One of the most prominent impacts of the 2026 Iran War has been on energy markets. The price of Brent crude has fluctuated from a low of around USD 70 per barrel prior to the war in February 2026, to around USD 115 per barrel at its highest during the conflict in May 2026. These price fluctuations have been largely driven by supply constraints resulting from the closure of critical waterways that witness the passage of oil and gas, namely the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab and, by extension, the Suez Canal. Around 20% of global LNG and 25% of global seaborne oil pass through the Strait of Hormuz, heading to various global destinations.[1] But Asian markets have been disproportionately hit by the energy disruption due to their reliance on the region for their energy needs. In 2025, around 80% of oil and oil products transiting the Strait were headed to the region.[2]
Energy disruptions are not new to Asia, given the large volume it imports. For instance, during the 1973 oil embargo, Japan had maintained a short-term cushion of oil reserves; however, the long-term possibility of high oil prices remained stark. After all, oil prices had quadrupled from USD 3 per barrel to USD 12 per barrel in 1973.[3] Consequently, short-term buffers evolved into strategic reserves that can support domestic consumption during periods of disruption.
Following the 1973-74 disruption, the region has implemented hedging strategies to ensure that geopolitical tensions in energy-abundant regions do not cause significant disruption to its energy consumption. For instance, China, Japan, South Korea, and India rank among the top states with the largest strategic petroleum reserves globally.[4] Long-term energy contracts have also provided a basis for a stable energy supply to the region. China, Japan, India, and South Korea all have long-term energy contracts with Gulf-based oil and gas companies like ADNOC and QatarEnergy, with the Gulf accounting for around 60% of Asian energy imports.[5]
However, the shock emanating from the Iran War Crisis has been unprecedented for Asia. Alongside the expected energy price volatility, the 2026 situation has also been accompanied by a) a complete cessation of Gulf shipments through the affected waterways, b) physical energy infrastructure being at risk, including vessels and Gulf-based production and refining facilities, and c) the uncertainty of insurance pricing and potential tolling systems. The impact of these features has been compounded by stalled negotiations for a peace deal—and the subsequent end of energy uncertainty—between the U.S. and Iran.
Asia Learning to Hedge
Since the 1970s, oil crises triggered by shipping disruptions and price hikes have occurred every decade. In 1973-74, the Arab-Israeli war caused OPEC countries to impose an oil embargo on the U.S., which caused oil prices to quadruple.[6] In 1979, following the Iranian revolution, Iranian oil output declined by 4.8 million barrels per day, which accounted for 7% of global production at the time. It is argued that while Iranian disruption may not have directly caused the oil crisis of 1979, the high global demand and anticipation of further disruption may have compounded the gains in oil prices.[7]
Following the Iranian revolution, oil crises triggered by high prices and potential disruption to supply have followed a similar trajectory of lost output and global economic impact. The 1980-81 Iran-Iraq War, though not resulting in a significant decline of output (amounting to a total loss of 2% of global oil supply), compounded the impact of the 1970s stagflation.[8] A decade on, the Gulf War caused significant disruption to oil flows from Iraq and Kuwait, with fears of attacks against Saudi oil fields causing an oil price spike of 160%.[9] Increased Chinese demand and the Iraq War caused a 14% increase in oil prices before stabilizing between 2003 and 2008, while the geopolitical turbulence in the Middle East following the Arab Spring uprisings caused a 40% increase in oil prices between 2011 and 2014.[10] More recently, the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine War caused similar inflationary pressures on the prices of oil before the Iran War in 2026.
The direct economic cost of an oil crisis triggered by high prices is global inflation. With high energy prices come high manufacturing and shipping costs, alongside high costs to acquire petroleum-based products like plastics and fertilizers. This filters into higher costs for consumer goods. For energy-importing countries, oil crises triggered by high prices and shipping restrictions are a double-edged sword due to the higher cost of acquiring energy reserves and the possibility of a domestic shortage of fuel.
