History books will remember the third Gulf war as a period that upended the status quo of regional geopolitics, solidified the Arab Gulf states’ resolve, and forced nations reliant on Middle Eastern energy to comprehend, first-hand, that the security dynamics of the region truly have global consequences. The far-reaching impacts of this war have shown that in an increasingly interconnected world, strategic detachment of the region’s conflicts is no longer tenable.

On 28 February 2026, under the Trump Administration, the U.S. Armed Forces commenced Operation Epic Fury—described as a ‘defensive’ attack intended to eliminate ‘imminent’ threats posed by Iran. Within the mission’s first 24 hours, the U.S. military, along with support from Israeli Forces, struck over 1,000 targets, including Iranian command and control centers, IRGC Joint Headquarters, integrated air defense systems, ballistic missile and anti-ship missile sites, ships and submarines belonging to the Iranian navy.[1] In addition to destroying Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal and production capacity and defeating the Iranian navy, additional Operation Epic Fury objectives include severing Iran’s ability to support its regional proxies and ensuring Iran can never acquire a nuclear weapon.

In response to the operation, Iran effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz on 4 March 2026—the world’s largest energy choke point, to what it labels “non-hostile vessels”, essentially ships belonging to, or affiliated with, states that did not participate in, or support aggression against Iran.[2] Historically, when under pressure—especially if Iran feels its oil exports may be threatened—a key source of revenue, Iran relies on a tactic of threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz. Following the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, Iran issued the warning, “We will make the enemy understand that either everyone can use the Strait of Hormuz or no one.”[3]

Following through with that very specific threat today, key trade routes remain disrupted with vessels being rerouted, affecting entire supply chains. Insurance premiums have surged, and while traders are imposed with additional war-time levies, it only adds to market uncertainty.

Following the initial rounds of joint U.S.-Israeli large-scale air attacks resulting in the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz travelled to Washington to obtain clarity on the recent developments and to better understand Trump’s intentions on how he plans to end the war, and under what conditions. For Germany, like many of the U.S.’s Western allies, it was not given prior consultation leading up to the attacks, which only served to generate transatlantic friction. For many European capitals, the strikes remained reminiscent of the U.S.-led war against Iraq in 2003. Similar to the ongoing war with Iran today, the 2003 attacks sparked divisions among EU member states on whether the bloc should engage militarily without a UN Security Council resolution in place.

The preliminary strikes inadvertently caused significant strategic challenges for the bloc. While the initial priority remained easing the impact of the Strait’s closure on EU citizens and businesses, the EU must also mitigate the volatility of the energy markets. Amid EU concerns over energy security and fears of a looming recession, the Trump administration called on NATO’s support to help keep the Strait open—despite the EU being unaware of the initial U.S.-Israeli attacks. While the NATO allies declined Trump’s request, only committing to supporting freedom of navigation once hostilities subside, the episode prompted Trump to consider reviewing the U.S.’s relationship with the alliance altogether.

Additionally, compounding this challenge are internal divisions within the European Union. The member countries of the EU have varying political views on the war, leading nations to take their own interests into account, creating divisions within the bloc, precisely at a time when unity is needed. This divergence raises broader questions about the resilience of the transatlantic alliance, internal EU cohesion, and the bloc’s ability to respond in a unified manner during periods of major global instability.

The Gulf’s Strategic Global Position

In addition to the closure of the world’s most strategic waterway, Iran’s destabilizing role in this crisis has resulted in unprecedented damage to its Gulf neighbors, attacking both civilian and critical infrastructure, including oil and gas installations. By early April, Iran had launched more than 6,400 missiles and drones against its GCC and Arab neighbors, with the UAE being the most disproportionately attacked.[4] During the first 40 days of war, the UAE has been struck by more than 2,800 missiles and drones, with 90% of the assaults targeting civilian targets.[5]

Iranian attacks against the UAE targeted key strategic and economic pillars of the country’s economy, including the world-famous Burj Al Arab, Dubai International Airport, the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC), Jebel Ali Port—the largest port in the Middle East, contributing 33.4% of Dubai’s GDP,[6] Abu Dhabi National Oil Company’s Ruwais refinery, which has the capacity to refine 922,000 barrels of oil per day,[7] and the Dubai-based Amazon Web Services data center. Despite the GCC states’ extensive diplomatic efforts to prevent U.S.-led attacks against Iran, Tehran framed its targeting of the region’s energy, logistics, shipping, and transport sectors, all critical pillars of the GCC economies, as a response to what it alleged was regional support for military operations against the Islamic Republic.[8]

The six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council have long positioned themselves as key global players, leveraging their strategic location, vast natural resource wealth, and expanding network of strategic partnerships and engagements with international organizations. To support regional stability, the Gulf states have actively sought to decrease tensions with Iran through formal diplomatic processes.  In 2023, China successfully brokered the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, resulting in restored diplomatic relations and expanded regional trade and economic exchanges.

