Since the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war in February 2022, numerous efforts and initiatives have sought to achieve a peaceful settlement. These began with mediation efforts by Belarus and Türkiye immediately after the war broke out, followed by the Istanbul negotiations and subsequent U.S. mediation, and most recently the trilateral talks between Ukraine, Russia and the United States held in Abu Dhabi and Geneva in January and February 2026. There are expectations that the trilateral talks could resume soon. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s invitation for Russia to participate in the G20 Summit in December 2026 may provide a venue for trilateral talks.[1]
These diplomatic initiatives and successive rounds of negotiations have clarified the central issues under dispute, but they have neither established a shared framework for peace nor secured a political settlement to the war.[2] This raises a fundamental question: Why does a political settlement to the Russia–Ukraine war remain elusive?
This question acquired renewed significance amid diplomatic activity surrounding the 81st session of the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2026. Efforts to advance a settlement gathered momentum as U.S. President Donald Trump called for an end to the “ridiculous war,”[3] U.S.–Russian and U.S.–Ukrainian contacts resumed, and proposals emerged for de-escalation and a limited energy-sector truce. On 21 September, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov reiterated Moscow’s readiness to resume trilateral talks with Washington and Kyiv.[4] The following day, Trump met Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in New York to discuss measures that could facilitate diplomacy, including steps to reduce hostilities and halt attacks on energy infrastructure. Zelenskyy subsequently affirmed Ukraine’s willingness to suspend strikes on Russian energy facilities if Moscow reciprocated by ceasing attacks on Ukraine’s energy system.[5]
On 22 September, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that the war would ultimately have to end through a “negotiated settlement” rather than a “military victory” for either side. Following his meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on 23 September, Rubio said that both Russia and Ukraine had “expressed interest” in a limited ceasefire covering grain and energy supplies. Although such an arrangement would not “solve the war,” he suggested that it could provide a foundation for a broader agreement.[6] Lavrov also confirmed Russia’s readiness to resolve the conflict through a political and diplomatic settlement “based on eliminating its root causes.”[7]
Nevertheless, statements made on 23 September underscored the constraints on this renewed diplomatic activity. Addressing the General Assembly, Zelenskyy called for sustained economic pressure on Russia to limit its capacity to finance the war. He also warned of the consequences of continued attacks on infrastructure and energy facilities as winter approached, while keeping open the possibility of a limited energy-sector truce.[8] For his part, Lavrov told the UN Security Council on the same day that Moscow was willing to negotiate a “lasting and just peace” but would continue military operations during the talks. He argued that a pause in the fighting would allow Ukraine and its European partners to rebuild Ukrainian military capabilities.[9] Then, speaking at the UN General Assembly on 26 September, Lavrov said Russia’s ‘fight for truth and justice’ in Ukraine will continue ‘through to the end,’ vowing that the objectives of Moscow’s military operation will be achieved.[10]
The New York meetings and interactions, including Germany’s Foreign Minister’s meeting with his Russian counterpart, thus exposed a central tension: although diplomacy had gained prominence, Moscow and Kyiv remained divided over the relationship between negotiations and military operations. Ukraine presented reciprocal de-escalation as a possible step toward broader talks, while Russia maintained that negotiations could proceed alongside continued fighting. These differing approaches complicated efforts to translate diplomatic engagement into an agreed path toward peace.
This insight examines why negotiations have yet to produce a political settlement by analyzing the positions of Russia, Ukraine, the European Union and the United States. It then assesses how the latest diplomatic developments in New York affect the prospects for peace, explores possible scenarios, and outlines the contours of a potential settlement.
1) Shifts in Russia’s Position
Moscow launched the war in February 2022 with broad political objectives, most notably what it described as the “demilitarization” and “denazification” of Ukraine, which it linked to the risks posed by NATO expansion. These terms, however, lacked clear criteria for implementation, leaving the scope of the changes Russia sought in Ukraine open-ended.
During the Istanbul negotiations in March and April 2022, discussions shifted towards neutrality, international guarantees, military restrictions, and the deferral of certain territorial issues. Nevertheless, the draft proposals did not culminate in a comprehensive agreement, particularly on guarantees, the size of armed forces, and territorial arrangements.[11]
Russia’s declaration in September 2022 that it had annexed Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson raised the level of its demands, as its claims to the four regions included territory that Moscow did not fully control. In June 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin made the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the entirety of the four regions within their administrative boundaries, as well as Ukraine’s abandonment of its bid to join NATO, conditions for a ceasefire and the start of negotiations. He also linked a final settlement to Ukrainian neutrality, recognition of the annexations, and the lifting of sanctions.
