As disruptions in shipping through the Strait of Hormuz cross two months, the global economy is reeling from shortages and high prices of energy, food, fertilizers, medicines, and diverse items that are essential for the world’s well-being and its manufacturing and technology industries. The immediate impact has been on the energy sector. International energy authority Daniel Yergin has written in the Financial Times that the world is looking at “the biggest disruption in oil production in history as well as a resounding shock to global gas markets.”[1] Yergin points out that 20% of the world’s oil and LNG travels through the Hormuz.
But, beyond the present shocks to the global economy, there is no certainty that a ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran and the commencement of peace negotiations will bring an end to the ongoing disruptions. The Executive Director of the Paris-based International Energy Agency (IEA), Fatih Birol, has said that “even if the Hormuz reopens tomorrow, geopolitical uncertainty will hang over it for years.”[2] Birol points out that energy exporters and importers are looking for new routes that “will redraw the global energy map, changing geopolitics, trade and the relative competitiveness of countries.”[3]
This insight will examine the nature and extent of the disruption in global commerce due to the Hormuz closure, the ongoing attempts at identifying and developing new routes, and the challenges that these efforts are facing.
Impact on energy supplies
Before the closure of the Hormuz in early March, the international economy was already reeling from disruptions in shipping through the Red Sea since the beginning of the Gaza war in October 2023. The Houthis in Yemen had begun attacks on ships associated with the U.S. and Israel from November; by October 2024, they had already mounted 190 attacks. The United States and the European Union navies responded with lethal military assaults on Houthi targets on sea and land, but the Houthi attacks persisted until the U.S. entered into a ceasefire arrangement with the Houthis in early 2025.
These attacks had immediately diverted international shipping from the Red Sea, accounting for 12-15% of global maritime trade, to the much longer route around the Cape of Good Hope, adding 3,500-4,000 nautical miles to the Asia-Europe journey and longer delivery times of 10-15 days, as well as higher freight container rates and insurance costs. Supply chains involving energy, agriculture, electronics and automotives were severely disrupted. The International Transport Forum has estimated that the Red Sea disruption will add costs of $15-20 billion to global trade.
The disruption in Hormuz traffic occurred when Red Sea transit had not fully stabilized; though Houthi attacks had reduced, shippers were wary of crossing the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Now, with the Hormuz closure, the impact on energy shipments was even more drastic—more than 30,000 ships transit the strait annually.
Out of the world’s total consumption of about 103.5 million barrels of oil per day (mbd) in 2025 (and 105 mbd in 2026), over 20% passes through the Hormuz daily; besides this, 20% of global LNG transits the Hormuz, consisting of 96% of Qatari exports and 93% of UAE exports. Between 1 and 25 March, just 142 vessels transited the Hormuz, as against 2,600 vessels in the same period last year.[4] Brent oil prices went from $64/barrel in February 2026 to over $100/barrel by mid-March; they reached $111/barrel by mid-April and were at $98/barrel in early June, with prices falling in response to news relating to prospects of peace, only to rise when these hopes were dashed.
The GCC states and Iraq, taken together, constitute the world’s largest oil export hub, accounting for about 44% of global oil exports. North America (the U.S. and Canada) has a 20% share in global oil exports, while Africa (mainly Nigeria and Angola) has an 11% share, and South America (mainly Brazil and Venezuela) has an 8% share. The export constraints that the Hormuz creates for Gulf producers are not present at other global supply hubs.
Saudi Arabia, the UAE—two among Gulf producers—and Iraq are in a position to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia has the East-West Pipeline (also called Petroline) that goes from the Abqaiq oil processing center at the Arabian Gulf to Yanbu Port on the Red Sea, a distance of 1,200 km. This pipeline has a capacity of 7 mbd, of which, in March this year, 5 mbd was made available for export, the rest being retained for local refineries. Saudi Arabia has a total production capacity of over 12 mbd, but in terms of OPEC+ quotas, in 2024, it exported about 5.5 mbd.
