nearly one-third of China’s LNG imports transit the Strait, primarily from Qatar and the UAE.[16] When Hormuz disruptions escalated in early 2026, crude oil prices rose over 70 percent and Asian LNG prices by 54 percent within seven weeks—costs that stockpiles could absorb temporarily but not indefinitely.[17]
On the naval front, China has moved to normalize its presence in the waters connecting the Gulf to the Chinese coast. The China-Iran-Russia Security Belt exercise series, initiated in 2019, has grown in frequency and complexity: the 2025 iteration, the seventh, was described by the U.S. government as having expanded from counter-piracy drills to include ‘simulated strikes and naval manoeuvres.’[18] China has also invested heavily in Gulf infrastructure through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): the Griffith Asia Institute’s China BRI Investment Report 2024 confirmed that the Middle East received $39 billion in BRI investment that year, a 102% increase from 2023 and the largest of any region globally, with the UAE securing $3.1 billion of that total.[19]
China’s Gulf infrastructure push reflects what’s identified as a deliberate pattern of “civil-military fusion”, using commercial port investments, technology contracts, and data systems to build strategic footholds that can later acquire military utility.[20]
India: Reframing the Gulf as an Extended Strategic Neighborhood
Of all the Indo-Pacific powers, India’s strategic reorientation toward the Gulf has been the most geographically and strategically significant. 95% of India’s trade by volume and 68% by value transits through the Indian Ocean, and the sea lanes connecting the Strait of Hormuz to the Malacca Strait pass directly through what India’s Ensuring Secure Seas maritime doctrine designates as its primary area of maritime interest.[21]
India’s response has been one of active forward deployment rather than passive dependence. Under Operation Sankalp, re-initiated in December 2023 in response to Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping, 5,000 personnel and 21 warships were deployed across the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea in the first hundred days alone.[22] India’s Navy chief confirmed that the operation responded to 18 incidents in the Gulf of Aden and adjoining areas, escorted over 450 merchant vessels, and conducted more than 1,000 boarding operations at sea.[23] The Tribune India reported that at least four deployed warships were armed with BrahMos missiles and anti-submarine warfare helicopters, reflecting a qualitative upgrade from earlier deployments.[24]
India has also formalized access to strategically located ports in Oman, including Duqm, obtained since 2018, which enable forward-deployed naval units to sustain upkeep without returning to domestic shipyards.[25] India has participated in bilateral exercises with all six GCC states, including a trilateral India-UAE-France exercise in the Gulf of Oman in 2023, adding a minilateral dimension that signals convergence between Indo-Pacific and Gulf security frameworks.[26] The Indian Navy formally joined the U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces in November 2023 and, in April 2024, participated in a counter-narcotics mission, seizing 940 kilograms of illicit drugs in the Arabian Sea, a shift toward operational rather than observational engagement.[27]
In addition, India has moved to institutionalize its energy security arrangements with Gulf partners as instruments of national security. During Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s May 2026 visit to the UAE, India and the UAE agreed to explore storing up to 30 million barrels of ADNOC crude oil as Indian strategic petroleum reserves at Fujairah, outside the Strait of Hormuz, complementing the existing arrangement under which ADNOC is the only foreign entity permitted to store crude oil in India’s underground strategic reserve system.[28] A $3 billion LNG supply deal between ADNOC Gas and Hindustan Petroleum provided long-term supply certainty.[29] In parallel, India launched the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), announced at the 2023 G20 Summit, which physically integrates India’s economic connectivity with Gulf stability through a multimodal rail and shipping route linking Indian ports through the UAE and Saudi Arabia to Europe.[30]
Japan and South Korea: Institutionalizing Energy Security
Japan and South Korea face the most acute structural exposure to Gulf disruption among the major Indo-Pacific economies. Japan sourced more than 95% of its crude oil feedstock from Middle Eastern suppliers as of mid-2025, a dependence deepened by the closure of its nuclear fleet following the 2011 Fukushima disaster.[31] The Middle East accounted for approximately 94% of Japan’s crude oil imports in 2025, while 69% of South Korea’s crude imports were sourced from the Arabian Gulf in the same year, according to the Ministry of Economy, Trade & Industry (METI) and the Korean National Oil Corp (KNOC) data.[32]