Under the Russian formula, therefore, an end to the fighting became contingent on broader political, territorial and security changes, rather than simply freezing the existing front line.
Following the Anchorage meeting in Alaska in August 2025, reports attributed to Moscow proposals that focused more closely on territorial and military issues. However, in the absence of an agreed text, these reports cannot be regarded as superseding Russia’s officially stated conditions. In July 2026, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that the conditions set out by Putin in June 2024 remained in effect, indicating that diplomatic contacts had not translated into any publicly declared retreat from the core of Russia’s position.[12]
This continuity helps explain the limited impact of technical progress in the talks. Moscow links a settlement to a broader restructuring of the European security environment and does not regard a ceasefire alone as sufficient to prevent Ukraine’s continued military integration with the West. The negotiations, therefore, concern not only territory but also the nature of the Ukrainian state and its foreign relations.
Developments in September 2026 reaffirmed this approach. On 21 September, Peskov said that the negotiation process had made no progress, while also affirming that Russia remained open to resuming trilateral talks with the United States and Ukraine. This suggests that Moscow is keeping the negotiating channel open but does not view continued diplomatic engagement as an alternative to military operations.
Lavrov’s address to the Security Council on 23 September made this position even clearer. He said that Russia was prepared to negotiate a “lasting and just peace,” but would not halt its “special military operation” in any form while negotiations were underway. Citing what he described as “bitter experience,” Lavrov argued that a truce could give Ukraine and its European supporters an opportunity to rebuild Ukraine’s military arsenal.
These statements are analytically significant because they distinguish between two concepts that are often treated as synonymous: a willingness to negotiate and a willingness to stop fighting. Moscow maintains that it is not closing the door to negotiations but rejects making the cessation of military operations a precondition for them.
This means that, from Russia’s perspective, the issue is not simply where the final borders should lie, but also the nature of the security settlement that Moscow wants negotiations to produce. Any formula that does not address Ukraine’s military status and its future relationship with the West would therefore remain incomplete from the Russian perspective. Yet incorporating these issues into an agreement would directly conflict with the principle of Ukrainian sovereignty.
The latest developments, therefore, do not necessarily represent a shift in Russia’s stated objectives. Rather, they provide greater clarity on Moscow’s approach to negotiations: negotiations do not require military operations to cease, and an end to the war should be the outcome of a broader political and security agreement, rather than merely a preliminary step towards one.
2) Positions of Ukraine, the EU and the United States
First: Ukraine
Ukraine remains committed to its territorial integrity and refuses to recognize Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territory. It links a sustainable peace to Russian withdrawal, the return of prisoners and deported civilians, and reparations. At the same time, it has shown a willingness to distinguish between a final legal settlement and a cessation of hostilities along the existing line of contact, potentially allowing some territorial issues to be deferred to a later stage.
Ukraine’s red line, however, concerns the sequencing of implementation: a ceasefire and security guarantees must precede irreversible concessions. A unilateral withdrawal from fortified areas in Donbas could weaken Ukraine’s defenses without guaranteeing Moscow’s compliance. Similarly, accepting that NATO membership may not be achievable in the near term is fundamentally different from granting Russia a permanent say over Ukrainian foreign policy. Kyiv’s ability to defend itself, therefore, remains a central element of any agreement.
Ukraine’s actions in September 2026 reaffirmed this approach, while demonstrating a clear willingness to discuss phased de-escalation measures. Kyiv expressed its readiness for a temporary truce covering certain types of strikes and also supported the resumption of negotiations.
In New York, Zelenskyy said that Ukraine and the United States had discussed steps that could pave the way for diplomacy, with the protection of energy infrastructure emerging as one of the most viable areas in which a limited arrangement could be tested.
On 23 September, Zelenskyy confirmed that Ukraine was prepared to halt strikes on Russian energy facilities if Moscow stopped targeting Ukraine’s energy system. He did not, however, indicate any willingness to unilaterally halt attacks on Russia’s energy sector. He also called for continued pressure on Russian revenues and on Moscow’s ability to finance the war.