The UAE has the Habshan-Fujairah oil pipeline of 380 km that has a capacity of 1.5 mbd, as against the UAE’s total exports of 2.75 mbd in January 2025. The UAE has a second pipeline under construction from Ruwais to Fujairah, with a capacity of 1.5 mbd; it is scheduled for completion in 2027.
Iraq has a pipeline that goes from Kirkuk to the Türkiye port of Ceyhan on the East Mediterranean, which is 970 km long. It consists of two pipelines with a joint capacity of 1.4 mbd, but at present it is only carrying 200,000 b/d due to maintenance problems; when repaired, it is expected to transport 600,000 b/d.
Thus, these three pipelines have a joint total capacity of about 7 mbd, as against oil exports through the Hormuz of 20 mbd.[5]
From the perspective of importers, Asian consumers—China, India, Japan and Korea—have the highest dependence on Middle East supplies. About 80% of Middle East exports go to these countries, which consume about 35-40% of global oil. China consumes about 15-16 mbd and has a 70-75% import dependency, while India consumes 5-6 mbd and has an 85-90% import dependency.
Exports to Asian consumers are influenced by maritime chokepoints. While most Gulf exports face an initial obstruction at the Hormuz, importers in Northeast Asia face a second chokepoint at the Strait of Malacca. Thus, the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca together account for over 60% of total seaborne oil flow.
Impact on non-energy trade
Urea
Besides energy resources, the Gulf’s ports are a major hub for global non-energy trade as well. The most important item in this regard is urea. It is the most widely used nitrogen fertilizer, which is produced from natural gas. About 30% of globally traded urea is shipped from Gulf ports, along with other fertilizer-related items such as potash, ammonia and phosphates.
With the commencement of the war on Iran from 28 February, these shipments have been severely curtailed. Thus, while 1.3 million tonnes of fertilizer-related items were exported through the Hormuz in March last year, this March, only 82,000 tonnes were exported.
Fertilizer costs account for a third of the cost of agricultural products such as corn and wheat; with significant increases in urea prices, this signals a rise in food costs globally. It is projected that a longer closure of the Strait of Hormuz would increase global wheat prices by 4.2%. However, food price rise in certain countries could be much higher: Zambia (30%); Sri Lanka (15%); Pakistan (12.5%); India (11%); and Türkiye (9.5%).[6] There are also concerns that there could be worldwide shortages in food production since March and April are the planting season in the Northern Hemisphere.
Sulphur/Petrochemical derivatives
Another byproduct in the processing of crude oil and natural gas is Sulphur, which is produced in large volumes in the Gulf: half of the global seaborne Sulphur trade passes through the Hormuz. Sulphur is used as an agricultural fertilizer and to make Sulphuric acid, which is used to process copper, cobalt and nickel and for the extraction of lithium. As against the export of 1.7 million tonnes of Sulphur in March last year, the export this March was 115,000 tonnes.
The Hormuz closure has also affected the exports of petrochemical derivatives, such as methanol and ethylene, which are used in the pharmaceuticals sector, particularly in the manufacture of painkillers, vaccines and antibiotics.
Helium
One major disruption caused by the closure of the Hormuz has been to advanced semiconductor fabrication facilities in Taiwan and South Korea. These manufacturing processes require raw materials such as helium, which is extracted as a byproduct from LNG liquefication facilities, mainly in Qatar.
In 2024, Qatar exported about 9.3 billion cubic feet per day of natural gas through the Hormuz. These LNG shipments went primarily to Northeast Asia: China (77 million tonnes per annum), Japan (66 MT), South Korea (47 MT), and Taiwan (22 MT); taken together, these four buyers account for half of global LNG demand.