The Gulf states have also become increasingly active in the diplomatic arena, both regionally and internationally. Oman continues to function as a neutral mediator within the region and served as a key facilitator in nuclear negotiations between the United States and Iran under the Obama and Trump Administrations. Similarly, Qatar positioned itself for years as a third party in diplomatic communications between the U.S. government and the Taliban, leading up to the Doha Agreement in 2020. More recently, Qatar again acted as a mediator when attempting to facilitate dialogue between Hamas, Israel and the United States during the war in Gaza. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have taken steps to increase their level of involvement on the international stage, coordinating prisoner swaps between Russia and Ukraine.

In addition to expanding their diplomatic leverage, Gulf states play a critical role in maintaining stability in global energy markets. As significant oil-producing countries, the member countries of the GCC will remain essential to maintaining the world’s energy supplies during times of global political instability. At the same time, in preparation for a post-oil economy, the GCC states are accelerating their economic diversification, decreasing their dependence on hydrocarbons. Large-scale investments in Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Doha and Riyadh are being made to transform these cities into major centers for financial services, logistics, tourism and high-technology development.

To support home-grown autonomy in the defense sector, the UAE and Saudi Arabia are heavily investing in their military capabilities. The Emirati defense group Edge, which specializes in advanced technology for weapons systems, cyber protection and UAV warfare, was responsible for thwarting 85% of Iran’s drone strikes on the UAE during the recent war.[9] Likewise, Saudi Arabia, under its Vision 2030 strategy, is aiming to achieve strategic autonomy and self-reliance within its defense sector, and to localize 50% of its own defense spending by the end of the decade.[10] Nonetheless, despite increased efforts toward greater autonomy, such efforts will not diminish the importance of continued strategic coordination between the Gulf states, the United States, and European allies in the face of growing regional instability.

EU Political Positions

Ahead of his trip to Washington in March, Chancellor Merz did not brandish the American and Israeli strikes as a violation of international law—but rather labeled the Iranian government as a terrorist regime that “threatens the very existence of the State of Israel.”[11] Merz condemned Iran’s nuclear program as a threat to global peace and security, and the attacks against Iran’s neighbors are undermining stability across the Middle East. While underscoring Iran’s ‘systematic’ support for Russia’s war effort against Ukraine, Merz expressed that his government “shares the relief of many Iranians that this mullah regime is now coming to an end.”

Merz raised additional concerns over a much broader issue: the erosion of the rules-based international order. The German Chancellor voiced his frustration with the effectiveness of implementing sanctions and the issuance of diplomatic condemnations, which have done little to weaken the Iranian regime, both in terms of funding of proxies and halting its nuclear and ballistic missile buildup.

“International legal classifications will have relatively little effect. This is all the more true if they remain largely without consequence. Appeals from Europe, including Germany, condemnations of Iranian violations of international law, and even extensive sanctions packages have achieved little over the years and decades. This was also due to our unwillingness to enforce fundamental interests, if necessary, by military force. Therefore, now is not the time to lecture our partners and allies. Despite our doubts, we share many of their goals, even though we ourselves are unable to actually achieve them.[12]”

While Merz acknowledges that Germany and the EU may support U.S. efforts to contain Iran, their own inadequacies, namely, their “unwillingness to enforce fundamental interests, if necessary, by military force”, underscore that the EU either lacks collective military leverage or a united political will. More importantly, what does this inaction say about the EU’s credibility in the face of hostility? As such, from Merz’s perspective, Germany, as well as Europe, has little right to “lecture” its allies if the bloc remains paralyzed and fragmented, yet united in a stance that Iran should be contained.

Conversely, French President Emmanuel Macron argued that the U.S.-Israeli strikes against Iran were directed “outside of international law” and that Paris “cannot approve of them.”[13] Yet from Merz’s perspective, international law rings hollow in the absence of enforcement. Merz’s candid acknowledgment is signalling to the bloc that we have no right to attribute responsibility if we are unable or unwilling to enforce the rules ourselves.

The European Union’s Response to War in the Middle East

Historically, Europe’s position toward the Middle East has remained committed to supporting economic cooperation, mitigating migration, safeguarding regional security, and protecting freedom of navigation in relation to the region’s waterways, including the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea. Immediately following the outbreak of attacks, the European Council released a joint statement by President Costa and President Ursula von der Leyen, underscoring that nuclear safety, a reduction of tensions, and safeguarding global non-proliferation remain of the utmost importance to the bloc. The statement concluded with a plea for all parties to “exercise maximum restraint, to protect civilians, and to fully respect international law.”[14]

For many of the U.S.’s European allies, at best what they are able to provide—at least until the war is over—is diplomatic assistance. Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre stated, “We are not part of this war. We did not initiate it. But we are all affected by it.” He added that international law must be respected, and it should be the responsibility of the affected parties to find ways of ending the ongoing hostilities that are having ripple effects worldwide.