This position reflects the continued pursuit of “diplomacy while maintaining deterrence.” Ukraine does not reject negotiations, but neither does it regard them as a substitute for military and economic pressure. Its calls for continued sanctions and reduced Russian revenues also indicate that Kyiv continues to view maintaining its resilience as essential to improving the terms of any eventual settlement.
Kyiv’s willingness to pursue de-escalation, however, does not imply acceptance of a final territorial settlement. Ukraine’s position in New York combined support for de-escalation with an emphasis on strengthening its defense capabilities, including air defense and military production, alongside continued sanctions on Russia. This reflects the continued combination of diplomacy and deterrence, rather than a shift towards negotiations based on relinquishing the instruments of power.
Second: The European Union
The European position combines a rejection of changing borders by force with a willingness to consider a truce beginning along the existing line of contact. The arrangements proposed by the “Coalition of the Willing” envisage continued support for Ukraine, international monitoring, and the possible deployment of a multinational force once a credible cessation of hostilities is in place.
Such an arrangement would allow the military situation to be frozen without foreclosing questions of sovereignty and reparations. However, it would require sustainable funding and clear rules for responding to violations.
This European approach was also evident in New York, where Zelenskyy continued to meet European leaders to discuss sanctions, financial assistance and air defense. This indicates that Europe does not regard negotiations as a substitute for supporting Ukraine’s ability to withstand the conflict, but rather as a parallel track.
Lavrov’s statements, by contrast, illustrate why Russian–European differences persist. Moscow believes that, in the event of a cessation of hostilities, some European support for Ukraine could provide an opportunity to rebuild Ukrainian military capabilities. Security guarantees, therefore, remain one of the most sensitive issues in any potential agreement.
Third: The United States
The Trump administration prioritizes ending the war and establishing verifiable arrangements, with Europe playing a role in providing security guarantees and the United States offering support. The approach under discussion envisages deferring a final resolution of territorial issues and linking stability to reconstruction, while ruling out Ukrainian membership in NATO in the near term.
However, details of plans or proposals reported in the media do not automatically constitute U.S. commitments. A distinction must also be made between Washington conveying Russian demands and endorsing them. The key test remains the extent to which the United States is prepared to provide credible guarantees that can endure across changes of administration.
The New York meetings reaffirmed the United States’ role as the most active mediator at this stage. Trump met Zelenskyy on 22 September, and according to the Ukrainian side, their discussions addressed ending the war and steps towards de-escalation, including energy security.
The meeting was also preceded by diplomatic efforts by U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, who engaged with Moscow and Kyiv in an effort to revive the negotiating process.
On 24 September 2026, it was revealed that the Trump administration is proposing three immediate steps to de-escalate the war and resume diplomacy: a Russian-Ukrainian ceasefire of long-range strikes on energy infrastructure; the reopening of the Black Sea grain corridor; and a trilateral meeting between the United States, Ukraine, and Russia, possibly in Abu Dhabi.[13]
These efforts produced no publicly announced breakthrough, but they kept channels of communication open.
U.S. mediation nevertheless faces a fundamental challenge: while Washington can help narrow the differences between the parties, it cannot single-handedly resolve the contradiction between Russia’s demands concerning territory and security arrangements and Ukraine’s position on sovereignty and security guarantees.
Nor did the Trump–Zelenskyy meeting produce the announcement of a comprehensive ceasefire agreement. The renewed mediation effort, therefore, does not necessarily indicate that a settlement is imminent; rather, it provides a channel through which the possibilities for a settlement can be tested incrementally.
3) Why Has a Peace Process Yet to Emerge?
Negotiations are proceeding along parallel tracks that lack a unified framework for implementation. The humanitarian track has made progress on prisoner exchanges and the return of remains, while U.S.–Ukrainian dialogue has focused on security guarantees and reconstruction. Trilateral military contacts have addressed monitoring and operational issues, whereas U.S.–Russian dialogue has linked the war in Ukraine to sanctions, bilateral relations and European security. The European track, meanwhile, has focused on developing post-truce arrangements.