Their high-precision fabrication facilities, including the world’s critical semiconductor foundries, depend crucially on the uninterrupted arrival of these refrigerated LNG shipments to ensure power supply without outages. Taiwan, which produces 70% of the world’s advanced semiconductors used in smartphones, computers and data centers, has been most seriously affected by the disruption in LNG supplies from Qatar, which account for 33.5% of its LNG imports. Again, Korea imports about 20% of its natural gas from Qatar to ensure stable energy supplies for its semiconductor facilities, which produce half the world’s flash memory chips.[7]
Disruption in helium supplies due to the Hormuz closure has pushed up the cost of helium itself, with a cascading impact on the cost of a single wafer from $20,000 to $30,000, and on the prices of smartphones and computers. The most significant impact has been on the infrastructure sector that supports AI technologies, affecting advanced graphics processors and high-bandwidth memory chips needed for data centers.
Hormuz – the digital jugular
The vast majority of the world’s internet communications are transmitted through undersea cables. These cables are either electrical or fiber-optic cables that are laid on the sea floor to transmit data and power, including 90% of the world’s internet traffic. Damage to these cables can lead to slower internet speeds, outages, and disruption to economic activity.[8]
During the Houthi-initiated attacks on regional shipping in late 2023, there were two major outages that severed four undersea cables, paralyzing connectivity across the world’s most vital arteries. These incidents exposed “the world’s reliance on these fragile links [and] just how vulnerable global internet traffic remains in the face of geopolitical turmoil.”[9]
The Strait of Hormuz is a critical corridor that links India and Southeast Asia with Europe, while providing internet services to the Gulf countries and Egypt. A Gulf observer has described the Hormuz as “the digital jugular of three continents,”[10] while another commentator has explained:
The Strait of Hormuz is not just an energy chokepoint; it is one of the world’s most critical digital bottlenecks. … the clustering of these multi-terabit cables in such a shallow, volatile maritime corridor creates a massive single point of failure for the global internet backbone.[11]
These undersea cables are crucial for the functioning of regional energy and financial systems. The energy sector depends on automated digital control systems for oil extraction and LNG logistics, while the global financial system processes daily transactions valued at about $10 trillion through cables.
One major impact of the Iran conflict is the critical blow it has already dealt to global digital infrastructure—the regional subsea cable systems. Some of the major projects that have been adversely affected are:[12]
- The 2Africa Pearls, a 45,000-km subsea cable system, which was to connect Oman, the UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, Pakistan and India, has declared force majeure due to military operations in the Gulf region. Once completed, this project will carry data traffic for more than three billion people, linking Asia, Europe and Africa.
- The SEA-ME-WE 6 and SEA-ME-WE 6 Gulf Extension (known as Al-Khaleej Cable System): this also connects Asia, Europe and Africa. The cable was to go through the Strait of Hormuz, linking the UAE, Qatar and Bahrain, coming on land at Al-Khobar, then traversing the Arabian Peninsula and emerging at Yanbu to go to Egypt and thence to Europe (or reaching Europe through Jordan or Syria). The Iran conflict has now indefinitely delayed the project.
- Fibre in Gulf (FiG): This project, now at a nascent stage, seeks to link the six GCC states and Iraq. It had earlier bypassed the Red Sea and was looking at land connectivity from Iraq to Türkiye to Europe. Due to the ongoing war, it is suspended for now.
- WorldLink Transit Cable Project: It has been developed by a joint UAE-Iraq consortium. It involves a submarine segment from Abu Dhabi to Faw in southern Iraq and then a land route through Iraq to Türkiye. The project’s principal feature was that it bypassed the turbulent Red Sea and placed the Gulf at the center of Asia-Europe connectivity. That feature has now collapsed.
Observers have noted that the present is a “watershed moment” for the global subsea industry. Meta, for instance, has responded by promoting “Project Waterworth” that links India, South Africa, the U.S. and Brazil, completely bypassing West Asia. The conflicts in West Asia over two and a half years have “fundamentally shattered the [submarine cable] industry’s long-held assumption that the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf represent viable, secure corridors for the world’s digital backbone.”[13]
Revitalizing connectivity
Over the last decade, the GCC states have emerged as hubs for regional and global energy, trade, financial and technological connectivity. Their location on the East-West route and the development of modern connectivity hubs with digital technology have enabled the GCC states “to reposition themselves as pivotal players in a multipolar world—acting not only as intermediaries in diplomacy, but as architects and beneficiaries of a new global connectivity.”[14]
This central role of the GCC states in global supply chains reflects the emergence of the states of the Global South as significant players in global commerce and the attendant need to pursue new routes—such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the planned India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) and the Iraq Development Road Corridor (IDRC)—to facilitate both South-South economic connectivity and fresh East-West trade links.