In an attempt to calm the British public over the impacts of the war and how it will affect the future of the UK, PM Keir Starmer echoed similar sentiment, adding “this is not our war; we will not be drawn into the conflict.  That is not in our national interest.” Like PM Støre, Starmer committed to de-escalation efforts through diplomatic means. However, that has not deterred the UK from taking a proactive stance in preparing for the post-war reality in the Strait of Hormuz—a zone that Iran remains steadfast in controlling.

In preparation, the UK, along with France, is paving the way for a 40+-nation coalition—minus the U.S.—to collectively ensure freedom of navigation within the Strait of Hormuz once the war comes to an end, or should a lasting ceasefire be agreed upon. The initiative, led by the UK’s foreign secretary, Yvette Cooper, aims to rely on coordinated diplomatic and economic measures to pressure Iran into reopening the Strait of Hormuz.

According to Cooper, Iran bears responsibility for ‘hijacking the global economy’, forcing the conflict to expand well beyond the region and is now affecting every corner of the globe. Recent reporting by the World Bank indicates that an extended closure of the Strait of Hormuz could result in food insecurity for up to 9 million people in addition to ‘unsustainable increases’ in global oil and food prices affecting consumers and businesses worldwide.[15]

During a recent virtual summit of the multinational coalition, Britain and France held discussions on the future of joint missions, which would be strictly defensive in nature, to ensure freedom of navigation and maritime security once a permanent ceasefire is in place.  The coalition has called for the unconditional and unrestricted opening of the Strait, essentially a return to pre-war conditions. Initial objectives include the protection of merchant and oil vessels and mine-clearing operations. Such measures are aimed at restoring confidence within the shipping industry and stabilizing the global economy.[16]

EU Declines Trump’s Requests for Military Support in the Gulf

Policy disagreements between the U.S. and the EU became increasingly visible following remarks made by Stefan Kornelius, the spokesperson for Chancellor Merz, who stated, “This war has nothing to do with NATO. It’s not NATO’s war.” Kornelius further noted that neither the United States nor Israel notified Germany of their intentions before the war, adding that both nations had stated at the onset of confrontations that “European assistance was neither necessary nor desired.”[17] German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius offered a similar assessment, stating, “This is not our war. We have ⁠not started it. What does Donald Trump expect a handful or two handfuls of European frigates to do in the Strait of Hormuz that the powerful U.S. Navy cannot do?”

Similar concerns were expressed by Italian ​Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani, who stated that diplomacy can only solve the crisis while declining support for naval missions in the Strait.   Luxembourg’s Deputy Prime Minister Xavier Bettel also voiced reservations about exposure to external pressures[18] and did not support participation in offensive strikes. Greece, which refrained from contributing to military operations in the Gulf, did remain committed to existing EU maritime missions in the Red Sea.

For its part, France has remained committed to maintaining a defensive stance in the region, while President Macron has reiterated the “need to build diplomatic solutions, to enable peace as quickly as possible.”[19] Yet, Paris, compared to its European counterparts, has built up an extensive military presence in the Gulf since the onset of hostilities. While France maintains defense agreements with Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE in order to protect both its assets and citizens in the region (nearly 400,000 French expatriates reside in the Middle East, more than any other European country), Paris deployed eight warships, two helicopter carriers, and the Charles de Gaulle—France’s only aircraft carrier—to the eastern Mediterranean and wider Middle East.[20]

Following Iranian drone attacks against its military base in Abu Dhabi on 1 March, France deployed the Rafale jets to protect its hundreds of navy, air force and army personnel based in the Emirates.[21]

The UK—America’s oldest ally—initially gave authorization for the U.S. military to utilize its regional airbases during the Iran conflict; access was specifically granted for a limited defensive strike against Iranian missile sites. Prime Minister Keir Starmer declined to deploy British forces, arguing the UK had drawn lessons from past military interventions, particularly its involvement in the 2003 Iraq War. Starmer emphasized his refusal to participate in offensive strikes alongside the U.S. and Israel against Iran, arguing such actions lacked a legal basis and clear rationale.[22]

U.S. President Trump’s Response

From Trump’s perspective, the lack of commitment from some EU states represented a clear divergence from U.S. expectations regarding alliance burden sharing. Following the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz in mid-April, Trump told NATO their support was no longer necessary,[23] suggesting the European states were primarily interested in securing energy shipments.

