Is Hormuz Expendable? The Future of Global Energy Security

On September 4, 2026, TRENDS US hosted its seventh strategy session titled “Is Hormuz Expendable? The Future of Global Energy Security.” The session examined whether the Strait of Hormuz can be bypassed, whether the current crisis marks a new normal for global energy security, and how Gulf producers, consumers, and outside powers are adapting.

The panel featured Laury Haytayan, Middle East and North Africa Director at the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI); and Jessica Obeid,  Founding Partner of New Energy Consult. The conversation was moderated by Bilal Y. Saab, Senior Managing Director of TRENDS US.

Key Insights and Recommendations 

• The discussion opened with a warning against accepting the disruption of Hormuz as a permanent condition. Before the crisis, global energy markets operated on the assumption that oil and gas would continue to move through the strait despite periodic tensions. That assumption has now been shattered. Yet both speakers argued that the objective should remain a return to free, predictable, and reliable passage. Normalizing selective access, Iranian control, fees, or preferential treatment for certain ships would set a dangerous precedent for other chokepoints around the world.
• Hormuz is an international passage and should not be treated as a bargaining chip. Even temporary workarounds—military escorts, altered shipping patterns, ship-to-ship transfers, or vessels going dark—should not be mistaken for normalcy. One speaker reinforced that point, stressing that replacing Hormuz is not simply a matter of rerouting oil. The strait carries oil, LNG, ammonia, urea, helium, and other commodities essential to energy, food security, technology, and the wider global economy.
• The speakers agreed that Gulf states underinvested in redundancy not because they ignored the risk, but because massive alternative infrastructure was not commercially viable before the crisis. True redundancy requires more than pipelines; it requires storage, terminals, ports, insurance arrangements, and market confidence. Building these systems costs tens of billions of dollars and takes years. The crisis has changed the calculus by making redundancy a matter of national security, economic security, and regime stability—not merely commercial optimization.
• Saudi Arabia and the UAE are best positioned to mitigate disruption. Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline can move crude from the Gulf side to the Red Sea, while the UAE has invested heavily in Fujairah as a bypass outlet and is expanding pipeline capacity. These measures helped prevent oil prices from reaching the extreme levels some feared. Still, they cover only part of pre-crisis flows and shift risk rather than eliminate it. Saudi exports through the Red Sea, for example, increase exposure to Bab el-Mandeb and Houthi-related risks.
• Other producers face sharper constraints. Iraq lacks sufficient alternatives to Hormuz and has explored options through Turkey, Syria, Jordan, and the Mediterranean, including trucking and potential pipeline routes. Kuwait has almost no practical bypass and has faced storage and production pressures. Qatar is especially exposed because LNG has no easy pipeline substitute. For Doha, maintaining open access through Hormuz is existential because LNG is at the core of its economy.
• LNG represents the hardest problem. Unlike crude oil, LNG cannot easily be rerouted through spare pipeline capacity. Qatar may respond by investing more aggressively in overseas LNG projects, storage options, and geographically diversified production assets in the United States, Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean, or Asia. But these are long-term hedges, not immediate substitutes for secure passage through Hormuz.
• The crisis has also highlighted the role of consumers in absorbing shocks. Strategic reserves, US shale, diversified imports, and lower demand all helped prevent a deeper global energy crisis. China was especially important. It imported less, drew on large storage capacity, accelerated clean energy deployment, and benefited from electrified transport. These measures reduced the impact of the Hormuz disruption and showed how demand-side resilience can be as important as supply-side redundancy.
• The Eastern Mediterranean could gain strategic relevance as Gulf producers and consumers look for alternatives. Syria may benefit from renewed interest in routes linking Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean, especially through Basra-to-Banias concepts or other regional corridors. Cyprus may also benefit as LNG and gas projects in the Eastern Mediterranean receive renewed attention. These opportunities, however, depend on political stability, investment, infrastructure, and sustained interest beyond the current emergency.
• Lebanon was described as a missed opportunity. Rather than proactively positioning itself as part of a regional gas and infrastructure solution, Beirut remains passive and reactive. The session suggested that Lebanon could pitch itself as a complementary hub for processing, LNG infrastructure, or future discoveries, potentially offering an alternative to overreliance on Egyptian export infrastructure. But that would require bold diplomacy, serious governance, and credible engagement with US and international energy companies.
• The crisis strengthens the case for clean energy because renewables are domestic, reduce exposure to chokepoints, and enhance energy security. Yet the transition will not be easy. Clean energy infrastructure is capital-intensive, and many developing countries face higher borrowing costs, inflation, weaker purchasing power, and reduced access to financing. Gulf states may continue investing, but non-exporting countries such as Lebanon and Jordan may struggle to attract the funds needed for large-scale projects.
• Even so, the broader direction is clear. Energy security planning will increasingly emphasize resilience, storage, electrification, efficiency, and demand management. The crisis may accelerate a structural shift away from fossil fuel dependence, especially among importers who do not want to remain vulnerable to disruptions caused by conflicts in the Gulf, Ukraine, or elsewhere. Europe’s post-2022 experience shows that sustained demand reduction and renewables growth can reshape energy systems over time.
• The crisis is inseparable from wider US-Iran tensions and the unresolved nuclear issue. Hormuz has become a focal point of a broader confrontation, making practical solutions harder. China and Russia have incentives to discourage escalation, not because they support US primacy, but because prolonged disruption harms their own economic and strategic interests. China, in particular, appears to have played a stabilizing role by managing imports, using reserves, and signaling concern over any attempt to permanently alter the rules of passage.
• The session closed with a strong normative point: closing straits and attacking energy infrastructure should be treated as unacceptable. The crisis has shown that energy infrastructure—pipelines, terminals, refineries, power plants, and maritime chokepoints—is not merely national property; it is part of the architecture of the global economy. Protecting it requires more than military deterrence. It requires diplomacy, investment, legal norms, and a shared international refusal to reward coercion.
• Hormuz is not expendable. Alternatives can reduce exposure, buy time, and strengthen bargaining positions, but they cannot fully replace the strait’s role in global energy, trade, and security. The most important lesson of the crisis is that energy resilience must be built on multiple pillars: open sea lanes, redundant infrastructure, strategic reserves, clean energy, demand management, and stronger international norms against coercion. The world can adapt to higher risk, but it should not accept the weaponization of chokepoints as the new normal.