Hungary’s relations with the Turkic world
Over the last decade, Hungary’s ties with the Turkic world have been one of the most unique aspects of its foreign policy. Historical affinity, symbolic politics, and the “Eastern Opening policy”[1] eventually gave way to a more pragmatic basis for cooperation in the fields of energy, trade, transport, education, diplomacy, and limited security cooperation. So, the bigger question about the most recent elections in Hungary is not whether this connection is there or not, but whether it will remain a reliable instrument of the government or be overly reliant on the style of politics and ideology of the governing polity.
Why Turkic cooperation remains useful across election cycles and political change in Hungary
The question matters not only for Hungary but also for the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), which has increasingly viewed Budapest as a valuable European interlocutor. Since joining the OTS as an observer in 2018,[2] Hungary has increasingly been involved in the organization, with Budapest hosting the first informal summit in an observer country in May 2025. The event highlighted Hungary’s desire to be a bridge between Europe and the Turkic world, but it also revealed the tension inherent in that policy: will Hungary have a sensible strategic policy, or is it stretching civilizational claims that may not hold up during an election?[3]
A balanced answer must acknowledge both elements. Hungary’s Turkic policy has definitely had a symbolic dimension, particularly in the use of kinship, shared destiny, and unique geopolitical terms. But behind the rhetoric is a deeper level of financial interests that is far more lasting, such as energy diversification, new trade routes, educational exchange, transport connectivity, and a niche diplomatic role within Europe. This underlines the fact that if the tone of Hungary’s foreign policy changes as a result of the elections, a total turnaround to reject the Turkic world would not be in line with its national interests.[4]
From symbolism to strategy
The changing dynamics of Hungary’s relations with the Turkic world are noteworthy because they exemplify the process by which identity politics can turn into interest-based cooperation over time. In the initial stage, Budapest’s involvement frequently seemed to be motivated by stories of cultural affinity and the overall political logic of distancing Hungary from the broader foreign-policy trends of the rest of Europe. The Turkic connection was an opportunity for the government to declare that Hungary has other avenues to explore than the traditional ones in Western Europe, and it complemented the government’s image of a country with a flexible and sovereign foreign policy.
This engagement, however, became more institutionalized over time. Hungary’s status in the OTS is not merely symbolic, as it enabled Budapest to be part of a new regional structure that connects Türkiye with the Central Asian states of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, which are also members of the OTS in one form or another. This status was then followed by actual institutional development and collaboration, indicating that the policy was not performative. Once a relationship has acquired the trappings of bureaucracy, summits, sectoral projects, and regular diplomatic communications, it can be difficult to pull apart, especially because of the change of government.
The Budapest Informal Summit (May 2025) is a good example of that. The first such summit in the territory of an observer state was no mere turn in the wheel of ceremony; it meant that Hungary was now deemed to be significant within the OTS arena to act as a convening platform. For the diplomatic context, hosting is important because it is a source of legitimacy, agenda setting, and visibility for long-term partnerships. It also indicates the eagerness of the Turkic nations to regard Hungary as a member who is not only an outsider but also shows occasional political zeal.[5]
While the symbolic element shouldn’t be overlooked easily, it shouldn’t be ignored either. Hungary’s Turkic shift had a highly personal political undertone, and it was linked to the personal political rhetoric and worldview of the governing elite. This is why elections are important. The symbolic heat of the relationship might cool off very quickly if the current administration decides to adopt a more Atlanticist, more traditionally European, or simply more conservative foreign-policy stance.[6]
Why elections matter
Foreign policy is never just foreign policy, which is why Hungary’s elections matter. Despite similar overall strategic interests, governments define interests, fund them differently, and give them political significance in varying ways.[7] For the Turkic world, this suggests that the depth of the relationship cannot be overstated, as political affinity and leadership narratives have played a significant role in Hungary’s interaction with the Turkic world. This is a convincing warning that what appears sound on the level of summit diplomacy can be somewhat conditional on the level of political will.