Trump’s earlier suggestions about potentially reducing U.S. commitment to the alliance continued to generate debate across European capitals. A central concern among European policymakers is that such a scenario might embolden Russia to expand its war in Ukraine—potentially triggering a broader crisis across the continent. As a close confidante to the U.S. President, often dubbed the “Trump Whisperer,” NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has said that while he understands the frustration and disappointment Trump is feeling with regard to the lack of collective action from NATO during the recent crisis, he dismisses any speculation of U.S. withdrawal from the alliance.

In response to these concerns, Rutte sought to engage with the President, highlighting the strategic advantages Washington could gain from Europe expanding its role in NATO—a step Rutte has called “a development from an unhealthy dependency to a transatlantic alliance based on true partnership.”[24] For now, the U.S.’s position within the NATO alliance remains safe.  Any change to the status quo would require two-thirds approval from the U.S. Senate, which remains highly unlikely, especially during an election year.

Yet amid lingering uncertainty in the face of long-term commitments from the U.S., for NATO’s EU members, the most logical, protectionist priority should be prioritizing autonomy within their defense industry. For many years, the EU has remained heavily reliant on acquiring U.S. weapons and munitions, especially for use in Ukraine, which has drawn down its own stockpiles—while simultaneously boosting demand for the American defense sector, an industry valued at approximately $354.48 billion in 2026.[25]

Now, as the war with Iran threatens supply chains even further, America’s allies in the Gulf are looking to also replenish their inventories. In the first 96 hours of the Iran war, U.S. and Gulf Patriot batteries fired 943 interceptor missiles, utilizing 13% of U.S. stockpiles and 16% of Gulf states’ inventories. At the current rate of production capacity, estimates predict it will take nearly 18 months to replenish those few days of expenditure.[26]

The Pentagon has already delayed weapon deliveries to several European partners, including Estonia and Lithuania, as the Iran war is stretching U.S. military equipment and ammunition thin.[27] As critical delays of both defensive and offensive weaponry undermine defense readiness, these delays are further compelling EU ministries to rethink procurement strategies from EU suppliers. Furthermore, the current global security environment underscores that defense production independence has never been a greater priority for both East and West allies.

America First?

The initial unilateral approach to this conflict appears at odds with Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ foreign policy. As a net energy exporter, if the U.S. views itself as insulated from energy disruptions in the Gulf, this should have negated the Pentagon’s objectives to undertake a high-risk military engagement against Iran without first obtaining support from its allies—particularly those who stand the most vulnerable to long-term disruptions, including NATO members, Japan, and South Korea.

If Trump’s objective is to preserve global energy flows for others, the rationale for unilateral U.S. leadership becomes far less clear, especially for Trump’s loyalists within the ‘MAGA’ base. Trump has long campaigned on ending costly ‘forever’ wars, and as such, his current strategy also runs counter to domestic political realities. Recent polling indicates that the American public’s support for the war remains limited. A recent Reuters/Ipsos poll found that 66% of Americans—i.e., 2 out of 3 of those polled—believe the U.S. should end its involvement in the war in Iran, even if the Trump Administration’s objectives are not yet met.[28]

Considering the midterm elections will be held in the fall of 2026, the Trump Administration will no doubt be scrutinizing public opinion, particularly the opinions of independent voters.  Recent AP-NORC polling found that 6 in 10 independents—i.e., those who typically have the power to swing an election—say that attacks against Iran have gone too far, while 59% of Americans view the military campaign against Iran as ‘excessive.’[29] Should the conflict continue to linger, particularly throughout the busy summer travel season, higher and lingering gas prices could provide Democrats with stronger political backing to take control of the House and, conceivably, the Senate, come November.

There is also the burden on the American taxpayer that the Administration must take into consideration. By April, the war’s price tag is estimated to have reached between $25 and $35 billion, according to the American Enterprise Institute, equivalent to $260 per household.[30] The war has also resulted in significant human losses, including the death of 13 U.S. service members and 346 wounded. Over 27,000 Iranian citizens have been injured, and more than 1,500 have lost their lives—including 175 killed at the Shajareh Tayyebeh girls’ school in Minab, Iran, on 4 March.[31]

Such figures remain unfavorable with American voters who elected Trump to office under the premise that he would not engage in future wars in the Middle East. Nearly 40% of Americans believe that U.S. military action taken against Iran will make the U.S. less safe in the long run, while more than a third believe Operation Epic Fury will make the world less safe.[32] Already months into the war, Iran has yet to relinquish its nuclear material, the Strait remains closed, shipping continues to face significant disruptions, and negotiations continue to be drawn out. While Iran’s missile arsenal and production capabilities have been significantly degraded, there remains the possibility that such industries could gradually rebuild in the absence of a formal agreement.