Both governments have built substantial strategic petroleum reserves: Japan reported approximately 254 days of crude supply as of the end of 2025, South Korea approximately 210 days.[33] However, analysts have consistently noted that stockpiles address volume shortfalls, not price shocks. When Hormuz disruptions escalated in early 2026, crude oil prices rose more than 70% within seven weeks, imposing costs on Japanese and Korean consumers and industries regardless of domestic reserve levels.[34] ORF Middle East’s analysis of Japan’s energy exposure noted the country has ‘no comparable buffer mechanism’ for LNG, which, unlike crude oil, cannot be held in long-term strategic reserves once regasified.[35]
The most significant institutional development was the bilateral summit held in Andong, South Korea, on 19 May 2026, at which Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi and South Korean President Lee Jae Myung agreed to deepen energy cooperation across crude oil, petroleum products, and LNG.[36] The agreement includes ‘mutual swap arrangements for crude oil, petroleum products and liquefied natural gas,’ while the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) published a joint press release outlining two cooperation pillars: securing strategic oil reserves for the Indo-Pacific region and mutually providing petroleum products and LNG from stockpiles in emergencies.[37] Japan separately announced a Tokyo-led framework providing $10 billion in financial support to help other Asian countries secure crude oil supplies, signaling that the two countries view their energy security challenge as regional rather than purely bilateral.[38] Both countries also set records for U.S. crude procurement in early 2026, with South Korea, Asia’s largest buyer of American crude, reaching a quarterly import record in the first quarter of 2026.[39]
Across these four cases, a consistent pattern emerges. Asian powers are no longer passively dependent on Gulf energy or on American security guarantees to protect those flows. China has built strategic buffers and extended its naval presence. India has deployed warships, secured port access, and formalized energy storage arrangements in the Gulf. Japan and South Korea have institutionalized bilateral energy cooperation and begun structural diversification programs.
The UAE as a Strategic Connector
As Gulf security has internationalized and Asian powers have deepened their stakes in regional stability, the UAE has emerged as the actor uniquely positioned to benefit from this convergence. Through a deliberate combination of physical geography, logistics infrastructure, trade agreements, and diplomatic flexibility, Abu Dhabi has transformed itself from a regional commercial hub into a bridge between Gulf security and Indo-Pacific prosperity, a connector whose strategic value grows in direct proportion to Asian dependence on Gulf stability.
Geography as Strategic Asset: Fujairah and the Hormuz Bypass
The foundation of the UAE’s connector role is geographic. The emirate of Fujairah sits on the Gulf of Oman rather than the Gulf, placing it outside the Strait of Hormuz. Oil and LNG exports routed through Fujairah bypass the Strait entirely, providing Asian importers with a route insulated from the scenarios that most concern their energy security planners.
The IEA has estimated that Saudi Arabia and the UAE together possess between 3.5 and 5.5 million barrels per day of capacity to export crude on alternative routes that avoid the Strait of Hormuz via Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline to the Red Sea and via the UAE’s Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline to Fujairah.[40] In a scenario where the Strait is closed or severely disrupted, this bypass capacity is among the most strategically valuable physical infrastructure in the global energy system.
This bypass capacity is set to expand significantly. In May 2026, ADNOC CEO Sultan Al Jaber confirmed that a new West-East pipeline is nearly 50 percent complete and targeted for 2027 completion, at which point it will double ADNOC’s export capacity through Fujairah. The Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi personally directed ADNOC to fast-track the project. ADNOC CEO Al Jaber was explicit about the strategic rationale: “Too much of the world’s energy still moves through too few choke points; that is exactly why the UAE made the decision more than a decade ago to invest in infrastructure that bypasses the Strait of Hormuz.” The UAE’s Hormuz bypass is not a legacy asset being passively maintained; it is being actively expanded.[41]
CEPAs: Institutionalizing the Connector Role
The UAE’s most important instrument and used as a tool for economic diplomacy is the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) program. Launched with the India CEPA in February 2022, the initiative has expanded to encompass 27 concluded agreements by mid-2025, with at least seven more completing negotiations.[42] The geographic range of this network across the Indo-Pacific is striking: agreements are in force with India, Indonesia, Cambodia, and South Korea, while deals with Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Australia are in advanced stages.