The principal obstacle lies in disagreement over the sequencing of commitments. Moscow demands a Ukrainian withdrawal and political restrictions before a ceasefire, while Kyiv seeks security guarantees and a sustainable cessation of hostilities before decisions are made on territorial issues. If security guarantees are deferred until after concessions have been made, Ukraine fears losing its leverage; conversely, as long as Ukraine retains strong military capabilities and close ties with the West, Russia maintains that the underlying causes of the conflict have not been addressed.
Closely related to this is disagreement over the very purpose of the security guarantees. Kyiv and Europe seek to deter another attack, while Moscow opposes arrangements that could result in a permanent Western military presence. General expressions of support are insufficient to resolve this contradiction; any arrangement would need to specify who determines whether a violation has occurred, the timeframe for responding, and the type of military or economic assistance that would follow.
The multiplicity of mediators and high-level contacts also cannot compensate for the absence of a permanent negotiating team, a defined agenda, and a mechanism for monitoring implementation. Some analysts emphasize that ending a war of this scale requires a sustained process rather than reliance on a single summit. Domestic legitimacy is equally essential, as an agreement that cannot be defended politically or implemented institutionally will remain vulnerable to collapse.[14]
1. Potential Scenarios for a Political Settlement of the Russia–Ukraine War
Western assessments converge around the prospect of a deterrence-backed truce that would preserve Ukraine’s ability to defend itself while deferring the question of territorial sovereignty. Thomas Graham outlines a formula combining a ceasefire with close Ukrainian ties to the West, but without formal NATO membership. Chatham House, meanwhile, warns that a poorly monitored truce could allow military forces to regroup and pressure to continue through cyber operations and sabotage. Commitments to refrain from the use of force and mechanisms for monitoring compliance would therefore need to apply to all parties.[15]
Russian experts, including Fyodor Lukyanov and Andrey Sushentsov, focus more on the broader security architecture than on the front line alone. This approach distinguishes between de facto control and legal recognition, while linking stability to restrictions on military bases, weapons and Ukraine’s military ties with the West. This demonstrates that agreement on an interim territorial arrangement would not in itself resolve the dispute over Ukraine’s autonomy in making its own security decisions.
Some Ukrainian opposition figures in exile emphasize the costs of prolonging the war and the need for a settlement accompanied by reintegration, secure elections and refugee participation. These views, however, cannot be taken as representative of Ukrainian society as a whole. Moreover, arrangements involving external administration could conflict with the principle of sovereignty. Their principal contribution lies in drawing attention to the domestic dimension of ensuring the sustainability of any agreement.
The Chinese approach outlined by the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies proposes parallel tracks addressing a ceasefire, security guarantees and reconstruction, while separating temporary control from legal sovereignty and employing technical monitoring and the participation of non-belligerent states with the consent of the parties. This approach provides mechanisms for structuring the process, but does not resolve the substance of the territorial and security bargain.[16]
Against this backdrop, the war and intermittent diplomacy are likely to continue in the near term, consistent with the baseline scenario examined by ACAPS. Should a breakthrough occur, the more plausible outcome would be a long-term truce underpinned by deterrence and monitoring. A comprehensive peace settlement or a victory by either side on its maximal terms, by contrast, would remain contingent on a major military or political shift.[17]
2. Contours of a Possible Settlement
An initial understanding could be built around a ceasefire along a defined line, without immediate recognition of any changes to borders, while deferring questions of sovereignty and reparations to a separate track. This would be accompanied by a credible Ukrainian defense capability, agreed arrangements governing military deployments, bases and weapons, and security guarantees specifying in advance the response to any violation. Such a formula remains a hypothetical basis for negotiation, however, as it does not align with Russia’s publicly stated demands.
A possible sequence could begin with mutual restrictions on strikes against civilian infrastructure and expanded humanitarian exchanges, followed by a comprehensive ceasefire, technical monitoring, and the simultaneous activation of core security guarantees. Subsequent negotiations could address mutual withdrawals, special zones, the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and navigation. Gradual sanctions relief could be tied to verifiable implementation, with a snapback mechanism in the event of non-compliance, while reconstruction financing could be linked to progress in implementing the agreement.