While Iran’s navy has suffered major setbacks, smaller Iranian vessels, commonly referred to as its “mosquito fleet”, continue to harass shipping vessels. These small, agile boats, which are too small to be detected by satellite, can also be used to launch missiles and drones, offering the IRGC increased mobility and operational flexibility.[33] Although the U.S. military has reportedly destroyed nearly 100 of these small boats, Iran may have hundreds or potentially even thousands dispersed and concealed within tunnels, military bases, or among civilian vessels.[34]

For Trump’s original objectives to be met—i.e., to ensure Iran can never acquire a nuclear weapon—a detailed, legal framework, similar to the JCPOA, must be reached in coordination with the international community, particularly with the Arab Gulf states, given their geographic proximity to Iran and central role in regional security dynamics. For Washington, a successful outcome would likely require robust verification mechanisms capable of ensuring Iran’s continued compliance with commitments not to develop a nuclear weapon. In the absence of such guarantees, the American public may question whether the strategic outcomes of this lengthy and costly war were achieved.

To progress, the U.S. should first take stock of its key tactical gains. Within the first few weeks of the war, U.S. and Israeli strikes targeted over 10,000 Iranian military targets, including missile, drone, and naval production facilities. As a result, Iran’s missile and drone attacks decreased by 90% by the end of March 2026. While these setbacks are notable, Iran’s military capabilities aren’t the only challenge—what the U.S. must weaken, more so than military might, is Iranian resolve. As nuclear discussions have reached a deadlock, the U.S., along with its European and regional allies, should prioritize undercutting Iran’s current leverage: the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

A coalition of allies would be required to present a coordinated front in the Strait of Hormuz, ensuring freedom of navigation for shipping and merchant vessels, while providing some relief for the global economy.  The challenge for Washington is that most European allies have made clear that any extension remains contingent on a durable ceasefire.

Regime Change, or a Change in Regime Behavior?

European Commission President Von der Leyen has continued to underscore that on the other side of this war, the EU would support a credible transition in Iran, while EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas has stated this conflict has shown there is now “an open path to a new Iran.”[35] No matter how robust the initial U.S.-Israeli military campaigns, the implications of hard power do not automatically translate into regime change simply because it was an intended military objective. Despite the Iranian mass protests and widespread public frustrations that preceded this conflict, the Iranian population remains disjointed in its effort to rally around a new government—or leader, for that matter.

Despite targeted U.S. and Israeli strikes against senior Iranian leadership, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, along with key pillars of the regime’s hierarchy in the initial days of the war, the regime itself remains intact and has shown signs of internal consolidation. As a result, Western allies may need to realign their approach to the realities on the ground.  Regime change is tough—but seeking a change in regime behavior may be easier.

For decades, Iran has honed the skill of absorbing pressure, managing escalation, circumventing monetary roadblocks, and operating on its own timeline. Just as Trump is viewed as an unconventional negotiator, so is Iran. As both sides offer arbitrary deadlines, vent public threats, and commit to zero-sum outcomes, such posturing only further complicates the possibility of achieving a diplomatic end to this crisis, adding much uncertainty to the post-conflict environment in the Gulf.

In contrast to Washington’s force-oriented rhetoric, the Europeans tend to favor a diplomatic and economic pressure-based approach, recently revising their criteria for their Iranian sanctions to include persons or entities found to be involved in the blockade of the Strait. The challenge with imposing sanctions, however, is that Iran has become increasingly adept at evading them—relying on financial back channels with its closest economic partners, Russia and China.

Despite Iran’s ability to circumvent sanctions, the country has nonetheless suffered to a degree from global economic isolation. The IMF predicts Iran’s economy will shrink by 6.1% this year, with a minimal rebound of 3.2% by 2027. Likewise, inflation is expected to reach 70% in 2026. Further complicating Iran’s economic forecast, the cost of the current war, along with damages to critical infrastructure, is estimated at $270 billion.[36]

Iran will need to rely on a select few external partners to support the nation in reconstruction efforts, as sanctions will hinder international aid and necessary imports. Easing sanctions to allow for increased reconstruction support and humanitarian aid could serve as critical leverage during ongoing negotiations, which would likely be implemented through a phased framework to ensure compliance.

Building on the 2022 GCC-EU Strategic Partnership, which called for stronger diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation between the EU and GCC states in support of regional stability, energy security, and the global economy, a critical next step for the EU will be to support the establishment of a framework through which the Arab Gulf states and Iran can manage regional tensions once this phase of hostilities subsides. Prior to the 2026 war, Iranian threats to close the Strait seemed more like a theoretical tactical advantage—yet now Iran’s leadership has achieved proven political leverage over the region’s waterways by effectively closing the Strait of Hormuz. Circumventing this dynamic will be a much larger challenge than the nuclear file.