Amidst ongoing regional conflicts, we are examining below how existing projects could be used by GCC states to reshape regional connectivity after the ongoing conflicts, as well as some new proposals that are being discussed by policymakers.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
The GCC states already have a central place in the six arenas of cooperation set out in the China-promoted BRI: conventional and renewable energy; infrastructure and transport; trade and investment; nuclear energy, digital technology, and space.[15] China is the principal importer of oil and gas from the GCC states and their major trade partner. It has invested in the development of several of the new ports and industrial zones in the region; these include the Yanbu Refinery and Port and the NEOM project in Saudi Arabia; the industrial city in Abu Dhabi’s Khalifa Industrial Zone; the development of the Northern Economic Zone in Kuwait; and the Duqm Port and Industrial Zone in Oman.
The UAE is now the cornerstone of the BRI, having placed itself as the “premier gateway connecting the economic might of Asia with the vast potential of the Middle East and Africa.”[16] Besides the UAE’s location at the crossroads of global commerce and its achievements in building world-class infrastructure, the $10 billion UAE-China Investment Cooperation Fund has enabled the two partners to jointly finance and develop important projects, including in third countries, particularly in East Africa.
Besides physical connectivity projects, in March 2015, China announced that the BRI would be complemented by the Digital Silk Road (DSR), under which Chinese technology companies would upgrade the participating countries’ telecommunications networks, satellite information passageways, artificial intelligence capabilities, cloud computing, e-commerce and mobile payment systems, surveillance technology, smart cities and other high-tech areas. In 2020, Saudi Arabia and the UAE joined the DSR, enabling Huawei to build the 5G network in the UAE and Alibaba to back the NEOM smart city project in Saudi Arabia.[17]
Looking ahead, the GCC states may be expected to remain active role players in shaping the content and direction of their engagement with the BRI. This is exemplified by their partnership with China through investments in its electric vehicle sector and the attendant setting up of joint venture companies for local production and to conduct research and development on autonomous driving and AI promotion.[18]
IMEC and IDRC
Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have backed the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which was approved by the U.S., the European Union, India, Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the sidelines of the G-20 summit in New Delhi in September 2023. The proposed corridor has two sections: an eastern maritime link connecting India with the Gulf and a northern section linking ports of the Gulf (in the UAE and Saudi Arabia) with Europe through a transnational rail and road network going to the Israeli port of Haifa, from where goods would be shipped to European ports—in Greece, Italy and France.
According to Alberto Rizzi, the IMEC “represents a complementary effort by (mainly) Western countries to push back against Chinese influence.”[19] However, the GCC partners do not share this view. As Dr. Gedaliah Afterman et al. point out, the UAE and Saudi Arabia view BRI and IMEC as “initiatives [that] align with their pursuit of diversified, multi-networked economic diplomacy. … Their involvement in multiple ‘minilateral’ arrangements underscores a quest for strategic autonomy and broader influence in global and regional affairs.”[20]
Although IMEC has received strong support from its sponsors, it faces significant challenges. An EU diplomat has described it as “a long-term vision”, while an Indian diplomat has characterized it as “futuristic.”[21] Besides financial and regulatory hurdles, commentators have highlighted that the region it spans is a “geopolitical tinderbox”, marked by competing and often conflicting relationships among key actors.
A major obstacle is the fact that Haifa is the land terminal of the project; given the present-day conflicts, the chances of cooperation on connectivity projects between Israel and the Arab states are remote.[22] While some commentators have suggested that IMEC is a competitor to the BRI, an Indian commentator has argued that IMEC does not seek to replace existing logistical corridors such as the Suez Canal or the Belt and Road Initiative, but reflects “a strategy for economic risk management through diversification of trade routes.”[23] In short, it is important in these uncertain times for states to expand their connectivity options.