The India-UAE CEPA is the flagship. Bilateral non-oil trade surged following its entry into force in May 2022, and by FY2024–25, total bilateral trade had crossed $100 billion, with both governments setting a new target of $200 billion by 2032.[43] This target signals ‘a commitment to creating a corridor in the Global South that bypasses traditional Western trade dependencies.’[44] The relationship has evolved well beyond hydrocarbons: it now encompasses fintech integration (UPI-AANI and RuPay-JAYWAN payment linkages), the IMEC corridor, a Strategic Defense Partnership signed in May 2026, and a $1 billion ADIA commitment to India’s National Infrastructure and Investment Fund.[45]
Across Southeast Asia, the CEPA network is opening similar channels. The Vietnam-UAE CEPA, signed in October 2024, was described by The Diplomat as signaling ‘both nations’ intent to deepen their partnerships beyond traditional alliances,’ with the UAE gaining a foothold in one of Southeast Asia’s fastest-growing economies.[46] The UAE-Indonesia CEPA covers energy, petrochemicals, ports, logistics, and tourism, with Emirati investment in Indonesia’s infrastructure already exceeding $3 billion.[47] The UAE-South Korea CEPA explicitly targets technology, energy, and healthcare, with non-oil bilateral trade rising 21% in the first half of 2023 alone.[48] Meanwhile, UAE foreign trade reached AED 3 trillion at the end of 2024, growing at 14.6%, seven times the global average, suggesting the CEPA program is generating material economic results alongside its strategic objectives.[49]
Multi-Alignment Diplomacy
Supporting the UAE’s connector role is a foreign policy of deliberate multi-alignment: the maintenance of deep economic and security relationships across competing great powers simultaneously, without formal alignment with any single bloc. This is the structural condition that makes the UAE valuable as a connector.
When it comes to the UAE, multi-alignment is visible across multiple dimensions. Abu Dhabi has deepened economic and technology ties with a wide range of partners, from infrastructure cooperation under BRI frameworks to the Strategic Defense Partnership signed with India in May 2026 and participation in the I2U2 grouping linking India, Israel, the UAE, and the United States. Gulf states, including the UAE, increasingly view maritime infrastructure as a soft power asset that fosters connections across the international system, consolidating their security while expanding their global influence.[50]
The UAE’s April 2026 decision to chart an independent course outside OPEC reflects its growing confidence in managing energy partnerships directly, a posture that has strengthened its bilateral relationships with Asian importers and reinforced its role as an independent energy actor.[51] ADNOC has simultaneously deepened ties with Asian national oil companies and maintained the Fujairah bypass infrastructure that gives Asian buyers an alternative to Hormuz-dependent routing. This positions the UAE not merely as a passive supplier but as an active architect of the energy security arrangements that Asian economies depend upon.
In short, the UAE is leveraging the internationalization of Gulf security to become indispensable to the Indo-Pacific strategic order. Its geography reduces chokepoint risk for Asian importers; its logistics infrastructure integrates Gulf supply chains with Indo-Pacific demand; its CEPA program institutionalizes commercial relationships at precisely the moment Asian governments seek flexible, reliable partners; and its multi-alignment diplomacy ensures it remains embedded in every major power’s network. The result is a connector role that is simultaneously economic, logistical, and strategic and one whose value grows precisely because Asian dependence on Gulf stability is deepening faster than any single power can manage alone.
Conclusion
Security in the Gulf is no longer a Middle Eastern issue. It’s an Indo-Pacific one.