Efforts to Bolster Transatlantic-Gulf Security Cooperation

Recent Iranian efforts to expand regulatory jurisdiction over the Strait of Hormuz have only reinforced the need for greater transatlantic-Gulf security coordination to protect freedom through this vital waterway. In April, CENTCOM forces implemented a blockade of all maritime traffic entering and exiting Iranian ports in an attempt to exert political leverage over ongoing negotiations. While Washington and Brussels may not completely align when it comes to political messaging and military posture, the overarching goal remains the same: ensuring continued access through the Strait of Hormuz.

Given the direct impact regional developments have on European security, Kaja Kallas reiterated that the EU views itself as a vital component of the Gulf’s security architecture.  Kallas also offered support with nuclear discussions,[37] considering its extensive experience in this arena, starting with France, Germany, and the UK, which initiated direct nuclear talks with Iran from 2003 to 2005.

While the EU has encouraged a diplomatic solution to this crisis, there are, nonetheless, ongoing parallel discussions on strengthening the mandates for the existing European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) ASPIDES and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA missions in response to recent threats.

The military operation ASPIDES was established in 2024 to safeguard the passage of merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea and a vast stretch of the North-West Indian Ocean in response to repeated Houthi attacks. Operation ATALANTA, established in 2005, plays a vital role in targeting piracy and illegal trafficking in the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean.

During May’s monthly meeting of the EU foreign ministers, officials stressed the importance of strengthening their strategic partnerships with the GCC states. EU ministers also discussed strengthening Operation ASPIDES, potentially laying the groundwork for ASPIDES to play a larger role in safeguarding freedom of navigation in the Gulf region.[38]

Further solidifying transatlantic-Gulf cooperation, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) invited the Foreign Ministers from the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain to its annual summit, which took place in Ankara in July. While the Gulf states are members of NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), the war with Iran has reinforced NATO’s push to further bolster its southern flank.[39] During the Summit, the ICI allies, along with NATO’s top leadership, announced the launch of new flagship projects in areas of mutual interest, including enhanced maritime security, counter-drone technology, and defense against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) threats. They also reaffirmed their commitment to counterterrorism[40]—a key pillar of the ICI-NATO partnership.

The growing violations at sea underscore that the blockade has produced not only regional but global repercussions, prompting parallel efforts at the United Nations. The U.S., along with Bahrain, proposed a resolution to the UN Security Council with additional support from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar. The draft text called for imposing additional sanctions against Iran—along with ‘other measures’ if Iran continues to impose tolls and attack vessels in the Gulf.

The proposed resolution also emphasized the need for Iran to disclose the location of its sea mines and to support a humanitarian corridor that would allow the delivery of aid, fertilizer, and other essential goods to recipients in Congo, Sudan, and Gaza. Similar efforts are being undertaken at the EU level, including the imposition of sanctions and stricter accountability mechanisms due to the deteriorating humanitarian conditions of the Iranian people.[41]

Conclusion

While it’s too soon to forecast the regional security dynamic that will unfold once negotiations conclude, one thing is certain for the Arab Gulf states and their Western allies: relations with the current regime in Iran remain likely beyond repair. The fragile trust that remained, pre-28 February, has likely diminished and moving forward, at least for the Gulf States, stronger defense partnerships with the West will likely take precedence over efforts to reassure Iran or limit the footprint of Western military presence in the region.

The legal ambiguity over how this war began and subsequently evolved has pushed the boundaries of international law and is reigniting the debate on the credibility and longevity of the post-war rule-based international order. During a Nordic-Canadian summit in Oslo on 15 March, Prime Minister of Denmark, Mette Frederiksen, stated, “the old-world order is gone, and it will probably not come back”, adding that as a result, “we need to build something new.”[42]

President Von der Leyen struck a similar tone, stating Europe can “no longer be a custodian for the old-world order” and needs “a more realistic and interest-driven foreign policy.”[43] Nonetheless, this extended conflict exposed the complications the EU continues to face in presenting a unified foreign policy approach in times of extreme crisis, even when the majority of its member states are equally affected by regional instability. As the Trump administration has contended, energy security is national security, and for nations that rely heavily on the Gulf for their energy resources, this dependency may increasingly necessitate a larger role in bringing the conflict to an end.

A challenge for the EU, however, is the U.S.’s shifting strategic objectives in ending this war. Initially, the U.S. sought to permanently disable Iran’s nuclear capabilities and neutralize its ballistic missile program, yet as the war progressed, reopening the Strait of Hormuz emerged as a primary objective. More recently, the President’s focus has shifted to ensuring Iran is unable to acquire a nuclear weapon. The absence of clearly defined conditions may further encourage EU allies to prioritize their own national interests while adopting a more cautious posture toward the conflict, particularly in light of domestic political considerations.

If allies remain fragmented in their approach to ending this war, Iran will take stock of this moment. A once theoretical threat of closing the Strait of Hormuz is now a proven reality—that worked. Moving forward, should it wish to repeat this strategy, Iran would only need to threaten closure of the Strait, triggering market panic, as shipowners will remain mindful of this period and potentially hesitate to allow their vessels to transit through the vital waterway.  This war could easily morph from one dominated by hard power to one driven by threats, intimidation, and precedent, with the potential to upend the global economy once again.