The success of such a package would require difficult concessions: Moscow would need to abandon its demand for the prior withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from all the territories it claims, while Kyiv would need to accept the possibility of continued de facto Russian control without granting it legal recognition. It would also require specific and durable U.S. and European commitments, as well as domestic Ukrainian consent secured under safe conditions. The value of any agreement would ultimately be measured by its ability to prevent a resumption of hostilities, rather than by the mere fact of its signing.
Conclusion
This analytical article has sought to explain why the numerous and varied efforts to achieve a political settlement of the Russia–Ukraine war have failed not only to end the war but also to establish a common framework for a settlement. It concludes that the principal factor lies in the incompatibility of the main parties’ ultimate objectives. Russia seeks territorial and security arrangements that would reshape Ukraine’s relationship with the West, while Kyiv remains committed to its sovereignty and demands security guarantees designed to prevent a renewed war. The European Union supports Ukraine’s position while remaining open to a cessation of hostilities along the line of contact, whereas the United States prioritizes ending the hostilities and sharing with Europe the burden of providing security guarantees for Ukraine.
For this reason, the most realistic outcome of negotiations is not a comprehensive peace settlement, but rather a deterrence-backed ceasefire. This does not mean that the parties have abandoned their ultimate objectives. Rather, it means that the gap between those objectives and the minimum terms each side could accept can no longer be bridged within a single comprehensive agreement. Instead, intermediate arrangements are emerging as possible alternatives: a ceasefire, a monitored line of contact, security guarantees, monitoring mechanisms, and a deferred political process. In other words, a truce underpinned by deterrence and monitoring appears more conceivable than a comprehensive peace treaty.
[1] Institute for the Study of War, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 24, 2026,” September 24, 2026, https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/.
[2] Ali Al-Din Hilal, “Why Do Some Mediation Efforts Succeed and Others Fail in Ending Wars?” Future for Advanced Research and Studies, August 6, 2026. https://futureuae.com/en-US/Mainpage/Item/11193.
[3] Christian Baha, “Trump: Russia-Ukraine ‘Ridiculous War’ Must End,” Breaking the News, September 21, 2026, https://breakingthenews.net/Article/Trump:-Russia-Ukraine-ridiculous-war-must-end/67144173.
[4] “Kremlin says no progress made in Ukraine negotiations,” Anadolu Agency, September 23, 2026,
[5] Institute for the Study of War, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 23, 2026,” September 23, 2026, https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/.
[6] Institute for the Study of War, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 23, 2026.”
[7] Berk Kutay Gökmen, “Top US, Russian Diplomats Discuss Ukraine Settlement in 50-Minute Meeting at UN General Assembly,” Anadolu Agency, September 23, 2026, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/top-us-russian-diplomats-discuss-ukraine-settlement-in-50-minute-meeting-at-un-general-assembly/4066478.
[8] Tom Balmforth, Antoni Slodkowski, and Simon Lewis, “Zelenskiy warns of painful winter for Russia if energy truce talks fail,” Reuters, September 23, 2026,
[9] United Nations, “Ukraine War Entering ‘Dangerous New Phase’ as Attacks Intensify, Risk of Regional Spillover Grows, Political Affairs Chief Warns Security Council,” press release, SC/16460, September 23, 2026, https://press.un.org/en/2026/sc16460.doc.htm.
[10] Al Jazeera, “Lavrov: Russia’s War in Ukraine Will Continue ‘through to the End,’” NewsFeed, September 26, 2026, video, https://www.aljazeera.com/video/newsfeed/2026/9/26/lavrov-russias-war-in-ukraine-will-continue-through-to-the.
[11] Charap and Radchenko, “The Talks That Could Have Ended the War in Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs, April 16, 2024.
[12] “Russia demands eastern Donbas, Ukraine neutrality and no NATO membership to end the war,” Reuters, August 22, 2025.
[13] Institute for the Study of War, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 24, 2026.”
[14] Charap, “A Comprehensive U.S. Approach Could Help End the War in Ukraine,” RAND, August 25, 2025.
[15] Graham, “The Time Is Ripe for Russia-Ukraine Peace Talks, But Putin Could Escalate Conflict,” CFR, July 10, 2026; Chatham House, “How a Russia–Ukraine ceasefire could imperil Ukrainian and European security,” May 28, 2026.
[16] Zhao Long et al., “Reframing Common Security,” Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, July 2025.
[17] ACAPS, “Ukraine: Scenarios 2026,” March 2026.