This is evident from the numbers. 84% of the oil and eighty-three percent of the LNG that crossed the Strait of Hormuz in 2024 went east to Asian markets. Three-quarters of that oil flow comes from just China, India, Japan, and South Korea. Early in 2026, a near-full Hormuz closure caused crude prices to soar 70% in just seven weeks. The economic shockwave was felt in Chinese refineries, Indian power plants, and Korean factory floors rather than in Tehran or Riyadh. Asia is aware that the Strait of Hormuz serves as its economic lifeline.
Not only has the dependence evolved, but so has the reaction to it. Asian nations are no longer satisfied with Washington handling Gulf security. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China has invested $39 billion in Gulf infrastructure and sends naval ships to the Gulf of Oman every year. Under Operation Sankalp, India dispatched 21 warships to the Arabian Sea and is keeping vital oil stockpiles at Fujairah, which is completely outside the Strait. At their May 2026 meeting, South Korea and Japan, who are most vulnerable of all, formalized their energy security cooperation for the first time, creating mutual supply agreements for LNG and crude oil in the case of a disruption in the Middle East. All of these answers point to the same conclusion: Gulf stability has been and will remain a factor in the national security calculations of Asia’s major nations.
The UAE is in the best position to take advantage of this strategic opening that this change presents. Fujairah’s location outside the Strait, DP World’s logistics network spanning 40 countries, a CEPA trade agreement program that currently covers much of the Indo-Pacific, and a diplomatic posture trusted by Washington, Beijing, and New Delhi all combine to give Abu Dhabi advantages that no competitor can easily match. The UAE is more than just a Gulf nation with connections to Asia. It is presenting itself as the link between two strategically important areas that have traditionally been viewed as distinct.
The Gulf and the Indo-Pacific are no longer distinct strategic spaces. Energy flows, maritime routes, and the security responses they have generated have quietly stitched them into a single system. The UAE has recognized this and is building accordingly. The question is whether the rest of the international community will do the same.
[1] International Energy Agency, “World Energy Outlook 2024,” IEA, October 2024, https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2024.
[2] U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Amid Regional Conflict, the Strait of Hormuz Remains Critical Oil Chokepoint,” Today in Energy, June 2025, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=65504.
[3] “Charted: Oil Trade Through the Strait of Hormuz by Country,” Visual Capitalist, March 3, 2026, https://www.visualcapitalist.com/charted-oil-trade-through-the-strait-of-hormuz-by-country/; EIA analysis based on Vortexa tanker tracking data.
[4] IEA World Energy Statistics, 2024; “Charted: Oil Trade Through the Strait of Hormuz,” Visual Capitalist, March 2026.
[5] “The Strait of Hormuz Crisis and Its Devastating Impact on Asia-Gulf Trade,” Seatrade Maritime, March 9, 2026, https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/tankers/the-strait-of-hormuz-crisis-and-its-devastating-impact-on-asia-gulf-trade; Andaman Partners, “China’s Dependence on Strategic Fuel Imports,” October 2025.
[6] “How Much of the World’s Shipping and Oil Goes Through the Strait of Hormuz?,” Speed Commerce, March 23, 2026, https://www.speedcommerce.com/insights/how-much-of-the-worlds-shipping-goes-through-the-strait-of-hormuz/; EIA, “World Oil Transit Chokepoints,” May 2026.
[7] “Asian Countries Most at Risk from Oil and Gas Supply Disruptions in Strait of Hormuz,” Zero Carbon Analytics, February 26, 2026, https://zerocarbon-analytics.org/insights/briefings/asian-countries-most-at-risk-from-oil-and-gas-supply-disruptions-in-strait-of-hormuz/; Dave Manuel, “Oil Flows: Strait of Hormuz,” March 28, 2026, https://www.davemanuel.com/2026/03/28/oil-flows-strait-of-hormuz/.
[8] “Global Markets and the Strait of Hormuz: The Economic Shockwaves of the Iran War,” Stimson Center, April 25, 2026, https://www.stimson.org/2026/global-markets-and-the-strait-of-hormuz-the-economic-shockwaves-of-the-iran-war/; “Asian Countries Most at Risk,” Zero Carbon Analytics, February 2026.