Various alternative routings are being examined to make IMEC both inclusive and viable by including within its framework Fujairah in the UAE or Omani ports such as Sohar, Salalah, and Duqm. Other possible routing options include linking Al-Hadithah, on the Saudi-Jordan border, with a Syrian port—Tartous or Latakia—on the eastern Mediterranean. Again, Saudi Arabia is looking at making Egypt (which is not part of IMEC at present) its partner on the Mediterranean and is constructing a 32-km-long, $4 billion causeway, called the Moses Bridge, from its NEOM hub to Egypt’s Sharm el-Sheikh in the Sinai.[24]
Other proposals are that the IMEC rail and road network could be connected at Riyadh to the Iraq Development Road Corridor (IDRC). Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has proposed the IDRC as an alternative to IMEC. This proposal envisages a land bridge from the Grand Faw Port near Basra to Faysh Qabur at the Iraq-Türkiye border, where it would link up with Türkiye’s existing railway system. Both Qatar and the UAE are reported to be interested in funding the project. However, besides its high cost ($17 billion), critics have noted that the project is very Türkiye-centric as it excludes Iran and Iraqi Kurdistan.[25]
The paper by Dr. Gedaliah Afterman et al., cited above, makes the important point that IMEC will realize its full potential beyond traditional physical infrastructure if it is viewed as incorporating digital transformation, sustainable energy initiatives and strategies for regional stabilization.[26] Thus, the paper calls for establishing a cross-border “Digital IMEC” that promotes technological partnerships, enhances trade ties, and strengthens cybersecurity among regional partners. Some specific areas of cooperation mentioned in the paper are:[27]
- Regional digital infrastructure
- AI and digital innovation
- Maintaining supply chain resilience through shared semiconductor fabrication facilities, research centers and tech incubators
- E-Commerce and Fintech: strengthening cross-border financial systems through digital payment platforms, joint Central Bank Digital Currency platforms, and harmonizing cross-border trade procedures
- Advanced manufacturing through collaborative R&D, and the manufacture of AI chips and the development of superconducting technologies.
A good model for cross-border collaboration within the IMEC framework is the India-UAE Virtual Trade Corridor (VTC) that was announced in September 2024. The VTC is based on the “Master Application for Trade and Regulatory Interface” (known as ‘MAITRI’) that integrates multiple digital systems and enables a seamless exchange of documents between regulatory stakeholders. Observers believe that the successful application of MAITRI “should be a starting point for building a seamless regional digital ecosystem across IMEC countries.”[28]
Shaping new routes and reviving old links
In the aftermath of the closure of the Hormuz, the GCC states are using ports on the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean for export and import purposes, utilizing existing road networks to link the ports with supply centers across the Arabian Peninsula. While Yanbu and Fujairah are being used for oil exports, Jeddah and Yanbu on the Red Sea, and the ports of Khor Fakkan (UAE) and Sohar (Oman) on the Indian Ocean are being used for transnational trade. Items for export include petrochemical byproducts, mentioned earlier, that are crucial for the health, technology and manufacturing sectors.[29]
The Hormuz crisis has expedited other efforts at intra-GCC cooperation. An observer has noted that Iranian strikes on key GCC infrastructure have “converted these projects [earlier under consideration] from economic aspirations into security necessities.”[30] Chief among them is the 2,100-km GCC railway project that, by 2030, will link the principal cities and ports of the six GCC states and will carry both passengers and freight.
Other transregional connectivity projects are:
- an interconnected water supply system, which is at an early stage of planning but could now be sped up, and
- oil and gas pipeline integration, which is at a conceptual stage, but could witness some fresh attention.