The 1973 oil embargo marked a pivotal point for energy geopolitics by not only contributing to the stagflation of the 1970s but also by institutionalizing measures to prevent domestic energy disruption. Every disruption since then has highlighted the need for hedging measures by highlighting the vulnerabilities of the energy market—price and supply vulnerability, concentration of supply in politically unstable locations (as in Libya in 2011–14 and Iran in 1979), vulnerability of physical infrastructure (as in the Gulf War), intense demands for industrialization (as in China in 2003–08 and with increased demand for AI and data centers more recently), and the ability of states to weaponize energy and trade routes.
With Asian economies being predominantly energy-importing, the lessons have been most stark in this region, particularly amongst the dynamic economies of China, India, Japan, and South Korea. These lessons have ranged from maintaining strategic reserves of energy resources to combat supply shocks to long-term contracts with energy suppliers, and from a shift to renewable sources of energy to reduce reliance on any one supplier to alternative supply routes like pipelines that do not rely upon critical waterways that have historically been weaponized.
Coping Strategies
The Chinese Route
China’s strategy in energy diversification has enabled it to become one of the more resilient states in the region.
One of the most prominent hedging strategies adopted by China has been to maintain significant amounts of strategic petroleum reserves. By the end of 2025, China held one of the largest reserves at 1.3-1.4 billion barrels, which accounts for roughly four months of import demand.[11] China actively pursued a policy of increasing strategic reserves in 2025. Global oil markets were met with an oversupply of energy from increased production by both OPEC and non-OPEC countries (originating primarily from the Americas), leading to lower prices in 2025. Coupled with perpetual geopolitical risk since 2023 in the Middle East, which accounts for over 50% of the country’s energy imports, building up strategic reserves was an effectively deployed policy.[12] Despite this large share attributed to the Middle East, China also maintains an extensive network of suppliers—for instance, Russia provided nearly 18% of China’s crude oil in 2025, ahead of Saudi Arabia, which accounted for 14% of imports.[13]
90% of China’s crude oil imports are seaborne, with one-third of crude oil imports traversing the Strait of Hormuz in 2025. However, to counter the dependence on seaborne routes, China also operates an extensive network of pipelines, including ESPO (Russia-China pipeline) and the China-Myanmar pipeline, which allows oil tankers from the Middle East to dock in Myanmar, negating the need to transit through the Strait of Malacca, another maritime chokepoint in the Indo-Pacific.[14]
Alongside strategic reserves is the Chinese endeavor to phase out internal combustion vehicles and replace them with Electric Vehicles (EVs). As of 2025, between 53 and 65% of new car sales in China are electric. This surge of EV acquisition has reduced fuel consumption in China by 1 million barrels per day.[15] In addition, China’s installed power capacity is expected to be dominated by solar energy in 2026 in an attempt to transition to green energy, reducing reliance on fuel imports and relying on critical waterways.[16]
Therefore, China’s hedging strategy is a combination of a diverse network of suppliers and supply routes, strategic petroleum reserves, and an active transition away from oil.
Japanese and South Korean Reserves
The Japanese and South Korean hedging strategy relies heavily on their strategic petroleum reserves, which rank among the top ten in the world. As of 2026, the reserves held account for over 200 days of consumption,[17] significantly higher than the mandate held by Japanese law, which calls for reserves to account for 70-90 days of oil consumption in the previous year.[18] Both Japan and South Korea[19] import virtually 100% of their total crude oil consumption, with the Middle East accounting for 90% of Japanese imports in 2025.[20] Similarly, 61% of oil shipments to South Korea traverse the Strait of Hormuz.[21] Therefore, a significant majority of Japanese and South Korean crude oil imports originate in the Middle East, reinforcing the need for strategic reserves to support periods of energy shortage.