[9] World Economic Forum, “Beyond Oil: 9 Commodities Impacted by the Strait of Hormuz Crisis,” April 2026, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/04/beyond-oil-lng-commodities-impacted-closure-hormuz-strait/; “How Strait of Hormuz Closure Can Become Tipping Point for Global Economy,” CNBC, March 11, 2026; Roland Berger, “Managing the Short- and Long-Term Effects of Strait of Hormuz Tensions,” March 2026; UNCTAD, “Hormuz Disruption Deepens Global Economic Strain,” April 1, 2026.
[10] US Energy Information Administration (EIA), “Amid Regional Conflict, the Strait of Hormuz Remains Critical Oil Chokepoint,” June 2025, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=65504.
[11] International Energy Agency (IEA), “Strait of Hormuz,” 2025, https://www.iea.org/about/oil-security-and-emergency-response/strait-of-hormuz.
[12] “Implications of the Conflict in the Middle East for China’s Energy Security,” Columbia University Centre on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), May 2026. https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/implications-of-the-conflict-in-the-middle-east-for-chinas-energy-security/.
[13] “Hormuz Disruptions: China’s Energy Security and Supply Chains,” China Briefing, April 2026, https://www.china-briefing.com/news/hormuz-disruptions-china-energy-security-supply-chain/.
[14] “Analysis of the Impact of the Strait of Hormuz Blockade on China’s Energy Market,” MEPEI, April 2026, https://mepei.com/analysis-of-the-impact-of-the-strait-of-hormuz-blockade-on-chinas-energy-market/.
[15] “Hormuz Closure Opens Doors for China’s Energy Leadership,” East Asia Forum, May 2026, https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/05/03/hormuz-closure-opens-doors-for-chinas-energy-leadership/.
[16] “Implications of the Conflict in the Middle East for China’s Energy Security,” CGEP, May 2026.
[17] “Hormuz Closure Opens Doors for China’s Energy Leadership,” East Asia Forum, May 2026.
[18] US Government, “U.S. Adversaries’ Trilateral Naval Exercises,” July 2025, https://g2webcontent.z2.web.core.usgovcloudapi.net/OEE/CRINK_01-25_1JUL25_anonymous.pdf.
[19] China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment Report 2024, Griffith Asia Institute / Green Finance & Development Center, https://greenfdc.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative-bri-investment-report-2024/; confirmed by AGBI, April 22, 2025. https://www.agbi.com/construction/2025/03/middle-east-is-top-recipient-of-chinese-belt-and-road-deals/.
[20] Louis Dugit-Gros, “How to Respond to China’s Growing Influence in the Gulf,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 21, 2022, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-respond-chinas-growing-influence-gulf.
[21] Aparna Pande, “India Eyeing the Maritime Domain,” India GIS Reports, March 2025, https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/india-maritime-domain/.
[22] Leonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco, “India’s Quiet Maritime Turn in Middle Eastern Waters,” ORF Middle East, April 7, 2026, https://orfme.org/expert-speak/indias-quiet-maritime-turn-in-middle-eastern-waters/.
[23] “Will Continue Maritime Interventions,” The Tribune India, March 23, 2024.
[24] “Red Sea Crisis: Tenacity of Indian Navy’s Anti-Piracy Operations,” ETV Bharat, April 2024, https://www.etvbharat.com/en/!opinion/red-sea-crisis-tenacity-of-indian-navys-anti-piracy-opeations-enn24040205617.
[25] “Dynamic Shift: Indian Navy in the Red Sea,” ORF, February 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/research/dynamic-shift-indian-navy-in-the-red-sea.
[26] “India’s Quiet Maritime Turn in Middle Eastern Waters,” ORF Middle East, April 2026, https://orfme.org/expert-speak/indias-quiet-maritime-turn-in-middle-eastern-waters/.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Embassy of India, Abu Dhabi, “Bilateral Economic & Commercial Relations,” May 2026, https://www.indembassyuae.gov.in/page/bilateral-economic-and-commercial-relations/.
[29] “India-UAE Trade Relations and the Strategic Value of Recent Agreements,” India Narrative, May 2026, https://www.indianarrative.com/opinion/india-uae-trade-relations-and-the-strategic-value-of-recent-agreements/.
