{"id":4020,"date":"2025-05-15T10:20:42","date_gmt":"2025-05-15T10:20:42","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/trendsresearch.org\/trendsusa\/?p=4020"},"modified":"2025-05-15T22:09:44","modified_gmt":"2025-05-15T22:09:44","slug":"us-strategy-options-for-iran","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/trendsgroup.org\/trendsusa\/us-strategy-options-for-iran\/","title":{"rendered":"US Strategy Options for Iran"},"content":{"rendered":"<p class=\"p1\">On 7 March 2025, TRENDS US, the Washington, DC office of TRENDS Research &amp; Advisory,\u00a0held its first Strategy Session, entitled US Strategy Options for Iran. The session, which is the\u00a0first of a new series for TRENDS US, analyzed Iran\u2019s changing strategic position in the Middle\u00a0East and explored US strategy options under the Trump administration.<\/p>\n<p class=\"p1\">Guest speakers Kenneth Pollack, Vice President for Policy at the Middle East Institute, and Karim Sadjadpour, Senior Fellow with Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,\u00a0addressed the issue of Iran\u2019s relative weakness in the region, Tehran\u2019s potential calculations,\u00a0Trump\u2019s likely approach vis-\u00e0-vis Tehran, and Israel\u2019s possible courses of action. Held under the\u00a0Chatham House rule, this exclusive event brought together top experts on the Middle East\u00a0from academia, the think tank community, the private sector, and the US government.<\/p>\n<p class=\"p1\"><strong>Key Insights and Recommendations<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li class=\"p1\">Participants engaged in a spirited discussion about whether Iran is able to rebuild the\u00a0regional militia network it so painstakingly built over decades. There was some agreement\u00a0that while that task would be incredibly difficult given the military defeats of Hezbollah\u00a0and Hamas following the war with Israel and the collapse of the Syrian regime, it wasn\u2019t unthinkable. Iran adopts a \u201cvulture doctrine,\u201d as one participant described it, always preying on the political fragilities and sectarian divisions of its Arab neighbors. So long as those exist\u00a0and Iran can exploit them, Tehran has a shot at rebounding regionally, even if this time\u00a0around, it will take longer.<\/li>\n<li class=\"p1\">One participant mentioned that while Tehran is often able to exercise pragmatism, it\u00a0is committed to certain principles that are non-negotiable: death to America, death to\u00a0Israel, and the mandatory hijab for Iranian women. It is unclear if there is a real debate\u00a0today inside the regime on whether significant adjustments in foreign policy should be\u00a0made. Several participants agreed that there are limits to Iranian rapprochement with\u00a0the United States due to ideology and raison d\u2019\u00eatre.<\/li>\n<li class=\"p1\">How the Trump administration might approach the Iran policy issue was a topic of intense debate among the participants. One participant surmised that the Trump\u00a0administration might adopt a gradual approach of pressure against Iran, dialing up or\u00a0down depending on the Iranian response. The goal, and priority, of US President Donald\u00a0Trump is to negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran, as mentioned by one participant. The\u00a0other elements of the Iran policy issue\u2014the regional militia network and the missile\u00a0arsenal\u2014have reduced strategic significance for Trump, according to one participant.<\/li>\n<li class=\"p1\">Trump\u2019s warmer personal relationships with several Gulf Arab leaders, along with his\u00a0penchant for big deals in foreign policy, should, in theory, serve US-GCC relations.\u00a0The key, as one of the participants said, is to find areas of common ground, issue a\u00a0strategic dialogue (or dialogues with individual GCC countries), and devise strategies\u00a0that promote collective interests.<\/li>\n<li class=\"p1\">A participant suggested that Washington should first seek to better understand its\u00a0Gulf Arab partners\u2019 strategic positions, preferences, and concerns. Not all of them\u00a0will be met, of course, but core ones, once identified, should be considered to avoid\u00a0disappointments and frustrations, as experienced in the lead-up to the signing of the Iran nuclear deal in 2015.<\/li>\n<li class=\"p1\">All participants agreed that Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar have no interest in seeking any confrontation with Iran. The opportunity to further weaken Iran exists,\u00a0and they can see it, but they won\u2019t take the lead. They never have and probably never will.<\/li>\n<li class=\"p1\">The days of lobbying Washington for a more aggressive approach toward Iran\u2014especially on the issue of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps\u2019 sponsorship of political violence\u00a0across the region\u2014are over for the foreseeable future, a participant said. Riyadh, Abu\u00a0Dhabi, and others have chosen the path of accommodation and normalization with\u00a0Tehran so they can focus on their top priority: economic development. They want a\u00a0calm and stable region that can attract the foreign direct investment they need to fulfill\u00a0the goals they laid out in their long-term economic visions.<\/li>\n<li class=\"p1\">As a participant cautioned, none of this suggests that the Arab partners suddenly trust\u00a0Iran or do not worry about their security. But it means that whatever opportunity Iran\u2019s\u00a0current relative weakness presents, the Arab partners have a ceiling in terms of security cooperation with Washington and Israel.