In the wake of the Iran War and the consequent closure of the Strait of Hormuz, Japan released 45 days’ worth of reserve oil, the largest amount released in the country following an energy shortage.[22] On the other hand, in South Korea, despite on-paper reserves of over 200 days’ worth of crude consumption, the reality of on-the-ground refinery throughput revealed supplies for only 67 days, taking into consideration both government and privately held reserves.[23]
With pressure on strategic reserves, both countries sought to solidify their reserves—and turned to one of their biggest suppliers, the UAE.
Following the UAE’s departure from OPEC in May, it reached an agreement with Japan for UAE-based oil companies to steadily increase crude oil stockpiles held in Japan.[24] South Korea, in turn, set out in March to acquire 6 million barrels of oil from UAE ports in Fujairah.[25] These moves reflect ongoing reliance on Middle Eastern oil supplies, despite physical disruption of shipments both in transit and at the source in production and refineries.
In what appears to be a reaction to this disruption, both Japan and South Korea are now aiming to diversify energy suppliers. Japan is pivoting from the Middle East toward the Americas—including the U.S.[26] and Mexico[27]—from whom it received nearly a million barrels of oil each in July. On the other hand, South Korea entered into an agreement with Kazakhstan to purchase 18 million barrels of crude oil.[28] Despite efforts to diversify, however, South Korea has been known to ship oil from the Middle Eastern ports of Yanbu in Saudi Arabia (through the Red Sea), Fujairah, and Oman (through the Gulf of Oman), successfully avoiding the security risks around the Strait of Hormuz but continuing to rely on supplies from the region.[29] This continued reliance further underscores the need for a diversified network of suppliers.
Overall, the experience of Japan and South Korea demonstrates both the effectiveness and limitations of strategic petroleum reserves as a hedging mechanism. Both countries have maintained buffers, which have allowed them to circumvent the immediate impact of a supply shortage. Yet, at the same time, both countries have also needed to continue relying on the Middle East for stockpiling through alternate routes and ports, signaling a deficiency in their network of suppliers. As a result, both Japan and South Korea are now seeking new deals with Mexico, the U.S., and Kazakhstan—a reaction to a crisis instead of preparedness.
The Indian Experience
As the third-largest oil importer globally, India’s hedging strategy is based on a mix of supplier diversification and building up strategic reserves.[30] India, like its Asian peers, ranks among the top 10 strategic petroleum reserve states; however, it is also worth noting that its reserves fall below the amount held by both Japan and South Korea (countries with significantly less population than India), which may provide a shorter buffer relative to the scale of its consumption.[31]
A statement by the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas following the wartime disruption of energy supply revealed that India was sourcing energy from 40 different suppliers.[32] A closer look at the non-Middle Eastern suppliers reveals Russia to be a top supplier of crude oil, with trade volume increasing steadily following the Russia-Ukraine War when sanctioned Russian oil was available at a discounted value. Prior to 2022, Russian supply accounted for around 1% of its crude oil imports;[33] however, in July 2026, Russian crude oil accounted for over 50% of imports.[34] The U.S. was also a top supplier of oil in Q1 2026; however, following the price hikes during the Iran War in February 2026, India has shifted toward discounted Russian oil.
Despite what may appear as a diverse network of energy suppliers, the shift from the Middle East to other suppliers brings with it a different set of challenges. Perhaps the most prominent of these is the reliance shifting from Middle Eastern suppliers to Russia. While the U.S. has waived sanctions against Russian crude for the period of disruption, India’s purchase of Russian oil has, in the past, caused friction in its relationship with the U.S. In 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump linked India’s purchase of Russian oil to enabling and prolonging the war in Ukraine, raising the risk of secondary sanctions against India. India also faced the added risk of increased tariffs on its imports to the U.S.[35] Therefore, India’s shift away from the Middle East to Russia signals a change in reliance instead of the degree of reliance itself. Should the U.S. change its posture on India’s energy ties with Russia again, it would face renewed threats within its foreign trade architecture. Therefore, the Indian hedging strategy reveals that its supplier diversification does not reduce geopolitical vulnerability as its reliance on Russian imports increases.