[30] “The Backbone of an Indo-Mediterranean Region,” Green Finance & Development Center / ISPI, March 2026, https://www.ispionline.it/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Report-IMEC-2026_ISPI.pdf.
[31] “How Middle East Turmoil Reverberates Through Japan’s Energy System,” ORF Middle East, May 2026, https://orfme.org/expert-speak/how-middle-east-turmoil-reverberates-through-japans-energy-system/.
[32] “South Korea and Japan to Strengthen Crude, LNG Supply Security Cooperation,” S&P Global, May 20, 2026, https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/crude-oil/051926-south-korea-and-japan-to-strengthen-crude-lng-supply-security-cooperation.
[33] “What a Middle East Oil and LNG Crisis Means for China and East Asia,” Atlantic Council, March 2026, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/what-a-middle-east-oil-and-lng-crisis-means-for-china-and-east-asia/.
[34] “Hormuz Closure Opens Doors for China’s Energy Leadership,” East Asia Forum, May 2026.
[35] “How Middle East Turmoil Reverberates Through Japan’s Energy System,” ORF Middle East, May 2026,
[36] “At Talks, Takaichi and South Korea’s Lee Agree to Bolster Energy Security,” Japan Times, May 20, 2026, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/05/19/japan/politics/takaichi-lee-japan-south-korea-summit/.
[37] “Lee, Takaichi Agree on Energy Cooperation at Japan-South Korea Summit,” UPI, May 19, 2026, https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/05/19/korea-Sanae-Takaichi-Lee-Jae-Myung-Japan-Korea-summit-Andong-energy-deal/5761779187702/; Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), “Japan and the Republic of Korea Strengthen Energy Security Cooperation,” May 19, 2026, https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2026/0519_001.html.
[38] “Japan, South Korea to Launch New Energy Cooperation Framework,” Gulf News / Kyodo News, “May 20, 2026, https://gulfnews.com/amp/story/world/asia/japan-s-korea-to-launch-new-energy-cooperation-framework-1.500546653.
[39] “South Korea and Japan to Strengthen Crude, LNG Supply Security Cooperation,” S&P Global, May 20, 2026,
[40] IEA, “Strait of Hormuz,” 2025.
[41] Justin Varghese, “ADNOC CEO Says Hormuz Bypass Pipeline Nearly 50% Complete,” Gulf News, May 20, 2026, https://gulfnews.com/business/energy/adnoc-ceo-says-hormuz-bypass-pipeline-nearly-50-complete-1.500547573.
[42] “UAE’s 27 Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements Explained,” The National, July 10, 2025, https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/economy/2025/07/10/uae-cepa-trade-deals-explained/.
[43] “The India-UAE Strategic Arc,” Drishti IAS, https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-editorials/the-india-uae-strategic-arc.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Embassy of India, Abu Dhabi, “Bilateral Economic & Commercial Relations,” May 2026.
[46] “Vietnam-UAE’s CEPA: A Strategic Gateway Between ASEAN and the Gulf,” The Diplomat, December 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/12/vietnam-uaes-cepa-a-strategic-gateway-between-asean-and-the-gulf/.
[47] Ibid.
[48] “The UAE’s Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements Agenda,” Hourani & Partners, https://houranipartners.com/the-uaes-aggressive-comprehensive-economic-partnership-agreements-cepa-agenda/.
[49] “Examining the UAE’s Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) Landscape,” ORF Middle East, March 2025, https://orfme.org/expert-speak/examining-the-uaes-comprehensive-economic-partnership-agreement-cepa-landscape/.
[50] “Navigating Rocky Waters: GCC Strategies for Maritime Security,” Middle East Council on Global Affairs, December 2025, https://mecouncil.org/publication/navigating-rocky-waters-gcc-strategies-for-maritime-security/.
[51] “India’s Growing Gulf Footprint: What the UAE Partnership Means for Regional Stability,” Modern Diplomacy, May 2026, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/05/24/indias-growing-gulf-footprint-what-the-uae-partnership-means-for-regional-stability/.