There were three broad choices for a post-election government. It may proceed along the same lines with a minimum of change; it may keep the line of close Turkic co-operation both in its content and in its manner. Second, it might help to maintain the status quo of the relationship, but remove much of the ideological rhetoric, making the OTS a practical foreign-policy tool and not a relationship defined by a sense of identity. Third, it might scale back the relationship in a more serious way, however, with formal connections, lower-level visibility, resources, and political investment.
Of these three, the second seems the most likely and, presumably, the most sensible. A new government would likely keep the positive elements of cooperation but be less inclined to accept the “more apparent civilizational rhetoric”. Such a move wouldn’t be a break. Instead, it would signify the transition of Hungary’s Turkic policy from a mission-oriented program to a more systematic and business-oriented approach.
This should not be interpreted as a failure but as a normalization. Foreign policy ties often start off with political fervor and transition to institutional pragmatism over time. It is possible that Hungary’s post-election attitude toward the OTS may become more measured, which would increase the chances of the sustainability of the partnership, as it would be based more on tangible benefits and less on party identity.
Energy is a core advantage
The best reason for stability in Hungary’s ties with the Turkic community is energy cooperation. It points out that Hungarian authorities have repeatedly associated cooperation with Turkic states with the objective of getting supplies in an unstable regional environment. The reason is that energy policy is one of the few sectors where the abstract geopolitical orientation has an instant impact on economic resilience, the competitiveness of industry, and the cost to households.[8]
Structural reliance, which is inherent in the geography of Hungary, is the country’s permanent national need to diversify. The country imports gas primarily via connections with Türkiye, while Hungarian companies have also been investing in the gas resources of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. The Turkic connection isn’t merely a diplomatic convenience, but indeed a part of Hungary’s wider strategy to gain access, routes, and leverage in a fractured energy landscape.[9]
This relationship is not only about volume—it is about strategic optionality. Any diversification that reduces the country’s vulnerability to disruption is important, even if all the existing supply channels are not replaced. What is important is that the country be able to develop alternative supply channels that increase reliability and the country’s bargaining power. Cooperation with Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and other Turkic partners boosts Hungary’s resilience from this point of view, even if it is only a small part of its energy portfolio.
A critical perspective, however, should be aware of its boundaries. Energy alliances are politically manipulated, and sometimes governments highlight their exclusive relationships in a politically correct manner. So, it is justifiable to doubt the proportionality of all claims regarding the indispensable role of the Turkic dimension. Despite all this, the idea is still valid: Hungary’s advantage in an unstable world is to have as many viable paths, sources and regional partners as possible that diminish the exposure to concentration risk.[10]
Therefore, a future government would be mistaken to give up on the energy sector in Turkic cooperation. The practical incentives would still be high—even if it communicates in a more technocratic and less ideological manner. One of the most obvious policy areas that appeals to both governments is energy security, where the structural problem addressed by the policy does not go away once the elections are over.
The EU aims to support trade and logistics, as well as diversification into other sectors
The economic argument for further interaction with the Turkic world goes far beyond energy. It includes Hungary’s efforts to promote its strategic cooperation, credit lines, and sectoral projects with Turkic countries, as well as the growing market and logistics possibilities offered by OTS partners. This reflects a wider concept of a Hungary that leverages its Turkic connections to broaden its commercial horizons and ensure it becomes a link between the European and Eurasian economic zones.[11]
Hungarian companies are active in several fields, including rail, pharmaceuticals, industrial development, and infrastructure.[12] This fact is significant as it indicates that the link is not limited to high politics and official speech. Cooperation gets domestic constituencies that can lobby for continuity, even if different governments are in power, as firms, investors, universities and chambers of commerce become involved.
The logistics aspect is particularly important. The three areas of Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Türkiye have become significant in the debate on the Asia-European connectivity. These large-scale changes are not something Hungary can prevent, but it can benefit from them through corridor diplomacy, transport cooperation, and selecting infrastructure partnerships. Because it is not just a matter of nostalgia or identity politics but of seeking to bring Hungary into the new Eurasian networks.
Still, the scale of bilateral trade should not be exaggerated, and Hungary is not a decisive economic force in the Turkic region.[13] However, incremental benefits are not politically insignificant provided they expand markets, provide contracts for Hungarian businesses and provide long-term familiarity in regions, which could evolve into significance for the country in the coming decades.