Besides these intra-GCC connectivity proposals, the GCC states are looking at transregional projects as well. Observers have described these proposals as reflecting “a new trade architecture, with multiple nodes linking the Indian Ocean with the Mediterranean Sea.”[31] Thus, the land transport links among GCC states will also cross into neighboring states—to the Suez Canal in Egypt or the Syrian ports of Latakia and Tartous—from where the goods will move to European destinations. In May 2025, the UAE’s flagship port development company, DP World, signed an $800 million agreement to develop and operate a multipurpose terminal at Tartous port, with attached industrial and free trade zones.[32] Again, agreements were finalized in March to set up sea-land bridges linking the UAE’s ports of Fujairah and Khor Fakkan with the Saudi ports of Jeddah, Dammam, and Jubail and set up rail cargo services from Jubail to Jordan.
Another interesting initiative is the agreement on 9 April between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Türkiye and Jordan to revive the old Hejaz Railway from the Ottoman period, which will link Istanbul, Damascus, Amman and Jeddah. On 16 April, the UAE also agreed to finance a railway line linking Aqaba with Jordan’s phosphate mines, which Saudi Arabia has said it would join.
Besides the building of an integrated oil and gas pipeline network that would link the GCC (mentioned earlier), Türkiye is seeking to revive an old pipeline that had carried Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean and the Red Sea in 1935-48. The Turkish Energy Minister has said that a start could be made by extending the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline to Basra. The minister has also proposed the revival of an earlier proposal for a gas pipeline from Qatar to Türkiye via Iraq, while pushing ahead with the Iraq Development Road Corridor that includes Qatar and the UAE.[33]
Meanwhile, Iraq, also crippled by the Hormuz closure, has reopened a key border crossing with Syria, Rabia, after more than a decade, and has resumed oil shipments through the Baniyas terminal for exports to Europe. Other border posts in Syria that have now been opened are Bab al-Hawa (Türkiye), Nassib (Jordan) and Al-Waleed (Iraq).
Amidst ongoing conflicts and connectivity disruptions, Syria has emerged as a possible “corridor” in new regional connectivity projects. Syria’s advantage is its geographical position between the Gulf, the Mediterranean, Türkiye and the broad Eurasian landscape. As Syria’s security situation has improved, Türkiye and Syria have revived the “Five Seas” project—an idea articulated by former president Bashar al-Assad in 2004, which envisaged the linking of the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea, the Red Sea and the Gulf—recalling the ancient trade network that had bonded this region.[34] Saudi Arabia is said to be supporting Syria as a “key node on the Mediterranean” and using its territory to build transport and trade routes.[35]
Outlook for regional connectivity
In the immediate aftermath of the Hormuz closure, while there have been calls for a shift toward renewables, there has also been a surge of interest in developing conventional fuels. For instance, a shortage of LNG has led countries to use more domestic coal, even as high oil and gas prices have encouraged an increase in exploration and development of these fuels.[36]
Hence, there might not be major changes in energy consumption patterns: though oil and gas prices will be high (and could get higher), the GCC suppliers will make the best use of the alternative routes available to them and, over the medium term (about 6-12 months from now), shape new routes. Meanwhile, other suppliers of conventional fuels, particularly from North and South America, Africa, Central Asia and Russia, will meet present demand for hydrocarbons. Once the Hormuz opens, the GCC producers should quickly go back to earlier levels of supply, this being facilitated by increases in the “OPEC+” production quotas to moderate prices, if required.
Based on this prognosis, over the longer term (for instance, after a year or so from now), it is unlikely that there will be significant changes in the energy supply and demand that had been projected by different states before the present crisis, including taking into account the gradual shift toward renewables as per the zero-carbon emission targets that different countries have set for themselves.