Within the broader Asian context being examined, China showcases diversification of supply routes and states alongside strategic petroleum reserves acting as buffers during times of crises, while Japan and South Korea highlight the limits of what reserves can offer. Meanwhile, India highlights the inherent vulnerability of energy markets where geopolitical risk remains one of the ever-present features.
Iranian Disruption—Was Hedging a Success?
Disruption to oil flows originating from the Middle East is not an unprecedented event; however, the Iran War has led to an unprecedented disruption for Asian economies’ access to energy. The crises from previous decades impacted energy markets through price hikes (as in the 1970s or during the Arab Spring) and a delay in shipments (as in the effective closure of the Suez Canal and Bab al Mandab in 2023 when shipments were rerouted through the Cape of Good Hope, adding 10-30 days to transit time based on geographic location[36]). However, the oil crisis in 2026 has impacted the global economy and especially Asian markets in three unprecedented ways.
Minimal Traffic Flowing Through the Strait of Hormuz
With 25% of global seaborne oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz, restricted movement of tankers through the waterbody disrupts the flow of a quarter of the global crude oil supply. Redirection has been possible in some cases. When Saudi Arabia managed to redirect 70% of its energy exports from the Arabian Gulf via pipelines to the Red Sea, its foresight in the construction of the pipeline network was hailed as a success. However, following the Houthi blockade of the Red Sea in July 2026, the Red Sea route for export has also come under pressure. Therefore, the geopolitical tensions surrounding the region have not only led to a price hike but also reduced the amount of fuel that can reach export destinations. This has tested the resilience of strategic reserves held by various states. While China has managed to bank on its significant reserves and also employ renewable energy sources, other states have not managed to do so. South Korea and Japan, both, found themselves relying on the Middle East—specifically, the UAE—for stockpiles. Meanwhile, Indian consumers not only shifted to ‘dirty fuels’ like kerosene to fight the supply squeeze[37] but also switched from reliance on the Middle East to reliance on Russia for fuel. These solutions have provided relief for the duration of the war but may not be considered viable hedging strategies for the long term.
Physical Infrastructure at Risk
While Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iraq managed to redirect oil shipments through pipelines and road networks, Qatar faced a different fate in the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) market. Attacks against the Ras Laffan Industrial City caused significant damage to QatarEnergy’s LNG facilities. Latest estimates suggest that production at the targeted facility may not resume until Q1 2027.[38] The scale of damage also caused QatarEnergy to declare force majeure. Its extensive network of domestic and cross-border pipelines may have provided some scope to circumvent critical waterways; however, the scale of damage meant that there was no supply to make the journey to export destinations at all.
Transit Cost Uncertainty
The oil crisis of 2026 has not only been met with price volatility typical of disruptions in energy-abundant geographies but also with prolonged uncertainty from stalled negotiations.
Oil prices have fluctuated from pre-war levels of USD 70 per barrel to around USD 115 per barrel at their peak in May 2026. While energy agreements factor in price fluctuations, the greater uncertainty lies in the cost of transit on its own. Insurance costs, the cost of additional fuel (for up to 30 additional days when rerouting via the Cape of Good Hope), staff costs, and security costs all increase the total cost to transit a waterway.[39] Additionally, war risk premiums increased from 0.25% of the hull value prior to the war to 3-10% in July 2026.[40]
The uncertainty has also lingered due to stalled negotiations between the U.S. and Iran. One of the points of contention is the Iranian demand to charge a service fee to vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Natural waterways typically allow for ‘innocent’ passage of vessels, unlike manmade passages like the Suez or Panama Canal. Should the service fee manifest into a future version of passage through the Strait, it could set a precedent for waterways globally.[41]
In both cases of high-risk premiums and service fees surrounding the Strait, the ultimate cost burden is likely to fall on the consumer through global inflationary pressures. While inflationary pressures are a reality of oil price hikes, debates around service fees for passage through natural waterways are not.