A more critical interpretation might be that sometimes the government has been giving the impression of great strategic breakthroughs toward the east, but that they have been modest opportunities. There’s some truth to that criticism. The best argument for Hungary’s Turkic policy is that it neither intends to transform the national economy nor is it an expensive strategic gamble.
Soft power and long-term influence through education
Education is one of the most lasting elements of Hungary’s ties with the Turkic world. Thousands of students from the Turkic region study in Hungary in the scope of educational programs like the Stipendium Hungaricum.[14] This is a big plus, as influence can be generated through education that isn’t immediately reflected in statistics and summit communiqués, but that is more enduring over time.[15]
Students who spend formative years in Hungary can find jobs later in life in government, academia, business, media, or civil society in the Turkic world. They engender familiarity, trust, and institutional memory, which are important factors in international relations. They also create a sort of ‘soft power’ which is not so easily created by speeches or ceremonial diplomacy. The programs have multiple functions in Hungary. They reinforce the universities, enhance the country’s image on the international stage, and contribute to the integration of Budapest into the regional discourse. They also establish a social context for the continuity between two cabinets, as personal connections can endure reshuffles in cabinets or in diplomatic relations. In this respect, education is one of the most successful instances of a relationship that has outgrown the ideology it was based on.[16]
What’s important is that education policy is underrated, in part because of the lack of sensationalist headlines. But if the Turkic opening is politically demeaned by elections, education ties could well turn out to be the stabilizing centerpiece of the relationship. The reasons for offering scholarships and academic exchanges do not have to be a matter of grand civilizational narratives, but can be very practical ones of talent attraction, internationalization, and long-term diplomacy, in the eyes of a government skeptical of such narratives.
So, it is in the arena of educational engagement that continuity is one of the least controversial and most defensible. No one can realistically counter this view that Hungary should terminate or detract from such connections, as they provide mutually beneficial, low-cost, high-value relationships and help Hungary maintain its profile as an intellectually open, internationally connected country.
The boundaries of identity politics
We should not overestimate the extent of Turkish/Turkic linguistic influences on the structure of the Hungarian language. One reason is that politics has sometimes led the institutional game. The language of shared destiny, civilizational kinship, and historical-cultural affinity can strike a chord or convey a symbol and be emotionally or symbolically powerful, but it is insufficient to constitute a basis of long-term foreign policy.
Storytelling based on identity can create opportunities, bring political visibility, and make a country stand out. However, they can also cause distortions. They can inspire over-optimism among governments in terms of symbolism, understate policy trade-offs, or make ordinary partnerships look extraordinary in the history books. The Hungarian situation is a case in point: critics have frequently interpreted the Turkic turn in this way, and the emphasis of the rhetoric sometimes far outweighs the material significance of the connection.
This criticism is not to be overlooked but not enough to put the whole project in a ditch. Symbolism and interest are often intertwined in foreign policy. The problem is not that there is symbolism; the problem is that there isn’t enough practical judgment. A mature Hungary-OTS relationship would retain the positive elements of affinity politics but would make them more subject to specific objectives, including energy diversification, business opportunities, joint research, and diplomatic positioning.[17]
That is, it is not necessary to ‘decide’ to stop being ‘tangled up with’ in order to de-ideologize. Conversely, it could be argued that less reliance on identity language is the most effective way of domesticizing and internationalizing the policy. The new government, with a lesser attachment to cultural ideology, may be able to maintain almost all the positive attributes of Turkic cooperation.
Hungary’s value for the OTS
Hungary’s value for the OTS is not symbolic alone, but structural. The relationship is mutual; Hungary has a special structural value to the Turkic countries as an interlocutor in Europe within the legal and political framework of the EU. For the Turkic states, Hungary offers a rare and credible European partner that can translate their interests into a more accessible political and institutional context. This is significant as it highlights the importance of Budapest beyond its symbolic novelty to the OTS.[18]
The geostrategic advantage of Hungary translates into benefits for the Turkic states, in terms of a host country for dialogue, visibility in Europe, and an institutional base that is not centered in the West. Hungary’s presence as an observer and not a member state contributes to the OTS expanding its diplomatic horizon and to the fact that it has relevance beyond its immediate, core members. This is reinforced since the Hungarian OTS Representation Office has been established, bringing the relationship into a real European context.