\u00a0\u2022 Trump seems to have prioritized the issue of reaching a nuclear settlement with Iran, but\u00a0this doesn\u2019t mean that he will ignore its destabilizing activities in the region, according\u00a0to one participant. In his first term, he ordered the killing of Quds Force commander\u00a0Qasem Soleimani in January 2020. It was a debilitating blow to Iran\u2019s military power in\u00a0the region. Soleimani was the glue that kept Tehran\u2019s regional network together, and\u00a0the Iranians have had a very hard time finding a capable replacement. Trump might\u00a0view such aggressive US tactics against Iran as a means to compel Tehran to make\u00a0concessions on its nuclear program.<\/li>\n<li class=\"p1\">But beyond the general dispositions of Trump and the Arab partners, there is no question that there is plenty of room for further security cooperation, all participants affirmed.\u00a0Indeed, there is no philosophical clash or major disagreement on Iran between the two\u00a0sides. Each will pursue its national interest, as always, but it would be foolish not to\u00a0take advantage of this historic moment in the region\u2014one where Iran is not on the\u00a0ascendancy and wreaking havoc across the region but on the decline.<\/li>\n<li class=\"p1\">The ultimate form of security cooperation is a scenario whereby President Trump\u00a0extends a formal defense pact to Saudi Arabia\u2014and possibly other Arab partners\u2014either as a result of a bilateral negotiation or a multilateral one that includes Israel (the\u00a0US idea presented so far is that a Saudi-Israeli normalization would earn the Palestinians\u00a0a path toward an independent state and the Saudis a formal defense guarantee from\u00a0Washington).<\/li>\n<li class=\"p1\">Should that come to pass, it could considerably influence how Saudi Arabia (and again, possibly others) decides to treat its cooperation with the United States on regional\u00a0security. With a robust US defense pact, Riyadh could accept greater risk than before,\u00a0knowing that if a conflict with Iran erupts or if Iran attacks the kingdom again as it did in\u00a0September 2019, the United States will be legally obligated to intervene militarily on its\u00a0behalf. Under such a framework and the US security umbrella, various forms of security\u00a0cooperation between the two countries could be entertained and instituted, especially\u00a0on integrated air and missile defense, which could benefit the whole region.<\/li>\n<li class=\"p1\">Trump will ask for the Gulf Arab states\u2019 cooperation on post-conflict reconstruction in Gaza and Lebanon and on regional security should a contingency with Iran arise, similar\u00a0to what happened last year when Iran and Israel traded direct blows twice. The Gulf\u00a0Arab partners may oblige, but only if the US plan(s) serve their interests and long-term\u00a0visions for their economies and societies.<\/li>\n<li class=\"p1\">Some of the black swans, or unexpected scenarios, that were discussed during the meeting and could have a dramatic effect on US policy included Iran racing\u00a0to the bomb and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei dying, either of which\u00a0could lead to an Israeli military strike against Iran\u2019s nuclear infrastructure. One\u00a0participant mentioned that the chances of an Israeli attack against Iranian nuclear\u00a0facilities are higher than ever but still low. How, and how quickly, the Trump\u00a0administration approaches the Iran issue will have direct implications for how\u00a0Israel acts vis-\u00e0-vis Iran.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>On 7 March 2025, TRENDS US, the Washington, DC office of TRENDS Research &amp; Advisory,\u00a0held its first Strategy Session, entitled US Strategy Options for Iran. The session, which is the\u00a0first of a new series for TRENDS US, analyzed Iran\u2019s changing strategic position in the Middle\u00a0East and explored US strategy options under the Trump administration. Guest [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":4021,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[6],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4020","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-news"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/trendsgroup.org\/trendsusa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4020","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/trendsgroup.org\/trendsusa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/trendsgroup.org\/trendsusa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trendsgroup.org\/trendsusa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trendsgroup.org\/trendsusa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4020"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/trendsgroup.org\/trendsusa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4020\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4128,"href":"https:\/\/trendsgroup.org\/trendsusa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4020\/revisions\/4128"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trendsgroup.org\/trendsusa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/4021"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/trendsgroup.org\/trendsusa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4020"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trendsgroup.org\/trendsusa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4020"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trendsgroup.org\/trendsusa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4020"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}