The disruptions caused by the ongoing conflict could be reversed once peace is restored. The GCC has unique advantages in terms of providing a congenial base for the energy sector—its significant reserves and its financial and technical resources that are crucial to support the energy ecosystem. As the distinguished authority on AI and geopolitics, Mohammed Soliman has noted, the fundamental advantages that define the GCC scenario in energy, connectivity and technology “are not going to go away.”[37]
Among importers, the change the regional conflict is expected to encourage is diversification of suppliers. Producers, on the other hand, will look for more storage capacity, new pipelines, and new land and maritime routes, with attendant hikes in transportation and insurance costs and geopolitical risk premiums.[38]
Meanwhile, it would be useful to note that the current conflict has been, as Umud Shokri says, a “war on connectivity” in that it has made energy corridors, maritime routes and digital infrastructure (undersea cables and data centers) new battlegrounds that, as Shokri says, will decide “who moves, who trades, who connects, and under what conditions.”[39]
However, the ongoing energy crisis has also highlighted the interdependence that binds diverse nations: the GCC’s oil and gas power global economies; the GCC’s LNG and petrochemical products are crucial for the health sector and the manufacture of semiconductors required for the world’s smartphones, computers and data centers, while urea and other fertilizer-related products from the GCC are crucial for global agriculture. Thus, energy security, food security and digital security are firmly linked to each other. The important lesson to be drawn from this reality is that national interests are served not by war, however powerful a nation might be, but through diplomacy.
While competition and conflict have pulled nations apart, the consequences of conflict have been painful reminders of the diverse connections that bind our interests and our well-being.
[1] Daniel Yergin, “Is the nightmare scenario for global energy here?,” Financial Times, March 7-8, 2026, p. 11.
[2] Quoted in Simon Kuper, “The failure of global crisis management,” Financial Times, May 23-24, 2026, p. 20.
[3] Ibid.
[4] “The Hormuz Crisis: A Structural Reset for Global Oil & Gas Markets,” Grand View Research, Undated (2026), https://www.grandviewresearch.com/research-insights/hormuz-crisis-global-oil-gas-market-reset.
[5] Sarah Shamim, “Saudi, UAE, Iraq: Can three pipelines help oil escape Strait of Hormuz?,” Al Jazeera, March 27, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/3/27/saudi-uae-iraq-can-three-pipelines-help-oil-escape-strait-of-hormuz.
[6] Ben Chu, “How the Hormuz closure could affect food, medicines and smartphones,” BBC, March 27, 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4gjxv5g19no.
[7] Mohamed Shadi, “Impact of Hormuz closure on semiconductor industry,” Al Habtoor Research Centre,
March 19, 2026, https://www.habtoorresearch.com/programmes/hormuz-closure-global-semiconductor/.
[8] “Hormuz digital chokepoint: How undersea cables underpin Gulf’s AI ambitions,” TRT WORLD, April 28, 2026, https://www.trtworld.com/article/ed01b7fdc9c3.
[9] Nadine Hawkins, “The end of the Red Sea era: Why war and politics are shattering a global digital lifeline,” Capacity, March 16, 2026, https://capacityglobal.com/news/red-sea-internet-outage-geopolitical-crisis/.
[10] Angel Tesorero, “Beyond Oil: Internet bandwidth, global commerce at risk with Hormuz strait closure,” Khaleej Times, March 23, 2026, https://www.khaleejtimes.com/world/asia/beyond-oil-internet-bandwidth-global-commerce-at-risk-with-hormuz-strait-closure#google_vignette.
[11] Miranda Jeyaretnam, “One of the World’s most critical digital bottlenecks: How the Iran war could threaten global internet access,” TIME, May 19, 2026, https://time.com/article/2026/05/19/iran-war-subsea-cables-internet-strait-hormuz-gulf-states-ai/.
[12] Winston Qiu, “War in the Gulf severs the world’s digital arteries: How the Iran conflict is reshaping global connectivity,” Submarine Networks, March 15, 2026, https://www.submarinenetworks.com/en/nv/insights/war-in-the-gulf-severs-the-world-s-digital-arteries.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Dalia Ghanem and Dania Thafer, “Toward a New Discourse of Global Connectivity: The Gulf’s Ambitions in Strategic Corridors and partnerships,” Middle East Council on Global Affairs, August 2025, p. 6, https://mecouncil.org/publication/toward-a-new-discourse-of-global-connectivity-the-gulfs-ambitions-in-strategic-corridors-and-partnerships/.