In this sense, Hungary can function as a diplomatic multiplier for the Turkic states: it can provide avenues of contact, provide regulatory familiarity and bring to the European audience a form of Turkic cooperation more accessible. It cannot be idealized as Hungary has limited influence in the EU, and the OTS is a relatively new and still not a fully institutionalized organization. Yet that limitation does not negate its usefulness; rather, it clarifies the kind of value Budapest brings—access, hosting capacity, visibility, and continuity.
That’s another factor that makes it unlikely that there’s going to be a complete break as an outcome of the elections. However, even in a more conservative future Hungarian government, the OTS will have reason to maintain Budapest as a gateway, contact, and European focal point. The relationship may become less ideological, but precisely for that reason, it may become more durable and more functional for both sides.
A critical but positive path forward
The most compelling policy argument for Hungary is not wild-eyed extremism but focused continuity. The future of Turkic cooperation hinges on the possibility of making it de-ideologized while not becoming diluted. That’s a pretty good characterization of the problem. Hungary should not idealize the Turkic world nor shun it needlessly.
The pillars of a serious post-election strategy would be quite few and to the point. It would continue to promote energy co-operation and supply diversification, facilitate transport and logistics co-operation, foster the development of commercially viable bilateral projects, ensure educational and research exchange, and keep the OTS channel as an addition to Hungary’s EU and NATO engagements, not as a replacement for them.[19] This is crucial as the trustworthiness of the Hungarian foreign policy relies on the fact that Turkic engagement doesn’t run counter to the country’s Western institutional membership.
At the same time, a stronger EU-oriented Hungarian foreign policy under the new government could create new constraints for OTS engagement, particularly where the organization’s links to Northern Cyprus raise sensitivities within the European institutional framework. This does not undermine the relationship, but it does mean that Hungary’s room for maneuver will depend increasingly on how carefully it balances OTS cooperation with its EU commitments.
This approach would also contribute to responding to the opposition at home. It would demonstrate that the intent of cooperation is not to indulge in rhetorical fantasies, but to pursue specific national interests that can be identified. A more pragmatic approach might help to make the policy more palatable to other parties and thus more sustainable between elections.
The same applies outwards. The question is whether Europe will be less resistant to Hungary’s Turkic activism when it is seen as a tool for diversification, connectivity, and dialogue, as opposed to a geopolitical identity statement. Similarly, the Turkic partners might ultimately want a partnership that is more about doing rather than saying. This would also be a partnership based on doing rather than saying, with more continuity and less partisan turnover, which may be more desirable for Turkic partners.
Conclusion
The elections in Hungary are expected to influence the nature, depth, and political agenda of Budapest’s relationship with the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), but they are not likely to end the ties. The most important facets of cooperation now focus on shared interests that are deeper and wider than mere campaign pledges: energy security, economic diversification, education exchange, diplomatic flexibility, and regional placement. These are not abstract gestures. They are policy resources, and they are useful even in the language of a more moderate policy.
It is therefore not incompatible to have a critical viewpoint accompanied by a positive conclusion. Hungary’s Turkic policy sometimes becomes overly symbolic and symbolized, and the civilizational rhetoric is sometimes overstated. But the benefits of continuing bilateral ties with the Turkic world are significant and worth it. The smart thing to do is to desacralize the relationship: less ideology, more strategy; less political showmanship, more institutional value.
So, if Hungary goes that way, eventually it will be even stronger than ever in the context of Turkic cooperation. This partnership will endure beyond party changes, be more effective in providing tangible gains, and make Budapest a viable link between Europe and the Turkic world. It’s not so much that Hungary is choosing to break up the relationship as it is reaching maturity to sustain it, and that’s the real message of the Hungarian elections for the OTS.
[1] Greilinger Gabriela, “Hungary’s Eastern Opening Policy as a Long-Term Political Strategy,” AIES Fokus, 2023, https://www.aies.at/download/2023/AIES-Fokus-2023-04.pdf.
