The United States held its 2026 midterm elections on 3 November, amid an ongoing war against Iran that has lasted more than eight months and had a significant impact on the Trump administration’s domestic agenda. With no foreseeable peaceful resolution to the war in sight, rising gas prices, costs of living, and rampant inflation, voters in the United States have grown frustrated with the current administration’s policies,[1] reflected in President Donald Trump’s record-low approval rating of 31% just weeks before the elections. As of 4 November, major news organizations projected that Democrats had regained both chambers of Congress, including victories in Republican strongholds. Although counting continued and final seat totals remained unsettled, the transition toward divided government was clear. This insight analyzes the outcome of the U.S. midterm elections and examines its implications on domestic and foreign policy spheres, particularly the extent to which the election results affect U.S. foreign policy choices regarding the Iran war.

The significance of the electoral outcome

Midterm elections take place halfway into a U.S. president’s four-year term, serving as a means of checking presidential power, public approval, and rebalancing of representation in Congress. The midterms effectively act as a referendum on approval of the sitting president, his administration, and the party. While the presidency is not on the ballot, the elections determine who controls Congress through its two chambers, the Senate and the House of Representatives, and therefore can significantly shape the remainder of a president’s term. Losing competitive districts and longstanding strongholds indicates electoral vulnerability and raises broader questions about the governing coalition’s durability.

Historically, the elected party has been particularly vulnerable in the House of Representatives in midterm elections. Since 1934, the sitting president’s party has lost House seats in 20 of 23 midterm elections, with an average net loss of 27 seats per midterm. The Senate is a similar case, although to a lesser extent, with an average net loss of 3.4 seats in midterm elections. This is partly explained by the fact that during midterms, only one-third of Senate seats are up for election, whereas in the House, all seats are due for renewal.

Prior to the midterm elections, the presidency, the Supreme Court, and both chambers of Congress were under Republican control. Considering that Republicans enjoyed a unified government leading up to the elections, and within the context of voter frustrations, particularly for the last eight months, it seemed almost a bygone conclusion that the question was not if the Republicans lose, but by how much they lose.

The Democrats have achieved a landslide win and made a strong comeback. In the Senate, Democrats have secured 54 seats, compared with 44 for Republicans so far, surpassing the 51-seat threshold required for a majority. Seven Senate seats were flipped, including North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Ohio, Maine, Kansas and Iowa. The result cannot establish a permanent partisan realignment, but it demonstrates that Republican strength in these states was insufficient to withstand the national political environment. Candidate selection also mattered in that several candidates backed by Trump lost races his party had expected to win.[2]

Figure 1: U.S. mid-term election results

Source: CNN, https://edition.cnn.com/

Meanwhile, Democrats have won 231 seats in the House of Representatives, compared with 139 for Republicans, with vote counting still underway as of 13:30 UAE local time. 27 seats were flipped. In the 2018 midterm elections during Donald Trump’s first term, the Democrats were only able to win the House, with the Republicans retaining Senate control, which makes this year’s results a landmark event just purely from the point of view of election arithmetic.

The outcome should be interpreted as a demand for political correction, rather than an unconditional endorsement of the Democratic platform. A coalition united by dissatisfaction with the administration may disagree over taxation, immigration, or the terms of a settlement with Iran. Democrats still need to translate electoral opposition into a workable governing agenda and a viable candidate in 2028. Their control of Congress increases both their influence and their exposure to public disappointment if economic conditions fail to improve.

Domestic implications of the U.S. midterm elections

The results are a rebuke of Donald Trump’s presidency and the Republican Party. This is further reflected by the wins of the Democrats in states considered as competitive and key battlegrounds, including typically Republican strongholds, such as Texas, Kansas, and South Carolina. Another case is Ohio, which was once considered a swing state yet has shifted strongly Republican in recent times, only to be flipped by the Democrats this time.

As mentioned, the midterm results are not necessarily an endorsement of the Democratic party, but rather a condemnation of the Republican policies. In other words, it was the Trump administration’s failures and shortcomings that pushed American voters not necessarily to elect Democrats, but to de-elect the Republicans currently holding office in Congress. Trump will be a lame-duck president for the remainder of his term. The results could also deepen divisions within the Republican Party and reshape its political calculations ahead of the 2028 elections.

The gap between the administration’s promises and its policy outcomes became increasingly apparent across the economy, immigration, and foreign affairs. Trump pledged to lower consumer prices, stimulate growth, and use tariffs to narrow the roughly US$1 trillion annual trade deficit. Instead, import tariffs and higher energy costs associated with the Iran war intensified pressure on household finances. This shift is compounded by unprecedented levels of U.S. sovereign debt (US$40.3 trillion) and mounting fiscal pressures (US$1.9 trillion budget deficit). On immigration, tighter border controls reduced migrant arrivals, while thousands were deported under his promised campaign of unprecedented removals. However, enforcement involving ICE, National Guard deployments, and immigration raids drew widespread opposition, particularly following fatal incidents.