[1] U.S. Central Command, “Operation Epic Fury: First 24 hours,” March 3, 2026, https://media.defense.gov/2026/Mar/03/2003882611/-1/-1/0/OPERATION-EPIC-FURY-FIRST-24-HOURS.PDF.

[2] “Iran tells UN: ‘non-hostile’ ships can transit Strait of Hormuz,” Reuters, May 24, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-says-non-hostile-ships-can-transit-strait-hormuz-ft-reports-2026-03-24/

[3] Tim Marshall, The power of geography: Ten Maps that Reveal the Future of Our World (Elliott & Thompson, 2021).

[4] Hussien Elkabany, “Iran targeted 7 Arab countries with 6,413 missiles, drones over past 41 days,” Anadolu Agency, April 10, 2026, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-targeted-7-arab-countries-with-6-413-missiles-drones-over-past-41-days/3900771.

[5] Jacob Wendler, UAE official: More than 90% of Iran’s targets were civilian infrastructure,” Politico, April 19, 2026, https://www.politico.com/news/2026/04/19/united-arab-emirates-iran-civilian-infrastructure-00880064.

[6] Huda Ata, “DP World: A key engine behind Dubai’s economic rise,” Gulf News, February 13, 2026, https://gulfnews.com/business/dp-world-a-key-engine-behind-dubais-economic-rise-1.500442565.

[7] Yusef Saba and Ahmad Ghaddar, “UAE oil giant ADNOC shuts Ruwais refinery after drone strike, source says,” Reuters, March 10, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/fire-hits-site-housing-abu-dhabi-national-oil-company-operations-after-drone-2026-03-10/.

[8] Ellen Clarke, Noor Hammad, and Asna Wajid, “Mapping the damage: Iranian strikes on the GCC,” International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), March 27, 2026, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2026/03/mapping-the-damage-iranian-strikes-on-the-gcc/.

[9] Fareed Rahman, “More than 85% of Iran’s drone strikes on UAE thwarted by Edge defence systems,” The National, May 5, 2026, https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/economy/2026/05/05/more-than-85-of-irans-drone-strikes-on-uae-thwarted-by-edge-defence-systems/.

[10] Sami Salem and Ammar Hindash, “Localisation in military industries: A perspective on industrial development in the Saudi Arabian defence ecosystem,” PwC Middle East, 2021, https://www.pwc.com/m1/en/industries/government/documents/localisation-in-military-industries.pdf.

[11] Bundesregierung, Chancellor Merz on situation in the Middle East: “Iranians deserve a better future,” March 1, 2026, https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/chancellor-statement-near-east-2409224.

[12] Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU), Pressestatement Friedrich Merz zum Iran, March 2, 2026, https://www.cdu.de/aktuelles/aussenpolitik/pressestatement-friedrich-merz-zum-iran/.

[13] Clea Caulcutt and Laura Kayali, “US strikes on Iran ‘outside international law,’ says Macron,” Politico Europe, March 3, 2026, https://www.politico.eu/article/us-strikes-on-iran-outside-international-law/.

[14] European Council, Joint statement by President Costa and President von der Leyen on developments in Iran, Council of the European Union, February 28, 2026, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/02/28/joint-statement-by-president-costa-and-president-von-der-leyen-on-developments-in-iran/

[15] Rowena Mason, “Coalition of countries discuss ‘every possible measure’ to pressure Iran into reopening Strait of Hormuz,” The Guardian, April 2, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/apr/02/coalition-countries-ships-strait-of-hormuz-yvette-cooper.

[16] Elysee, France, Joint statement by President Macron and Prime Minister Starmer, co-chairs of the international summit on the Strait of Hormuz, April 17, 2026, https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2026/04/17/joint-statement-by-president-macron-and-prime-minister-starmer-co-chairs-of-the-international-summit-on-the-strait-of-hormuz.

[17] Nette Nöstlinger, “Germany to Trump: We won’t help you reopen the Strait of Hormuz,” Politico Europe, April 16, 2026, https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-to-trump-this-not-nato-war-strait-hormuz-iran/.

[18] Nicholas Vinocur and Sebastian Starcevic, “Top EU diplomat to Trump: Europe exploring ways to secure Strait of Hormuz,” Politico Europe, April 28, 2026, https://www.politico.eu/article/kaja-kallas-donald-trump-europe-strait-of-hormuz-war/.

[19] Ilayada Cakirtekin, “France rejects US criticism over Iran, says ‘it is not our operation,’” Anadolu Agency, April 2, 2026, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/france-rejects-us-criticism-over-iran-says-it-is-not-our-operation/3889278.