[2] Organization of Turkic States, “Observers,” https://turkicstates.org/en/observers. Accessed June 1, 2026.
[3] Organization of Turkic States, “Informal Summit of the OTS held in Budapest,” https://turkicstates.org/en/news/informal-summit-of-the-ots-held-in-budapest. Accessed June 1, 2026.
[4]Organization of Turkic States, “Budapest Declaration,” https://turkicstates.org/u/f/budapest-declaration.pdf. Accessed June 1, 2026.
[5] Organization of Turkic States, “OTS Secretary General’s Interviews Highlight Key Outcomes of the Budapest Summit,” May 25, 2025, http://www.turkicstates.org/en/news/ots-secretary-generals-interviews-highlight-key-outcomes-of-the-budapest-summit.
[6] Biró, Dávid; Seremet, Sándor; Vasa, László, “Nemcsak megfigyelő, hanem formáló – Magyarország szerepe a türk államok biztonsági együttműködésében,” Magyar Külügyi Intézet, May 20, 2025, https://hiia.hu/nemcsak-megfigyelo-hanem-formalo/.
[7] “EU cash, Ukraine, Russia and migration: Five takeaways from Péter Magyar’s press conference,” Euronews, April 12, 2026, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/04/13/eu-cash-ukraine-russia-and-migration-five-takeaways-from-peter-magyars-press-conference.
[8] Biró, Dávid; Vasa László, “Türk energiaregionalizmus: új szövetségek Kelet és Nyugat között,” Magyar Külügyi Intézet, https://hiia.hu/turk-energiaregionalizmus-uj-szovetsegek-kelet-es-nyugat-kozott/. Accessed June 2, 2026.
[9] “Hungary’s energy security boosted by OTS nations, PM Orbán says,” Trend News Agency, November 5, 2024, https://en.trend.az/business/3966185.html.
[10] “Hungary to deepen energy cooperation with Turkic Organization states,” Report.az, October 6, 2025, https://report.az/en/foreign-politics/hungary-to-deepen-energy-cooperation-with-turkic-organization-states.
[11] Report on Turkic Economies 2024: Strengthening Transport and Energy Connectivity among Turkic States, Turkic Academy and OTS (2025), https://turkicstates.org/u/Report%20on%20Turkic%20Economies%202024.pdf. Accessed June 2, 2026,
[12] “Hungary to further strengthen relationship with Turkic states,” Telex, May 20, 2025, https://telex.hu/english/2025/05/21/szijjarto-hungary-to-strengthen-relationship-with-turkic-states.
[13] “What is Hungary doing in the Organisation of Turkic States?,” Emerging Europe, January 18, 2023, https://emerging-europe.com/explainer/explainer-what-is-hungary-doing-in-the-organisation-of-turkic-states/. Accessed June 2, 2026.
[14] Stipendium Hungaricum, “Apply,” https://stipendiumhungaricum.hu/apply/. Accessed June 2, 2026.
[15] Szegedi Tudományegyetem, “Stipendium Hungaricum,” https://u-szeged.hu/stipendium-hungaricum. accessed June 1, 2026.
[16] “Hungarian State Scholarships,” ELTE, May 13, 2016, https://www.elte.hu/en/incoming-mobility/hungarian-state-scholarship. Accessed June 1, 2026.
[17] Organization of Turkic States, “The 3rd Meeting of OTS Ministers in charge of Energy convened in Budapest,” November 28, 2024, https://www.turkicstates.org/en/news/the-3rd-meeting-of-ots-ministers-in-charge-of-energy-convened-in-budapest.
[18] Organization of Turkic States, “Hungary Joins the Turkic Investment Fund,” October 8, 2024, https://www.turkicstates.org/en/news/hungary-joins-the-turkic-investment-fund.
[19] “OTS: Projects are ongoing to boost cargo transportation via Middle Corridor,” Report.az, December 25, 2024, https://report.az/en/infrastructure/ots-projects-are-ongoing-to-boost-cargo-transportation-via-middle-corridor/.