The Iran war connected foreign policy choices to household finances. Energy costs affect transportation and production, transmitting external insecurity into domestic purchasing power. Import tariffs created an additional burden when businesses passed higher costs to consumers. The combined political effect was particularly difficult to manage for an administration elected on promises of greater affordability. Arguments about long-term strategic gains became harder to sustain when voters experienced immediate costs without a convincing timetable for relief.

For Republicans, the defeat is likely to sharpen debate over their approach to the 2028 presidential election. Some may argue that the party needs greater distance from Trump’s policy choices and candidate preferences. Others may attribute the losses to campaign execution or insufficient mobilization. The balance between these explanations will influence whether Republicans continue to support the president consistently or become more willing to negotiate with Democrats on selected issues.

Starting from January 2027, when the new Congress is sworn in, the remainder of Trump’s presidency will be a divided government. Until then, Republicans retain an opportunity to advance pending nominations and legislation. In this tense political atmosphere, the administration is likely to rush with the incumbent Republican Senate to confirm appointments of judges, ambassadors, and senior officials, as post-January Congress could reject or delay future nominees. A similar push is likely to go underway to approve funding for government agencies and defense, as settling now could alleviate negotiations with Democrats next year.

Under a divided government, Democrats can use control of the legislative agenda to block new initiatives and seek concessions on funding. A Democratic Senate can also reject presidential nominees. Nevertheless, Trump retains the veto power, and overriding it requires two-thirds support in each chamber of Congress. The constitutional structure gives both sides considerable capacity to prevent action while requiring cooperation to enact durable changes.[3] The judiciary remains institutionally separate from these partisan contests and will continue to adjudicate disputes over the boundaries of executive action.

Implications for foreign policy and the Iran war

Donald Trump’s pledge to serve as a “president of peace”, avoid new wars, and resolve the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, contrasted with the joint U.S.-Israeli campaign against Iran, which provoked public opposition and challenges to its legality. Meanwhile, ceasefire efforts in Gaza stalled, and the conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine remained unresolved.

Democratic control of Congress could constrain Trump’s legislative agenda and intensify congressional oversight of his administration, particularly regarding the war with Iran. The Iran war has cost the Department of War and U.S. taxpayers over US$47 billion so far, including more than US$29 billion projected for replacing expended munitions.[4]

As significant as the sweep of Congress by Democrats in the midterm elections is, and although it likely limits and challenges the Trump administration’s ability to govern domestically, the President retains significant executive powers. Overall, even with Congress set to come under Democratic control, there are still limits to how much lawmakers can restrain Trump’s authority over foreign policy, including the Iran war. When the new Congress is sworn in, the “power of the purse” will likely begin to appear as a tool for the Democrats, who will have a say in matters of funding, having the ability to deny or attach specific conditions to funding requests.

Congress’s most consequential instrument is its authority over appropriations. Democrats could seek conditions on additional war funding, require more detailed expenditure reports, or distinguish protection of deployed personnel from financing new offensive operations. Requests to replenish munitions could become occasions to question the campaign’s objectives and sustainability. This would force the administration to explain how further resources would improve the strategic outcome, rather than merely sustain existing operations.

However, withholding funds in Congress is politically and operationally difficult. Lawmakers may oppose escalation while supporting defensive capabilities, force protection, and assistance to regional partners. Existing appropriations can also sustain activity before new funding decisions arise. A broad cutoff for funding could expose Democrats to accusations of endangering personnel, encouraging them to favor targeted restrictions instead. The effect of congressional leverage will depend on the wording of funding conditions, their timing, and the coalition willing to enforce them.

War powers provide a further avenue for contestation. The War Powers Resolution establishes reporting requirements and generally requires termination of covered hostilities 60 days after a qualifying report is submitted or required, absent congressional authorization and subject to statutory exceptions and a limited extension. There are procedures in Congress for considering measures authorizing force or directing withdrawal.[5] Applying these provisions to particular operations can generate disputes over executive authority and the definition of hostilities. Electoral victory alone neither resolves those disputes nor automatically terminates military action.

The election increases incentives to reconsider the war’s political costs but does not establish that Trump will change course. The president acknowledged Iran had contributed to Republican losses while defending his original decision to launch the conflict.[6] His emphasis on higher gasoline prices suggested that he distinguished the war’s strategic purpose from its immediate electoral consequences. This distinction matters because a president who accepts the economic criticism may still resist a settlement he considers strategically inadequate.