Hedging Against the Next Crisis
Against the backdrop of the nature of the oil crisis of 2026, the hedging strategies involved in the Asian states—strategic reserves, diverse supply routes, and diverse suppliers—may be considered a partial success.
Strategic reserves have allowed states a buffer before they seek alternate suppliers. In the case of China, the supply of oil shifted from waterways to pipelines. In the case of India, supplier diversification from the Middle East to Russia enabled it to navigate the supply disruption. However, these strategies did not eliminate the systemic vulnerability of the global energy market. Therefore, Asian hedging may be considered a success at mitigating the impact of the crisis, rather than evading it altogether.
The Iran War has demonstrated that existing Asian energy hedging strategies remain valuable, but may not be sufficient to handle a crisis that simultaneously disrupts supply, transportation, infrastructure, and the cost of accessing energy.
While strategic petroleum reserves have provided critical short-term buffers, cooperation in reserve strategy may aid their success. To this end, Japan and South Korea, in May 2026, explored the benefits of cooperation in securing energy stockpiles for the two states to combat disruptions, while also providing financial assistance to neighboring states.[42]
Cooperation could also extend into the diversification of supply routes. For instance, the East-West pipeline in Saudi Arabia that allows Saudi oil to bypass the Strait of Hormuz and reach the Red Sea port of Yanbu is one strategy to ensure the continued flow of energy during times of disruption. Cooperation among energy partners in the construction and financing of pipelines could be a way of hedging against supply crises.
Diversification may also be achieved within suppliers. This entails reducing dependence on any one supplier. For instance, India’s reliance on the Middle East has simply been replaced by reliance on Russia. For longer-term security, diversification of energy suppliers will be critical as energy security remains a frequent victim of geopolitical turbulence. Targeted investment in a transition away from oil and gas to green energy may also be considered to diversify energy sources.
Finally, the Iran War has also uncovered vulnerabilities in the shipping and navigation architecture of global trade. Enhanced cooperation to implement war-risk premium mechanisms may protect shipping companies, insurers, and consumers. War-risk mitigation could also be achieved through emergency shipping protocols being formulated.
The principal lesson of the Iran War for Asia is not that existing hedging strategies are obsolete, but that they must evolve. The energy security strategies developed since the oil crises of the 1970s were designed to ensure that geopolitical disruption did not translate into domestic energy shortages. The nature of the challenges emanating from the global energy market has evolved. In 2026, the challenge is ensuring that when one route, supplier, facility, or market becomes inaccessible, the wider energy system remains capable of functioning. Asian energy security must consequently move from reserves to resilience.
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[1] UNCTAD, 2026
[2] IEA, 2026a
[3] Corbett, 2013
[4] EIA, 2026
[5] IEA, 2026b
[6] Corbett, 2013
[7] Graefe, 2013
[8] Baumeister, Kilian, 2016
[9] Century Financial, 2026
[10] Century Financial, 2026
[11] Kılıç (2026)
[12] Downs, 2026
[13] Downs, 2026
[14] Baker Institute, 2025
[15] Jaeger, 2026
[16] Li, 2026
[17] Hee-yeon, 2026
[18] IEA, 2020
[19] EIA, 2020
[20] WAM, 2025
[21] Shim, 2026
[22] Nippon, 2026
[23] Cha, Lim, 2026
[24] The Japan Times, 2026b
[25] Hee-yeon, 2026
[26] The Japan Times, 2026a
[27] Adriano et. al., 2026
[28] Omirgazy, 2026
[29] Vahn, Lin, 2026
[30] Verma, 2026
[31] EIA, 2025
[32] Salve, 2026
[33] Havelcock, 2026
[34] Verma, 2026b
[35] Linscott, 2026
[36] ITF-OECD, 2024
[37] Sharma and Singh, 2026
[38] Gnana, 2026
[39] ITF-OECD, 2024
[40] Nagraj, 2026
[41] Harding, 2026
[42] WAM, 2026