[15] Emad Kaddorah, “The Position of the GCC States in the Belt and Road Initiative,” Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies, May 27, 2024, p. 2, https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/ResearchAndStudies/Pages/the-position-of-the-gcc-states-in-the-belt-and-road-initiative.aspx.
[16] “Belt and Road Initiative: UAE as the Gateway to the Middle East and Africa,” UAE-China Chamber of Commerce (UECN), September 27, 2025, Belt and Road Initiative: UAE as the Gateway to the Middle East and Africa – UAE-CHINA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE.
[17] Maria, “China’s Digital Silk Road: Outlines and Implications for Europe,” International Centre for Defence and Security, February 2024, https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2024/03/ICDS_Brief_China´s_Digital_Silk_Road_Maria_February_2024-1.pdf.
[18] Ghanem and Thafer, p. 20.
[19] Alberto Rizzi, “The Infinite Connection: How to Make the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor Happen,” European Council on Foreign Relations, April 23, 2024, https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-infinite-connection-how-to-make-the-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor-happen/.
[20] Gedaliah Afterman, N. Janardhan, Mohammed Baharoon, and Maximilian Mayer, “Connectivity and ‘Reglobalization’: India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor and Its Potential Digital Future,” Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy, Abu Dhabi, April 2025, p. 5.
[21] Dalia Ghanem and Amaia Sánchez-Cacicedo, “From Hype to Horizon: What the EU needs to know to bring IMEC to life,” European Union Institute for Security Studies, Brief 10, June 2024, p. 3, https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_2024-10_IMEC.pdf.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Nilanjan Ghosh, “IMEC and the Future of Global Connectivity”, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, January 8, 2026.
[24] Cinzia Bianco and Arturo Varvelli, “Bypassing the Straits: the India-Middle East-Europe corridor needs a wartime design,” European Council on Foreign Relations, May 22, 2026, https://ecfr.eu/article/bypassing-the-straits-the-india-middle-east-europe-corridor-needs-a-wartime-redesign/.
[25] Ghanem and Thafer, pp. 12-13.
[26] Gedaliah Afterman et al., “Connectivity and ‘Reglobalization: India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor and Its Potential Digital Future,” p. 7.
[27] Ibid., p. 8.
[28] Afaq Hussain, “IMEC must be more than a trade route. Digital integration should be a priority,” Atlantic Council, August 26, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/imec-must-be-more-than-a-trade-route-digital-integration-should-be-a-priority/.
[29] Atul Aneja, Arab states seek new land corridors that bypass Strait of Hormuz, Geopolitika.ru, May 13, 2026, https://www.geopolitika.ru/en/article/arab-monarchies-seek-new-land-corridors-pass-strait-hormuz.
[30] “From railways to energy —five strategic projects linking Gulf states,” Al Jazeera, April 30, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/4/30/from-railways-to-energy-five-strategic-projects-linking-gulf.
[31] Tom Hussain, “Middle East states eye transport resilience with new logistics corridor to bypass Hormuz,” South China Morning Post, May 3, 2026, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/economics/article/3352166/middle-east-states-eye-transport-resilience-new-logistics-corridor-bypass-hormuz.
[32] Ghanem and Thafer, pp. 11-12.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Anan Tello, “How viable is Syria as a trade route to bypass blocked Hormuz strait?,” Arab News, April 28, 2026, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2641485/middle-east.
[35] Bianco and Varvelli.
[36] Dharna Noor, “What does the Iran war mean for clean energy transition?,” The Guardian, March 26, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2026/mar/26/iran-war-clean-energy-transition.
[37] Rishi Iyengar, “Will the Iran War Evaporate the Gulf’s AI Oasis?,” Foreign Policy, April 2, 2026, https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/04/02/iran-war-gulf-data-centers-ai-technology/.
[38] “The Hormuz Crisis: A Structural Reset for Global Oil & Gas Markets.”
[39] Umud Shokri, “Chokepoints and control: Iran war and the new geopolitics of connectivity,” Firstpost, April 28, 2026, https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/chokepoints-and-control-iran-war-and-the-new-geopolitics-of-connectivity-14005366.html.