There are two broad, plausible responses possible from Donald Trump. The administration could pursue negotiations with Iran more actively to reduce costs and recover domestic political initiative. Alternatively, it could maintain or intensify pressure in the expectation that stronger coercion will produce better terms for the war outcome. Neither response follows automatically from the election. The choice depends on the administration’s assessment of Iranian intentions, the feasibility of an agreement, and the risks associated with further military action.

Tehran would also face a complex calculation in the end. Congressional opposition might weaken the credibility of a prolonged American campaign, encouraging Iran to wait for further constraints on the president and better terms for itself. Yet assuming that electoral defeat eliminates Washington’s capacity to act would be hazardous for Iran. As pointed out, the executive retains significant operational authority, and concern about Iranian capabilities can attract support across U.S. party lines. A settlement would also need enough political backing to survive domestic challenges and provide credible expectations of implementation with clear benefits (or lower risks) to the American public.

Implication for the Gulf states

For Gulf Arab states, the immediate concern is whether Washington’s internal disputes make escalation harder to predict. Greater congressional scrutiny could encourage diplomacy, but a contested transition could also produce inconsistent signals about American intentions. Gulf countries would have plenty of reason to maintain dialogue with the Trump administration while expanding engagement with congressional leaders. On issues requiring appropriations or legislative support, relationships with both branches can help clarify which commitments are likely to endure.

Any negotiations would need to address the security concerns of states exposed to retaliation and disruption to energy infrastructure and maritime trade. An agreement focused narrowly on American domestic political relief could prove fragile if Gulf regional partners regard it as inadequate. Conversely, demands so extensive that no workable settlement is possible could prolong the economic pressures that helped drive the electoral backlash. The challenge is to connect diplomatic objectives with an acceptable and sustainable regional security arrangement.

Diplomatic sequencing to approach the tense situation in the Gulf matters more. Limited arrangements that reduce immediate risks could create space for wider negotiations, provided each side can verify compliance and explain the benefits domestically. Such steps would also give congressional leaders concrete outcomes against which to assess the administration’s policy. Their value would depend on whether they reduce the likelihood of renewed conflict, rather than simply postpone the next confrontation. Gulf partners could help identify practical measures, but their participation would require confidence that Washington’s commitments can survive disagreement at home.

On the economic front, the Gulf’s growing access to coveted AI chips and other sensitive tech under the current administration is another storyline to watch. A hostile Congress is unlikely to unwind these burgeoning AI partnerships, but it could make regional tech dealmaking a more contentious issue. Trump, meanwhile, could double down on unilateral moves to reward Gulf allies as his domestic room for maneuvering shrinks.[7]

Conclusion

The midterms have strengthened the institutional capacity to challenge the administration while leaving the direction of U.S. policy unsettled. Their significance for the Middle East will become clearer through subsequent funding decisions, the conduct of oversight, and the administration’s response to diplomatic opportunities. Democratic gains can make continued confrontation more difficult to sustain politically, and turning that pressure into de-escalation will require choices by both branches of government and an agreement that the principal regional actors have reason to uphold.

[1] Joseph Ax, Brad Heath, and Jason Lange, “Democrats Seize Congress in Sweeping Midterm Repudiation of Trump,” Reuters, November 4, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/democrats-seize-congress-sweeping-midterm-repudiation-trump-2026-11-04/.

[2] Reuters News Service, “US Midterms: Five Takeaways from Democrats’ Sweeping Victory,” Cyprus Mail, November 4, 2026, https://cyprus-mail.com/2026/11/04/us-midterms-five-takeaways-from-democrats-sweeping-victory.

[3] U.S. Constitution, art. I, secs. 7–9; art. II, sec. 2, National Archives, “The Constitution of the United States: A Transcription,” accessed November 4, 2026, https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript.

[4] Phil Stewart, “US Costs of Iran War Rise to over $47 Billion, According to Pentagon Estimate,” Reuters, October 28, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-costs-iran-war-rise-over-47-billion-according-pentagon-estimate-2026-10-28/.

[5] Michael Greene, War Powers Resolution: Expedited Procedures in the House and Senate, R47603 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 22, 2023), https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R47603/R47603.10.pdf.

[6] “’Iran Was a Piece of It’: Trump Admits War Hurt Republicans,” Türkiye Today, November 4, 2026, https://www.turkiyetoday.com/world/iran-was-a-piece-of-it-trump-admits-war-hurt-republicans-3231681.

[7] Samuel Wendel, “US Elections Spotlight Gulf Tech Risks,” Al Monitor, November 3, 2026, https://www.al-monitor.com/newsletter/2026-11-03/us-elections-spotlight-gulf-tech-risks.