[20] Associated Press, “Why France is bolstering military presence in the Middle East, as Macron prepares for postwar talks,” Arab News, March 16, 2026, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2636549/world.

[21] “France deploys fighter jets over UAE to protect its military bases,” France 24, March 3, 2026, https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20260303-france-deploys-fighter-jets-over-uae-to-protect-its-military-bases.

[22] GOV.UK, PM statement on Iran: 1 March 2026, Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s statement on Iran, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-on-iran-1-march-2026

[23] Athena Stavrou and Alex Croft, “Trump tells ‘useless’ NATO to stay away after UK and France vow to protect Strait of Hormuz shipping,” The Independent, April 17, 2026, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/starmer-macron-strait-of-hormuz-iran-war-trump-b2959902.html.

[24] Emmy Sasipornkarn, “Rutte dismisses speculation about US leaving NATO,” Deutsche Welle, April 18, 2026, https://www.dw.com/en/rutte-dismisses-speculation-about-us-leaving-nato/a-76841349.

[25] United States defense market size & share analysis, Mordor Intelligence, 2026, https://www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/united-states-defense-market.

[26] Dalibor Rohac, “Ukraine Can Teach the US About the Future of Warfare,” American Enterprise Institute, March 27, 2026, https://www.aei.org/op-eds/ukraine-can-teach-the-us-about-the-future-of-warfare/.

[27] Gram Slattery and Humeyra Pamuk, “US to delay weapons deliveries to some European countries due to Iran war, sources say,” Reuters, April 16, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-officials-tell-european-countries-expect-weapons-delivery-delays-sources-say-2026-04-16/.

[28] Costas Pitas, “Two-thirds of Americans want quick end to Iran war even if goals unachieved, Reuters/Ipsos poll finds,” Reuters, March 31, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/two-thirds-americans-want-quick-end-iran-war-even-if-goals-unachieved-2026-03-31/.

[29] “Poll shows most Americans feel war against Iran has gone too far,” PBS NewsHour, March 25, 2026, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/poll-shows-most-americans-feel-war-against-iran-has-gone-too-far

[30] Roger Pielke Jr., “The economic costs of the Iran war,” American Enterprise Institute, April 2, 2026, https://www.aei.org/articles/the-economic-costs-of-the-iran-war/.

[31] Iran war cost tracker: Live estimate of U.S. taxpayer spending. (n.d.), https://iran-cost-ticker.com/.

[32] Steven Shepard and Andrew Daniller, “Americans broadly disapprove of U.S. military action in Iran,” Pew Research Center, March 25, 2026, https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2026/03/25/americans-broadly-disapprove-of-u-s-military-action-in-iran/.

[33] Neil MacFarquhar, “Why Iran’s ‘mosquito fleet’ remains a potent threat in the Strait of Hormuz,” The New York Times, April 18, 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/18/world/middleeast/iran-irgc-navy-strait-of-hormuz.html.

[34] “U.S. can only confirm about a third of Iran’s missile arsenal destroyed, sources say,” Reuters, March 27, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-can-only-confirm-about-third-irans-missile-arsenal-destroyed-sources-say-2026-03-27/

[35] Eliza Gkritsi, “EU reaction to Iran–US–Israel crisis exposes divisions in Brussels,” Politico, March 1, 2026, https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-react-iran-us-israel-crisis/.

[36] Shweta Jain and Aarti Nagraj, “War pushes Iran’s fragile economy closer to its limits,” The National, April 21, 2026, https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/economy/2026/04/21/iran-us-war/.

[37] “EU urges reopening of Strait of Hormuz, calls for de-escalation and diplomatic solution,” Emirates News Agency (WAM), May 12, 2026, https://www.wam.ae/en/article/177tzlb-urges-reopening-strait-hormuz-calls-for

[38] Council of the European Union, Foreign Affairs Council, 11 May 2026, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2026/05/11/.

[39] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO deepens security cooperation with Gulf countries through the launch of flagship projects,” July 10, 2026, https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2026/07/10/nato-deepens-security-cooperation-with-gulf-countries-through-the-launch-of-flagship-projects.

[40] Ibid.

[41] “European Parliament adopts resolution condemning deterioration of human rights conditions in Iran,” Emirates News Agency (WAM), May 21, 2026, https://www.wam.ae/en/article/178ff6j-european-parliament-adopts-resolution-condemning.

[42] The Financial Express, It’s not our war’: Norway PM warns Middle East conflict impacting Europe [Video]. YouTube, March 15, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mEvVOe6e-lI.

[43] Jennifer Rankin, “Von der Leyen calls for EU foreign policy to be ‘more realistic and interest-driven,’” The Guardian, March 9, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/09/ursula-von-der-leyen-eu-foreign-policy-more-realistic-interest-driven